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The energy sector in the developing world is expected to account for 27% of global 
emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel combustion in 2035 – in 1990 it 
accounted for 7%.  The increase is concentrated in rapidly growing countries in Asia that 
depend on coal for power generation.  Maximizing electricity generation using 
renewable technologies in these countries provides an obvious approach to slowing 
global emissions growth.   
A barrier to increased use of renewable generation is cost: financial incentives could 
help to increase its use in developing countries.  The principal objective of this research 
is to examine the practicability and potential scale of an offset scheme aimed at 
providing this incentive. 
Offset schemes have a poor reputation due to problems experienced with the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).  I identify the CDM’s failure to ensure the additionality 
of projects as a key issue and propose an approach to the assessment of additionality 
specific to grid connected generation projects.  I present case studies of wind and small 
hydro projects in China and India in which I calculate the marginal abatement cost of 
emissions cuts and use the new approach to additionality to draw conclusions regarding 
the eligibility of projects to receive offsets in some hypothetical future scheme.  My 
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analysis shows that the proposed approach offers advantages over methodologies 
permitted by the CDM. 
I analyze the supply and demand for credits from existing schemes during 2013-2020 
and show that oversupply will continue to impact their price, removing any incentive for 
investment in renewable generation.  Using an original approach based on IEA forecasts 
for the energy sector, I estimate the maximum availability of offsets from a post-2020 
scheme based on renewable generation, and assess the potential global demand. 
I conclude that a scheme of the type considered would be feasible; that the proposed 
approach to determination of additionality could ensure its environmental integrity; 
that the supply of offsets could be managed to maintain the level of incentive for 
investment in renewables; and that a scheme of this nature would make a significant 
contribution to financing emission cuts in the developing world.   
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The process of international negotiations and action against climate change that began 
at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 crashed and burned at Copenhagen in 2009.  Most delegates at 
Copenhagen believed that their role was to agree on the next stage of an ongoing 
process, following a roadmap agreed at Bali in 2007.  Instead, the communiqué issued at 
the end of the conference was dictated by a few countries that did not want to follow 
the Bali roadmap and grudgingly accepted by the others.  It mentioned some ideas that 
came out of Bali – such as NAMAs and New Market Mechanisms (these terms are 
explained in section 2.5 – a list of acronyms and abbreviations can be found following 
the Appendix, at the end of this document).  However the Copenhagen accord 
abandoned all pretence that the international community was following a clear 
timetable for the implementation of the Bali proposals.   
The two years after Copenhagen, marked by the conferences at Cancún and Durban, 
saw strenuous efforts to get the negotiation process moving forward again.  The 
outcome was an agreement reached at Durban to complete negotiations by 2015 on 
actions to be implemented by 2020.  Agreement on a timetable is clearly a hopeful 
development - it might seem unconstructive to point out that the Bali roadmap created 
a similar negotiating process and a deadline for agreement – at Copenhagen in 2009.   
Arguably the signs look better this time around, but some observers believe that the 
framework of global negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations Framework 
Agreement on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has run its course.  A recent book by David 
Victor argues that the time has come to jettison the global approach altogether: 
progress on cutting emissions would be faster in a context of negotiations between 
small groups of countries with interests that complement each other (Victor, 2011). 
It is at least questionable whether the approach based on global negotiations and global 
implementation of agreed solutions can be revived.  However a more optimistic view of 
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the Durban resolutions is that they accept that a solution to the climate change problem 
could evolve outside the UNFCCC process – the conference discussed a proposal to 
create a framework that would enable countries to design and implement their own 
approaches under decentralized governance.  Greater acceptance of flexibility may 
prove to be the most important outcome of Durban.  The overall objective of this 
dissertation is to contribute to discussion of how that flexibility should be used. 
1.1: PRIORITIES FOR ACTION 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) include methane and various others in addition to CO₂: in 
2004 about 77% of GHG emissions in terms of CO₂ equivalent – usually abbreviated to 
CO₂e1 - were CO₂.  Of the total volume of CO₂ emissions in 2009, about 91% were due to 
the combustion of fossil fuels and to cement production – the remaining 9% arose from 
the net impact of changed land use practices, forest clearing and forest growth 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2010).  Coal consumed in power stations accounted for about 30% 
of that 91% - up from 24% in 1990 and expected2 to grow to 31% by 2020 (IEA, 2011).   
Table 1.1 shows that the increase in global CO₂ emissions has occurred entirely in the 
developing countries and is concentrated in two sectors – energy and transport.  By 
2035, emissions by the energy sector in the developing world will account for 27% of all 
CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion – in 1990 they accounted for 7%.  This is the 
                                                     
1 CO₂ equivalent: the quantity of CO₂ that would have the same impact on climate as the 
quantity of the gas in question (during the 100 years after emission). 
2 The IEA’s annual World Energy Outlook includes forecasts for the global energy sector based 
on a number of scenarios.  These change from time to time, but the current version of the 
document (IEA, 2011) employs three: the Current Policies scenario assumes no change in the 
energy-related policies adopted by governments as of mid-2011; the New Policies scenario 
incorporates broad policy commitments that have been announced but not yet implemented; 
and the 450 scenario adds policy measures that, in the opinion of the IEA economists, would 
allow a 50% probability of limiting temperature increases due to global warming to 2°C.  All IEA 
forecasts quoted in this research relate to the New Policies scenario unless stated otherwise. 
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largest share of any emissions category in table 1.1 (below) and the growth of 537% 
over the period is the highest growth rate of any sector.   
Table 1.1: CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2035 
(a) % of global total 
 Devcos Non-Devcos World 
Energy 27.0% 13.6% 40.6% 
Transport 10.8% 12.7% 23.5% 
International Bunkers   3.8% 
Other 21.3% 10.8% 32.1% 
Total 59.1% 37.1% 100% 
(b) Growth 1990-2035 
 Devcos Non-Devcos World 
Energy 537% (17%) 97% 
Transport 432% 26% 94% 
International Bunkers   127% 
Other 165% (29%) 38% 
Total 313% (11%) 74% 
Notes:  Devcos means developing countries; source of all data is (IEA, 2011), based on 
the IEA’s New Policies scenario; totals may not add due to rounding. 
Breaking the category down further, a few rapidly growing countries in Asia show an 
even faster growth rate of energy sector emissions.  Countries such as China and India 
are not only experiencing rapid economic growth - they are also dependent on coal for 
power generation.  During the period from 1990-2035, forecast emissions from coal 
fired power stations in China will increase by 740%: in India the expected increase is 
600%; and corresponding emissions in the US will fall by 10% (IEA, 2011).  Several other 
developing countries - South Africa and Indonesia, for example – also have high rates of 
economic growth and high dependence on coal for power generation.   
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In terms of climate change mitigation, coal fired electricity generation in the developing 
countries is the elephant in the room: it is getting increasingly difficult to ignore (though 
climate change negotiators up to and including Kyoto managed to ignore it).  This 
research focuses on the scope for reducing emissions from coal fired generation in a 
small number of fast developing countries. 
The economic achievements of India and China in recent years make it easy to forget 
that they are poor by world standards.  They both give very high priority to economic 
development – particularly industrial development - and any realistic model of industrial 
development implies growth of electricity use.  During 1990-2009, electricity generation 
increased by a factor of more than five in China and more than three in India: the 
increase in China was equal to total generation in the EU in 2009 (IEA, 2011).   
Both India and China have large indigenous reserves of coal and existing energy policies 
in both countries are essentially based on meeting increases in electricity demand by 
burning more coal.  Even if the effect on global warming is ignored, this policy is likely to 
lead to problems.  Coal fired plants emit damaging pollutants and use large volumes of 
water for cooling - the latter is a particular problem in Northern China.  The economic 
impact of large-scale coal imports raises further issues, at least in India, where domestic 
output seems to have reached a plateau, leaving more expensive imports as the 
country’s marginal energy source.  Chinese mines have so far kept pace with demand, 
though domestic coal production cannot be increased indefinitely and China is no longer 
a major coal exporter. These concerns about the domestic impacts of coal burning 
together with international concerns about climate change create a shared interest in 
increasing investment in low carbon generation. 
Potentially, this could be achieved by means of technological fixes such as nuclear 
power or “clean coal” – efficient coal fired generation with carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS).  Another possibility is natural gas, which emits half the CO₂ of coal 
per unit of electricity generated.  In section 4.2.1 I discuss the possibility of either 
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nuclear power or unconventional gas as solutions to Chinese and Indian emissions 
problems.  I conclude that these are long term prospects, at best: in the short term, the 
best option for cutting emissions from power generation seems to be renewable energy. 
At this point the problem becomes one of cost: the conventional wisdom holds that 
electricity from renewables is more expensive than electricity from coal, and developing 
countries are less able to pay.  Its costs are also heavily front end loaded - in India in 
2009, the initial investment cost per MW of wind generation was almost 70% higher 
than the cost of a coal fired power station (figures from generation cost model – see 
Chapter 4).  These economic problems could be alleviated by a scheme or schemes that 
would channel funds to the developing world to incentivize the use of renewable 
generation by covering at least part of the added cost.  In this research I analyze the 
practicability and potential effect of a scheme of this nature. 
1.2: FUNDING PROPOSALS – THE GREEN CARBON FUND AND MARKET BASED MECHANISMS 
The climate change summit at Durban in 2011 agreed to initiate negotiations aimed at 
reaching agreement on further actions by 2015.  The intended agreement will build on 
decisions made at past climate change conferences, which means that some of its key 
components can already be discerned, at least in outline.  In particular, the agreement 
will recognize that the developing countries will take actions to reduce their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions3 and the developed world will partly finance these efforts. 
The proposed financing mechanism is a Green Carbon Fund (GCF) that will have access 
to up to $100bn per year of funding.  Spending on this scale would be decidedly 
ambitious: the closest institutional parallel to the proposed fund is the UN’s Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF), which claims to be the largest provider of grant finance for 
                                                     




environmental projects.  Grant expenditure by the GEF is expected to reach $1bn per 
year during the current round of spending – 1% of the size of the proposed GCF.  
Financing provided through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) amounts to 
about $2.4bn per year (of which only part accrues to the host countries).4  Turning to 
the private sector, $100bn is more than the combined annual capital spending of Exxon, 
Shell, Chevron and BP.  It is hard to believe that any team of investment professionals 
could adequately evaluate spending proposals on this scale.  Realistically, only a small 
part of the proposed funding can take the form of direct grants to fund specific projects 
- which leads to the question of how to utilize the rest of the available funds.   
A clue to the answer is the provision in the Cancún agreement that foresees a significant 
role for new market-based mechanisms (NMMs).  In this context, a NMM would mean 
some variation on an offsets scheme.  An offsets scheme takes advantage of the fact 
that the cost of eliminating a given quantity of greenhouse gas emissions is not the 
same at every location.  If a country – or a firm – has taken on an obligation to make 
cuts but finds that the cost of cutting emissions from its own facilities is high, it can cut 
emissions somewhere else where the cost is low and credit the cut against its own 
obligation.  If the offsets scheme provides for trading of credits, it is possible to simply 
buy the credits corresponding to cuts that have been made by some other party.  A key 
assumption that underlies the offset schemes described in this research is that it is 
cheaper to cut emissions in developing countries than in those with more advanced 
(and slower growing) economies.  This is not always true (see, for example, (Sathaye and 
Phadke, 2006)), but it is normal and, in most cases, realistic to assume that the cuts are 
made in developing countries and the emitters with obligations to cut are located in the 
developed world.   
                                                     
4 Credits issued since 2006, annualized and valued at $15 per ton of CO₂e.  Expected annual 
issuance between 2013 and 2020 by projects currently registered, also valued at $15, would be 
$13.1bn (though the oversupply discussed in Chapter 5 makes $15 seem somewhat optimistic). 
8 
 
The theoretical advantages of market based approaches have been described by 
economists (Coase, 1960; Montgomery W D, 1972).  They also have political advantages: 
David Victor believes that private sector funds for GHG mitigation brought in via an 
offset scheme are likely to be more reliable than government to government funding, 
which he doubts will ever approach the level of $100bn per year proposed at 
Copenhagen.  He sees the fundamental political logic behind the CDM (and, presumably, 
its successors) as moving the cost of resource transfers off government budgets.  He 
believes that private firms have the strongest incentive to make a scheme that offers 
low-cost emission controls actually work, and have the best information on how to cut 
emissions at the least cost.  In future, in Victor’s view, most resources for emission 
controls in developing countries will flow through offset mechanisms (Victor, 2011).   
Offset schemes do not cut emissions: their net effect is to ensure that cuts are made 
where the cost is lowest, thus saving money for their participants.  It follows that, if 
those emissions reductions were going to be made anyway, with or without the scheme, 
the issue of offset credits actually increases global emissions.  There is a net increase 
when the buyer of the credits does not make cuts that would otherwise be required as 
he is able to use the credits for compliance (Fischer, 2005).  To ensure that this does not 
happen, the emissions reductions for which credits are awarded must be additional: this 
means that they would not have happened if the project had not received a subsidy in 
the shape of marketable credits (Fischer, 2005).  Many researchers believe that the 
largest existing GHG offsets scheme – the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) issues 
credits to many projects that are not additional. 
1.3: KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
The research presented in this dissertation is based on two propositions: firstly, that a 
scheme that provided financial incentives for investment in renewable generation in 
developing countries that are currently reliant on coal could make a significant 
contribution to cutting global GHG emissions; and secondly that an offsets scheme could 
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potentially be the most effective approach to providing these incentives.  The two 
principal elements of the research are a “bottom up” analysis of renewable generation 
projects in China and India, aimed at clarifying how they might fit into an incentives 
scheme; and a “top down” study of the potential scale of the scheme.  A subsidiary 
element of the research is a review of criticisms that have been made of the CDM and 
an exploration of a possible approach to assessment of project additionality that would 
be more effective than methods used in assessing CDM projects. 
In sections 1.1 and 1.2 above I identify coal fired electricity generation in a small number 
of rapidly developing countries as one of the largest and fastest growing sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  I find that, in the short term, maximizing the use of 
renewable generation in these countries offers an obvious approach to cutting – or at 
least, sharply reducing the growth rate – of global emissions; and I suggest that a major 
barrier to increased use of renewable generation is the additional cost compared to 
coal.  This cost disadvantage could be mitigated by a scheme designed to incentivize the 
use of renewable generation in the developing world.   
In section 1.2 I point to the advantages – both theoretical and political – of an offset 
scheme as a means of achieving this objective: however offset schemes suffer from a 
reputation problem: the only significant carbon offsets scheme that has been 
implemented to date – the CDM - has been severely criticized.  In Chapter 2 of this 
research I describe the CDM and provide an overview of the institutions – international 
bodies, offset schemes, emission trading schemes and funds – of which it is a part.  In 
Chapter 3 I review criticisms of the CDM by other researchers and outline proposals that 
have been made for changes to the scheme – or its replacement.  In my conclusions to 
Chapter 3 I draw on that analysis to identify conditions that should be met by a 
hypothetical future offset scheme intended to channel funds to the developing world to 
incentivize the use of renewable generation. 
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In Chapter 4 I present case studies of renewable generation projects in China and India 
and analyze empirically the suitability of different types of project for incorporation into 
a hypothetical sector specific offset scheme.  Concluding Chapter 4, I use this analysis to 
add focus to the list of design parameters for a future offset scheme that concludes 
Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 includes details of a proposed methodology for determination of 
additionality that offers advantages in the context of a sector specific scheme focused 
on electricity generation.   
Chapter 5 comprises two separate analyses of the future supply and demand for offsets.  
I look first at the situation during 2013-2020.  During this period, which coincides with 
phase 3 of the EU ETS – the EU’s emissions trading scheme - offset supply and demand 
are likely to be dominated by currently existing schemes.  My analysis quantifies the 
serious oversupply of offsets that is building up as phase 2 of the EU ETS comes to an 
end.  This oversupply is linked to design issues with the CDM but linked also to the lack 
of flexibility of existing schemes when facing a changed economic situation.   
The second part of Chapter 5 presents a completely new analysis of the potential scale 
of a hypothetical offsets scheme that would operate during the period 2021-2035 and 
would cover only projects that substitute electricity generated using renewable 
technologies for electricity generated from coal.  Also in Chapter 5 I present a forecast 
of potential demand for offsets from developed countries during that period.  My supply 
and demand forecasts for 2021-2035 are based on projections of emissions reductions 
and electricity generated by type of technology taken from the IEA’s World Energy 
Outlook (IEA, 2011). I show that an offsets scheme of the type envisaged is feasible and 
that it could be designed and managed to match offset supply to likely demand. 
Chapter 6 presents my overall conclusions.  Chart 1.1 provides an overview of the 
dissertation structure.   
The research presented here appears to be unique in its scope.  The prior research 
reviewed in Chapter 3 points out problems that have been encountered with the CDM 
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and reviews some proposals that have been made for changes to the scheme or for new 
schemes that might replace it.  These proposals are valuable contributions to debate, 
but in no case has an attempt been made at quantification of their impact on either 
emissions or on investment in developing countries.  The combination in this research of 
a bottom up evaluation of actual projects with a top-down analysis of possible future 
schemes does not seem to have been attempted before: it enables me to put forward 
quantified suggestions as to how supply and demand might be managed in a possible 
future offsets scheme.   
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1.4: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
As noted above, my dissertation research focuses on how a hypothetical future offset 
scheme might be designed to channel funds to the developing world to incentivize the 
use of renewable generation.  It asks how such a scheme could avoid the problems 
encountered with the CDM; it examines types of renewable energy project to consider 
how they might fit into such a scheme; and it assesses the scale of the contribution that 
the scheme could make to financing renewable generation in the developing world.   
I conclude that it would be feasible to design such a scheme.  I estimate that it could cut 
GHG emissions by roughly 0.5 bn tons per year.  The offsets generated could amount to 
roughly double what the CDM has provided per year since 1/1/2010 (this is a maximum 
level that is unlikely to be reached).  At an offset price of $20 per ton, the revenue 
generated by the scheme could amount to up to $10bn per year. 
I propose an approach to the assessment of additionality based on comparison of 
generation costs and show that certain types of project that are strongly represented in 
the CDM should not be seen as additional.  An incidental benefit of the proposed 
methodology is to emphasize that additionality should be seen as a dynamic concept – a 
project’s additionality is affected by rapidly varying parameters such as input prices and 
parameters that change more slowly such as the effect of experience of a new 
technology in bringing down costs.  Methodologies used in assessing the additionality of 
CDM projects are essentially static.  In the specific context of grid-connected generation 
projects, the proposed methodology is clearly superior to those currently in use. 
A key conclusion of my research is that it is necessary to manage an offset scheme to 
ensure a reasonable balance of supply and demand and avoid the price collapse 
experienced by the CDM.  I show that this requirement could be incorporated into the 
scheme’s initial design: maintenance of the necessary balance would require periodic 




2: Carbon Finance – the Institutional Architecture 
The Kyoto Protocol, agreed at the Kyoto climate summit in 1997, grew more or less 
logically from a series of conferences that began with negotiation of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed in 1992.  Kyoto created a 
structure of mandates, requirements and flexibility mechanisms that was undoubtedly 
complex but was at least coherent: its elements were designed to work together to 
reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases in the least painful manner.  This rationally 
designed structure began to buckle almost immediately, with the decision of the most 
important participant – the US – not to ratify.  As the rest of the world implemented the 
elements of Kyoto, problems appeared and were dealt with through modifications to 
the original structure.  Chapter 3 provides an analysis of problems encountered with the 
CDM, in particular, due to its importance to the subject matter of this research.  (The 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is described below.  Climate negotiators love 
acronyms – a comprehensive list is provided at the end of the dissertation). 
The period during which ratifying countries are obliged to comply with Kyoto ends in 
December 2012: long before that, successive climate summits were discussing the next 
stage.  Various documents have emerged from this process: road maps; outlines; 
timetables (usually ignored); agreements to agree and so on.  By now – only months 
before the Kyoto period finishes – discussions are continuing within a framework set by 
an agreement to agree by 2015 on a scheme to be implemented in 2020. 
The structure of agreements and proposals described in this dissertation was never 
simple and has long since lost its basic coherence.  It comprises the institutions and 
schemes created by Kyoto (and the conferences that preceded it); the patches that were 
applied as problems appeared; and the proposals that have been made for the future.  
In this Chapter I set out to describe and make sense of that framework, and to 




2.1: THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment 
Program set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – the IPCC.  A 
resolution of the General Assembly of the UN stated that the initial task of the new body 
was “to provide internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, 
timing and potential environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change and 
realistic response strategies”.5   
The IPCC produces periodic Assessment Reports on “the causes, impacts and possible 
responses” to climate change.  The first Assessment Report, published in 1990, was the 
basis for the negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) which was adopted in May 1992 and signed by 154 nations (plus the 
EU) in June 1992, in Rio de Janeiro.  It came into force in March 1994 after receiving the 
required number of ratifications.  Since then, the principal forum for global negotiations 
on climate change has been the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC.   
The third of these conferences (known in the jargon as COP3 – the third conference of 
the parties), held at Kyoto in 1997, adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which came into force 
on February 16, 2005: as of September 2011 it has been ratified by 191 nations plus the 
EU.  Of the original signatories, only the US has failed to ratify.6  The Kyoto Protocol 
commits the developed countries to reduce their emissions of six key greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) by at least 5% from 1990 levels during 2008-2012 - this amounts to a roughly 
20% cut from the expected business as usual level of emissions for that period.7  The 
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 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm (accessed July 18 2012). 
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Andorra and South Sudan. 
7 At least, it did at the time the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.  The sharp reduction in growth due 




reductions are stated as CO₂ equivalent (CO₂e): for example, methane has a CO₂ 
equivalent (or global warming potential) of 25, meaning that the effect on the world’s 
climate of a ton of methane over the first hundred years after it is emitted is the same 
as 25 tons of CO₂.  Not all countries have accepted the same reductions: the EU as a 
group, for example, will reduce its emissions by 8%.   
Annex 1 to the UNFCCC lists the developed countries and countries with economies in 
transition (the latter are mostly ex-communist states) while Annex B to the Kyoto 
Protocol lists the emission reductions agreed to by the developed countries.  
Confusingly, the two lists are not the same: Annex 1 (as amended in 1998) lists 40 
countries plus the EU while Annex B lists 38 countries plus the EU, omitting Turkey and 
Belarus.  The distinction is outdated – at least three non-Annex 1 countries (China, 
Korea and Mexico) intend to set a limit to their GHG emissions in the near future.  
However in this research I will follow common practice and refer to the developed 
countries generally as Annex 1 countries, using the term Annex B for discussion of the 
provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. 
2.2: THE KYOTO FLEXIBILITY MECHANISMS: EMISSIONS TRADING 
The cost per ton of reducing CO₂ emissions is likely to vary from place to place.  The 
three flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol allow cuts to be made where the cost 
is the lowest, thus reducing the aggregate cost of reductions to the Annex B economies.  
The first Kyoto flexibility mechanism is emissions trading: article 17 of the Protocol 
creates a legal framework for countries with obligations to cut GHG emissions to trade 
these obligations among themselves.  The other two are both offset schemes: the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).  An offset scheme is a 
framework for any party with an obligation to cut GHG emissions to fund a project that 




Article 17 envisages trading at several levels.  The Kyoto emissions caps are stated in 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs): countries may trade AAUs; they may also trade Removal 
Units (RMUs) – i.e. quantities of CO₂ removed from the atmosphere by land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities; also Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) and 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which are reductions in GHG emissions achieved 
by JI and CDM activities respectively.  The trading envisaged by Kyoto is between 
countries: the best known emissions trading scheme – the EU ETS – covers trading 
between emitters (primarily commercial firms) and is not strictly speaking a Kyoto 
flexibility mechanism. 
2.2.1: Why emissions trading? 
The rationale for emissions trading is that it enables emissions to be cut where it is 
cheapest to do so.  Scheme participants that are able to reduce their emissions cheaply 
can make reductions over and above their caps and sell the surplus to participants that 
face higher costs: the net effect is to reduce the average cost of emission reductions.  
The intellectual roots of all market based approaches to dealing with the externalities 
inherent in industrial processes can be found in the work of R.H. Coase – see (Coase, 
1960).  During the 1960s and early 1970s several authors analyzed the pros and cons of 
markets in rights to pollute – for example a market in water pollution (biological oxygen 
demand) for the Delaware estuary suggested by Jacoby and Schaumburg.8  The 
economic basis of such schemes was explored by Montgomery (1972), whose key 
conclusion was that “even in quite complex circumstances the market in licenses has an 
equilibrium which achieves externally given standards of environmental quality at least 
cost to the regulated industries” (Montgomery W D, 1972).   
                                                     




A weakness of the cap & trade approach is that, because reductions are made where it 
is cheapest, it is possible that most will occur in a few regions, leaving other regions as 
badly polluted as before.  This is the problem that has effectively sunk the US Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (CAIR) and with it the market in SO₂ emissions initially created by Title IV 
of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  A court held9 that CAIR created a risk that some 
areas of the country could remain heavily polluted while others were cleaned up, and 
that this was inequitable and contravened existing law.  It is ironic that emissions 
trading was included in Kyoto largely at the insistence of the US, which promoted the 
cap & trade approach because of the success of the SO₂ trading scheme.   
The court’s finding was foreshadowed by Montgomery (1972), which considered two 
forms of market: emission licenses, granting the right to emit a pollutant at a given rate, 
and pollution licenses, granting the right to cause a defined level (e.g. ambient 
concentration) of pollution at a given point.  In a system of emission licenses, a market 
transaction that transfers emission rights from one source to another results in changes 
in pollution levels at all monitoring points, because emissions from the two sources 
would typically have different impacts at the various locations.  An increase in pollution 
at a location already badly affected might be seen as inequitable – which is the issue 
that sank CAIR.  Montgomery showed that a system of pollution licenses could ensure 
equity, but each emitter would have to hold a portfolio of permits covering all locations 
affected by its emissions – this would be impossibly complex if the objective were to 
control pollution over a wide area (Montgomery W D, 1972).   
The brief history of CAIR contains two lessons for the carbon markets: the first is that 
the problem of concentration of pollution does not apply to CO₂ emissions, which affect 
the global climate – they have essentially no local pollution impact.  The second lesson is 
                                                     
9 The judgment of the Court is at http://www.epa.gov/cair/pdfs/05-1244-1127017.pdf (accessed 
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that, taking a closer look, it is clear that the SO₂ trading scheme had collapsed before 
the Court voided CAIR.  The price of SO₂ emissions permits, which had peaked at $1,600 
in 2005, had fallen to $3 by the time the Wall Street Journal published the story 
mentioned earlier.  The collapse seems to have been due to over-allocation of permits, 
in part because the financial crisis had cut economic activity, reducing the BAU 
emissions level.  It may also have been partly due to changes in technology as the US 
electricity generation sector switched from coal to natural gas.  Those problems are 
certainly relevant to experience with the CO₂ markets. 
2.2.2: The EU ETS 
To the extent that there is a global price of carbon it is set by the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme (the EU ETS), which in 2010 accounted for 97% of all carbon 
trading globally (World Bank, 2011).  The scheme was set up on October 13, 2003 by the 
EU’s Directive 2003/87/EC and started operating in 2005.  Its first phase, from 2005-
2007, was intended to test the concept and the practicalities of trading mechanisms.  
The emissions cuts targeted in this phase were deliberately unambitious.  The second 
phase was the Kyoto commitment period itself (2008-2012): the overall emissions cap 
for phase 2 was the level agreed by the EU at Kyoto, but individual countries’ 
commitments were redistributed to take account of current circumstances.  For 
example, the situations of the ex-communist EU members had changed radically with 
the fall of communism and the collapse of much of their heavy industry.  With the Kyoto 
compliance period ending in 2012 and no successor in sight, the EU has unilaterally set 
targets for a third phase of the scheme, to run to 2020 and agreed outline arrangements 
for the period beyond 2020.  By the end of phase 3 the EU countries will have reduced 
their emissions by 20% from 1990 levels. 
Emissions caps are implemented by issuing EUAs (EU Allowances): one EUA confers the 
right to emit one ton of CO₂.  For phase 3 this will become one ton of CO₂ equivalent as 




and glyocalic acid and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector).10  EUAs are 
registered securities - initial allocations and changes in ownership are recorded. For 
phase 1, practically all permits were allocated to EU firms for free, as were about 90% of 
permits for phase 2.  In 2013 – the first year of phase 3 - at least 20% will be auctioned: 
this will rise to 70% by 2020 and it is intended that all permits will be auctioned by 
2027.11  The allocation process has evolved: for phase 1 the EU Commission – the 
central bureaucracy of the EU – effectively accepted caps proposed by the member 
states; for phase 2 it questioned and modified national proposals; for the third phase it 
made the allocation itself, based on detailed sectoral benchmarks. 
By the end of April each year, firms that participate in the scheme must post audited 
reports of their emissions during the previous year and produce an equivalent number 
of permits.  The EUA allocation for the current year is distributed in February: current 
year EUAs can be used to meet the previous year’s compliance obligation – this is 
known as borrowing EUAs.  Starting with phase 2, permits may also be banked – a 
surplus of permits may be carried over to succeeding years.  Once delivered for 
compliance, the permits are cancelled and (at least for the Kyoto compliance period), 
information is passed to the UNFCCC, which cancels a corresponding number of AAUs. 
A major change in the scheme is its expansion from January 1 2012 to cover aviation.  
CO₂ emissions from aviation account for about 3% of all EU emissions of GHGs; however 
the impact on global warming is roughly doubled due to the effect of contrails and of 
other gases.12  All flights that arrive at or depart from an airport in the EU will have to 
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produce permits to cover the whole length of the flight – not just the miles flown in EU 
airspace.  It is not clear that the EU has the right under international law to charge non-
EU airlines for miles flown outside EU airspace, however so far, no attempt to raise legal 
obstacles to the proposal has succeeded.  The EU intends to bring emissions from the 
maritime transport sector into the ETS, though neither the method nor the timetable for 
this has been clarified.   
The prices of EUAs have been highly volatile, partly due to the problems that the EU 
experienced in setting appropriate caps.  In the first phase, the EUA price initially rose to 
€32.9 per ton,13 and then collapsed when it became clear that the caps had been set too 
high.  The caps were tightened for the second phase, but the unforeseen fall in EU GDP 
resulting from the financial crisis has reduced actual emissions, so the phase 2 caps are 
again too high.  Cynics suggest that caps have been so consistently loose that the ETS 
has had no effect on European firms’ emissions – this is probably too harsh a view, but 
certainly the EU ETS has yet to be tested under fire. 
2.2.3: Other GHG emissions trading schemes 
The EU ETS is not the only GHG emissions trading scheme operating today, though it is 
by far the largest, accounting for around 97% of all trading of emissions permits and 
offsets in 2010 (World Bank, 2011).  A number of other schemes exist and may grow in 
importance in the future: 
North America: Although there is no near term prospect of a national scheme being 
introduced in the US, two regional schemes are operating: 
 A group of states in the Northeast (initially ten states, but New Jersey has 
withdrawn) have operated the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) – see 
                                                     




http://www.rggi.org/ - since January 1, 2009.  The scheme applies to CO₂ emissions 
from the power sector only. 
The RGGI has suffered since its inception from serious over allocation, primarily 
because caps are based on 2002-2004 emissions: since that period a significant 
proportion of US generation has switched from coal to natural gas, and nuclear and 
renewables have made inroads.  There are no plans to change the approach.  
Auctions are held quarterly but are something of a formality as the clearing price 
throughout the last two years has been equal to the floor price set by the scheme 
(currently $1.93 per ton of CO₂: the most recent auction was on June 6, 2012).   
Offsets generated by projects in a few selected sectors, located in the RGGI states 
themselves, are eligible for compliance subject to a ceiling of 3.3% of the total 
compliance requirement. 
 The second North American regional scheme – the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 
– see http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org - will operate from January 1 2013.  
Member states will set up independent cap & trade schemes following a common 
set of standards.  Several of the original members have withdrawn - currently it 
looks as if the scheme will commence operations with only California and four 
Canadian provinces – British Columbia, Ontario, Manitoba and Quebec.  California 
and Quebec will participate from the start, with the other provinces joining later.   
Carbon leakage (i.e. the replacement of power generated within the state by power 
imported from a state that is not a participant in the scheme) is a major concern for 
both California and the RGGI states.  It is less of an issue for Quebec, which is a 
major generator of hydro power.  California includes emissions originating from 
imported power in its scheme – this might create problems if the courts interpret 




New Zealand: Until July 1 2012, when the Australian scheme came into force, the New 
Zealand ETS14 was the only national level mandatory scheme outside the EU.  In its 
current form it has effectively been operational for the forestry sector since 2008, with 
transport, power generation and most industrial processes included since 2010 and 
other sectors being brought into the scheme later.  The scheme does not impose an 
absolute cap on emissions: instead, units (called NZUs) are issued free to most sectors 
on an intensity basis – i.e. a set number of NZUs per unit of sector output based on an 
assumed level of emissions intensity.  The allocation rate will reduce over time, starting 
in 2013.  Scheme participants with emissions in excess of their free allocations must 
purchase additional units – either NZUs, which will be sold by the government, initially 
at a fixed price of NZ$12.50 per ton of emissions, or Kyoto Credits (CERs or ERUs).  The 
fixed price for additional NZUs was intended to set a cap on prices, however the recent 
fall in the price of CERs means that, above the free allocation limit, it is now cheaper to 
rely on Kyoto units, which are accepted subject to the same restriction on industrial gas 
projects as the EU ETS.  Unlike the EU ETS, the New Zealand scheme accepts RMUs. 
The scheme has a strong focus on forestry.  Owners of forests planted since 1989 
receive NZUs for the increase in carbon sequestered in their forests but must produce 
NZUs when sequestered carbon is reduced by harvesting.  There is a simpler scheme for 
owners of pre-1990 forest land.  When agriculture is brought into the scheme in 2015 it 
will be the only scheme in the world that covers the agricultural sector.  
Australia: A bill passed by the Australian Senate15 in November 2011 paved the way for 
carbon pricing, with 500 of the country’s largest emitters required to present permits 
for their emissions from July 2012.  Initial allocations to some sectors will be free, with 
others obliged to purchase units at a price that is initially fixed at A$23 (US$24) per ton 
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of CO₂e (effectively a carbon tax), and will escalate at 2.5% per year.  In 2015 the 
scheme will transition to cap & trade, operating on a market basis with controls on 
prices that will be removed in 2018.  The extent of reductions targeted by the scheme 
will depend on the degree of effort made by other countries, with an unconditional 
commitment to at least 5% below 2000 levels by 2020.  Two existing Australian carbon 
trading schemes – in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory – were 
terminated as of July 2012 when national carbon pricing took effect (the New South 
Wales scheme had the distinction of being the world’s first CO₂ cap & trade scheme). 
Switzerland: Switzerland operates a semi-voluntary carbon trading scheme (firms may 
participate as an alternative to paying a carbon tax).  The Swiss government is 
considering making the scheme mandatory and negotiations to link the Swiss and the 
EU schemes have been ongoing since 2010 – a recent government announcement 
indicated that this could happen from 2014.  
Japan: Japan has several voluntary schemes in operation: the most important are the 
Japan Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS), which sets absolute caps on CO₂ 
emissions; a scheme set up by the Keidanren (organization of the major Japanese 
industries), which sets intensity targets and tends to attract high emitters as voluntary 
participants (Kimura and Tuerk, 2008); and a scheme covering the Tokyo metropolitan 
area.  The Japanese government seems to have abandoned plans to introduce a 
mandatory national emissions trading scheme, partly due to the disruption to its energy 
markets following the Fukushima nuclear disaster.  Reports in Australian newspapers 
during February 2012 cited comments by Japanese diplomats that carbon pricing could 
not be considered in current circumstances.  A press report dated June 1 201216 quoting 
Deputy Prime Minister Katsuya Okada stated that Japan may set new emissions targets 
– officially it intends to cut emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020. 
                                                     




The voluntary markets: Voluntary markets are a small but important component of the 
overall carbon market.  Their primary role is to provide a market in which individuals 
and organizations can offset their personal carbon footprint – mostly via schemes such 
as those run by airlines (“check this box if you are a good citizen and want to offset the 
emissions caused by your flight!”)   
In 2011 the voluntary markets saw a record transaction volume of $569m, though this 
was still no more than 0.3% of the global carbon market.  Reports indicate this includes 
some so-called “pre-compliance” buying by organizations interested in the WCI cap and 
trade scheme that is now due to start operating in 2013.  Pre-compliance buying 
accounts for large purchases of forestry-related offsets that are not eligible for the EU 
ETS but will be accepted in the WCI (World Bank, 2012).   
The voluntary markets have encouraged the creation of a small parallel universe of 
organizations that assess and certify offset projects – essentially doing the same job as 
the CDM Executive Board but (they would argue) with greater flexibility and less 
bureaucracy.  The largest of these in volume terms is the US-based Verified Carbon 
Standard (VCS) – http://www.v-c-s.org/.  The Gold Standard seal of approval, which can 
also be granted to a CDM project (http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/), provides 
additional assurance, particularly for buyers motivated by the contribution their 
purchase makes to sustainable development.  Gold Standard projects seem to enjoy a 
price premium over others (World Bank, 2012).  A voluntary cap & trade scheme run by 
the Chicago Climate Exchange folded during 2010, partly due to serious over-allocation 
that had cut prices to a few cents per ton (World Bank, 2011) – essentially all voluntary 
market transactions are now over the counter.  
2.2.4: Carbon trading in non-Annex 1 countries 
A few non-Annex 1 countries plan to introduce emissions trading schemes.  Korea is 




New Zealand) to introduce carbon trading.  A bill mandating the creation of a Korean 
ETS passed its final legislative hurdles In May 2012: trading will start in 2015.  In Mexico, 
the legislature passed a climate change law in April 2012 that sets legally binding (and 
notably ambitious) targets for emissions reductions and encourages the setting up of a 
national cap & trade scheme (apparently compliance would initially be voluntary).  
Brazil has stated an intention to introduce carbon trading: the state of Rio de Janeiro is 
setting up a state level scheme that will operate from 2013 and may serve as a pilot for 
a national scheme.  The state of Acre has signed a memorandum of understanding with 
California and the Mexican state of Chiapas that allows for the implementation of 
forestry schemes and the generation of REDD+ credits (see list of acronyms and 
abbreviations at end of document) that will be eligible as offset credits in California’s 
emissions trading scheme.   
One of the more significant national emission promises announced after the 
Copenhagen conference was an unconditional commitment by China to reduce the 
emissions intensity of its economy to 40% - 45% below its 2005 level by 2020.  Some 
critics have denounced the proposal as no more than business as usual but an analysis 
by Frank Jotzo shows that this is based on a BAU case that already includes strenuous 
efforts to cut emissions (Jotzo, 2011).  It seems churlish to criticize the Chinese proposal, 
bearing in mind that the proposed absolute reduction from BAU is greater than the 
2005-2020 reductions proposed by all developed countries combined (Jotzo, 2011).   
A key element of China’s plan to achieve this target will be a cap & trade scheme.  The 
country’s 12th five year plan (2011-2015) provided for carbon trading and in October 
2011 the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced the 
introduction of pilot schemes in five cities and two provinces, together accounting for 
18% of China’s population and 28% of its GDP.  NDRC officials have indicated that the 
plan is for these pilot projects to operate from 2013 with a view to establishing a 




Bank announced that it will provide both funding and assistance with design for a pilot 
scheme to be established in Tianjin – a municipal province - in 2013 (press release dated 
Jan 25, 2012 – see www.adb.org).  In July 2012 the NDRC released outline regulations 
for the new markets, apparently closely modeled on the rules of the CDM and allowing 
explicitly for the use of offsets derived from CDM projects. 
There is still some uncertainty about the details of China’s scheme, which may be 
intentional – China agreed at the Durban climate conference to enter negotiations over 
an international agreement to control emissions and to reach an agreement by 2015: it 
may want to try out ideas without disclosing its real negotiating position.  Other 
approaches to control of emissions have been mentioned – caps on energy use, for 
example.  However a realistic appraisal of Chinese intentions would be that a national 
emissions trading scheme will be introduced – possibly by 2015, more likely by 2020 – if 
the pilot schemes show that the idea is workable in Chinese circumstances. 
2.3: THE KYOTO FLEXIBILITY MECHANISMS: CARBON OFFSETS 
The Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms include two different offset schemes: the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).  Under the CDM 
an Annex B nation may create offsets by financing emissions reductions in a developing 
country; under JI, offsets can be created by financing reductions in another 
industrialized country.  In practice, most JI projects are located in countries with 
economies in transition – this means primarily the ex-communist countries.   
The Kyoto Protocol also provides for crediting of volumes of CO₂ removed from the 
atmosphere by absorption in soil and vegetation, by means of measures coming under 
the general category of LULUCF – land use, land use change and forestry.  Although it is 
not usually described as a Kyoto flexibility mechanism, Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of Kyoto 
permit a country to assess volumes of CO₂ removed in this way and either count these 




that can be traded in the same way as CERs or ERUs.  The RMU market has never taken 
off as the two better known flexibility mechanisms have: the direct cause of this failure 
is the EU’s refusal to accept RMUs for compliance in its emission trading scheme: the 
underlying cause is probably a persistent lack of trust in the integrity of issuance 
procedures.  However the first issues of RMUs were recorded in 2011, by France, 
Australia, Russia and Hungary; it seems likely that Hungary sold its RMUs to buyers in 
New Zealand – if confirmed, this would be the first sale of RMUs (World Bank, 2012). 
2.3.1: The Clean Development Mechanism 
The objectives of the CDM, which was created by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, are 
(in the order in which they are stated in the text of Kyoto): to assist non-Annex 1 
countries in achieving sustainable development; to “contribute to the ultimate objective 
of the convention”; and to cut the costs of emissions reductions in Annex B countries.  It 
is not entirely clear what the second of those objectives means: some have interpreted 
it as putting the less developed countries onto a low carbon development path (Vasa 
and Neuhoff, 2011); my own view is that the ultimate objective of the convention is 
simply to reduce GHG emissions.  It is possible that a lack of agreement on its objectives 
is one of the underlying reasons for the many criticisms of theCDM.    
The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, gave few details on how the CDM was to be 
implemented: these had to wait until COP7, held at Marrakech in 2001.  The intervening 
years saw intense negotiations.  According to Lecocq and Ambrosi, some stakeholders 
were suspicious of elements of Kyoto: in particular, some European parties distrusted 
the concept of flexibility mechanisms and, in some cases, the concept of markets 
(Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007).  Partly to placate these critics, the UNFCCC evolved a 
bureaucratic approach to CDM project assessment which has been criticized at various 
times for failing to adequately assess proposed projects and for assessing projects so 




section 3.1.2 I provide an outline of the process; sections 3.2.7 and 3.2.8 include some 
analysis of the problems that it has created – or at least has been blamed for. 
Whatever the problems, demand for offsets emerged even before Marrakech: the 
Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) - a $180m fund run by the World Bank that invests in CERs 
and ERUs – operated from 2000.  The government of the Netherlands was also an early 
investor (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007).  Large scale participation by private firms had to 
wait until governments that had ratified Kyoto had determined how they would achieve 
their targets – a key development was the acceptance of CERs for EU ETS compliance 
from 2005 under the “linking directive” (EU Directive 2004/101/EC).  Almost all trading 
in CERs now occurs on markets linked in some way to the EU ETS (World Bank, 2011). 
2.3.2: Joint Implementation 
The second offset scheme created by the Kyoto Protocol is Joint Implementation, or JI.  
The JI program awards offsets to projects that reduce emissions of GHGs in Annex B 
countries - the offsets awarded are called Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) and can be 
traded and used for compliance in the same way as CERs.  There are two alternative 
procedures for JI project validation and award of ERUs.  The Track 1 procedure can be 
used by countries that have a national reporting system for GHG emissions, make 
annual returns of emissions and have set up a national registry for ERUs.  Under the 
Track 1 procedure a country certifies emission reductions and issues ERUs in respect of 
projects in its own territory.  Countries that do not meet the eligibility requirements can 
still set up JI projects but reductions must be certified by the JI Supervisory Committee 
of the UNFCCC.  This is called the Track 2 procedure. 
As an Annex B country, the host country of a JI project is subject to an emissions cap, 
must make an annual return of its emissions and must surrender the appropriate 
quantity of AAUs in the annual Kyoto compliance exercise.  To avoid double counting of 




issued only for the Kyoto compliance period (2008-2012) and there is at present no 
prospect of international agreement on an extension, the validity of ERUs issued after 
the end of 2012 is questionable.  The current situation is that post-2012 ERUs will not be 
accepted for compliance in the EU ETS but will count in determining national 
compliance under the Kyoto Protocol.  As the “true-up period” for Kyoto lasts until mid-
2015, there will be a limited ERU market until that date. 
Most JI projects are located in Russia and the former communist countries of Eastern 
Europe (the “transition economies”) however a few have been registered in New 
Zealand, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden (as of February 2012).  JI projects in EU 
countries are subject to special rules designed to prevent double counting of emissions 
cuts by selling credits while simultaneously counting the reductions towards compliance 
with the host country’s obligations under the EU schemes. 
2.3.3: Offsets in the EU ETS 
Participants in the EU ETS may meet their compliance obligations by delivering CERs or 
ERUs in lieu of EUAs.  The use of offsets for compliance is subject to volume limits – the 
intention is that emission reductions made by the EU countries themselves should be 
the primary means of compliance.  Despite these limits, the EU ETS is by far the most 
important market for carbon offsets: in 2011 the value of secondary market transactions 
in the CER market reached a global total of $22.3bn, almost all linked to the EU ETS.  The 
volume of secondary ERU transactions in 2011 was $780m (World Bank, 2012). 
Its dominance of the offsets market means that EU rules on eligibility of offsets for ETS 
compliance have a major impact on the CDM and JI schemes.  The EU does not accept 
credits from nuclear power projects, nor projects in land use, land use change and 
forestry (LULUCF), while strict rules limit the use of credits from large hydro schemes.  




acceptance of offsets in the EU ETS, which have split the post-2012 CER market into EU 
ETS-eligible and ineligible sectors – see box below.   
Changes in eligibility of offset credits for the EU ETS 
The key changes, which take effect at the end of 2012, are: 17 
 A lower limit on the total number of offsets that can be used for compliance.  The 
use of offsets was not permitted at all during the first phase; during phase 2 the limit 
is based on a set percentage (that varies by country) of average emissions during 
2008-2012 – the overall limit is 1,419 Mt18 (including a small volume in respect of 
aviation in 2012).  Changes for the third phase, including small additional volumes in 
respect of sectors that were not covered by phase 2 of the scheme, increase the 
limit to 1,611 Mt.  However this applies to phases 2 and 3 combined: whatever is not 
used in phase 2 can be carried forward to phase 3. 
 Changes in sector eligibility.  From 2013, emission reductions from projects that 
incinerate industrial gases (HFCs and N₂O) will not be accepted.19  CERs from carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS) projects can be opted in for phase 2 compliance: for 
phase 3 they are explicitly eligible.   
 Disallowance of most projects registered after 2012.  Kyoto Credits from any 
project (excluding industrial gas destruction projects) registered before the end of 
2012 will be accepted for compliance during 2013-2020.  However credits awarded 
to projects registered after that cut-off date will only be accepted if the project is 
located in countries on the UN list of least developed countries and small island 
developing states (referred to hereinafter as LDCs).   
 The effective end of the JI scheme.  Because the Kyoto Protocol requires that a valid 
AAU must be cancelled for each ERU issued to a JI project and AAUs are valid only 
for the Kyoto compliance period (2008-2012), the EU is somewhat pedantically 
taking the view that no more ERUs may be issued after the end of 2012. 
                                                     
17 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:EN:PDF.  Also 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/docs/q_a_20111114_en.pdf (accessed July 18 2012). 
18 Different analysts estimate slightly different figures – there is uncertainty about, for example, 
the status of sub-sectors that a country has included in its cap unilaterally. 




Possibly the most significant change is the disallowance of schemes that cut emissions 
of certain industrial gases.  As these industrial gas projects account for 68% of all CERs 
issued to date, the result is a draconian reduction in availability of offsets for EU ETS 
compliance. However, this is not sufficient to ward off the buildup of a large surplus.  In 
Chapter 5 I present an analysis of supply and demand for offsets post-2012: it shows a 
major imbalance, with very large and rapidly increasing supply and essentially fixed 
demand from the EU ETS and other schemes.  Despite the changes in eligibility 
described above, even the ETS-eligible sector is in oversupply and offset prices have 
fallen to the point where the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms no longer provide a 
significant incentive for investment in GHG mitigation in the developing world.  The EU 
is considering measures aimed at reducing this imbalance, including possibly 
withholding tranches of EUAs from the market, but no decisions have been taken. 
2.4: EMISSIONS TRADING TODAY 
Carbon trading has been one of the successes of the GHG mitigation architecture 
created by the Kyoto Protocol, very largely because of the success of the European 
Union’s Emission Trading Scheme.20  EU emissions allowances (EUAs) accounted for 84% 
by value of all global carbon trading in 2011 while the secondary market in CERs 
accounted for another 13% - almost all trading in CERs is linked to the EU ETS (World 
Bank, 2012).  Several governments are active players in the carbon markets, in particular 
those of Japan and the EU countries (the EU ETS covers about 41% of all GHG emissions 
in the EU: governments have direct responsibility for the remaining 59%).  Table 2.1 
provides a summary of how carbon trading has grown over time. 
  
                                                     
20 The EU ETS is a framework for trading between emitters while Kyoto allows for trading 













2005 7.9 2.6 0.2 0.3 11.0 
2006 24.4 5.8 0.4 0.6 31.2 
2007 49.1 7.4 5.5 1.0 63.0 
2008 100.5 6.5 26.3 1.8 135.1 
2009 118.5 2.7 17.5 5.0 143.7 
2010 133.6 2.7 20.5 2.4 159.2 
2011 147.8 3.0 22.3 2.9 176.0 
Source: (World Bank, 2011, 2012), based on various primary sources 
Notes: The apparent increase from 2009 to 2010, particularly in EUA trading, reflects a change 
in methodology by the World Bank team. 
These figures include both physical and derivatives trading.  Most trading is in futures. 
Most of this trading takes place in liquid markets in which financial sector regulators 
ensure price transparency.  The futures markets accounted for 88% of EUA trading and 
92% of secondary CER trading in 2011 (World Bank, 2012) - trading in options is also 
significant.  About 90% of futures transactions are made on ICE Futures Europe, a 
London-based unit of the Intercontinental Exchange (New York), formerly known as the 
European Climate Exchange (World Bank, 2011).  Part of the reason for the high 
proportion of derivative trading is that the spot markets have been tainted by fraud 
during the last two years (World Bank, 2012); an equally important reason is that there 
is no advantage in holding actual EUAs, which are used only once a year for compliance.  
In fact, there is an opportunity cost to holding them because in a spot transaction the 
full price must be paid immediately; futures may be held by meeting only the margin 
requirements (Daskalakis et al., 2010).   
However not all trading occurs on transparent and regulated markets.  About 43% of 




reported,21 while almost all transactions in the primary markets for CERs and ERUs 
result from deals made directly between project developers and market participants, 
again without price disclosure.  Some information on prices for these transactions 
comes from organizations such as IDEAcarbon and Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 
which assess prices based on contacts with market participants.  The annual World Bank 
publication State and Trends of the Carbon Market collates information from these 
sources as well as its own market survey.  The most recent edition states that prices 
achieved in 2011 for pre-2013 primary market CERs averaged €7.9 per ton, with CERs 
from post-2012 registered projects about 5% higher (World Bank, 2012).  Uncertainty 
over prices reduces the value of studies of the CDM where the conclusions depend on 
the carbon price or on a value that implies a price, such as project revenues or rates of 
return.  Often the “carbon price” comes from project documentation prepared before 
construction commences and some years before CERs are actually issued.  One suspects 
that developers do not spend much time over this estimate as it seems to have no 
relevance to the registration process.   
Price formation in the most important sectors of the carbon market is described below: 
 A CDM project developer sells the expected stream of CERs forward, using the 
primary CER market.  A primary sale is typically a fixed term contract to sell units at 
a pre-determined price.  The purchaser bears significant risks: prices in this market 
vary considerably between deals, depending on the perceived risk of non-delivery 
and the expected volume of credits to be delivered before some deadline – for 
example, there has always been some uncertainty about the value of CERs post-
2012.  Contract terms may be drawn up to transfer more or less of this risk to the 
buyer (Lewis, 2010): some “sales” contracts are little more than options.  Post-2012 
risk has been reduced by the EU’s decision to continue with the EU ETS until 2020; 
                                                     




however changes in the rules for EU ETS eligibility have fragmented the market 
(World Bank, 2011).  Primary market volumes have fallen from a peak of $7.4bn in 
2007 to $3.0bn in 2011 (World Bank, 2012).   
 The secondary market for EUAs and CERs has been highly volatile.  CERs are 
equivalent to EUAs for EU ETS compliance purposes and the CER price has typically 
tracked the EUA price, which reached a peak of €32.9 in April 2006.22  However in 
April 2006, when the first hard data on 2005 emissions in the EU emerged, the price 
collapsed.  Prices for futures for delivery during the second phase of the EU ETS later 
recovered to around €15 but fell again as the financial crisis cut economic activity.  A 
recent phenomenon is a widening spread between EUA and CER prices linked to 
oversupply of CERs.  As of July 18 2012 EUA futures (for delivery Dec 2012) are 
priced at €7.13 and CER futures at €2.96. 
 The ERU market is similar to the CER market, but far smaller – secondary market 
volumes in 2011 amounted to $780m compared to $22.3bn for the secondary 
market in CERs (World Bank, 2012). 
 The Kyoto Protocol emissions caps are implemented by issuing each Annex B 
country with AAUs: an AAU is a permit to emit one ton of CO₂e.  Countries that emit 
less than their quota can sell the surplus in the AAU market.  The ex-communist 
countries are the largest potential sellers as their caps were based on emissions in 
1990 and the collapse of their heavy industry when communism fell left most of 
them with huge volumes of surplus AAUs (Aldrich and Koerner, 2012).  In Ukraine, 
emissions declined by 60%.  Den Elzen et al calculated that the surplus of AAUs in 
Eastern Europe and Russia amounted to 13bn tons.  (den Elzen et al., 2010).   
                                                     




Cynics refer to the AAU market as a market in hot air.  The first AAU trade was in 2002 
but most potential buyers seem to fear damage to their reputations if they achieve 
compliance by purchasing AAUs.  In an effort to make AAU trades more respectable, 
selling countries may commit to spending the proceeds on green investment schemes 
(GISs) - projects that cut GHG emissions.  A sale of AAUs linked to a GIS is known as a 
“greened” sale.  However, there are no rules defining a GIS and no entity analogous to 
the CDM EB to determine whether claimed GHG reductions are real.  It is not unknown 
for a selling country to agree to a greened sale then postpone investment in a GIS – 
according to media reports, the Hungarian government was reprimanded by the EU for 
using revenues earmarked for a GIS for general budgetary expenses (Tuerk et al., 2010). 
However, as the Kyoto deadline approaches, some Annex B countries are becoming 
concerned about hitting their emissions targets.  AAU trading stuttered into life - then 
collided head on with the financial crisis that weakened economies (and thus cut 
emissions) in many Annex B countries.  A growing surplus of CERs now competes with 
AAUs that are hampered by skepticism about hot air and the dubious benefits of some 
GISs.  Volumes of AAU sales are minimal: the “Other Instruments” column in table 2.1, 
mainly AAUs and ERUs, accounted for only 1.6% of the global carbon market in 2011. 
The real significance of the AAU surplus is the fact that the Kyoto Protocol allows surplus 
AAUs to be banked for use in an anticipated second compliance period (Aldrich and 
Koerner, 2012).  If the East European countries insist on the validity of their AAUs in a 
post-2020 climate deal, or if countries that made unilateral reduction commitments for 
2012-2020 want to meet these commitments by using AAUs, the apparently moribund 
hot air market could come back to haunt climate negotiators.  
2.5: FROM BALI TO DURBAN – AND BEYOND 
The timetable set by the Kyoto Protocol extends only to the end of 2012.  A second 




known in the jargon as COP13 – held on the island of Bali in 2007.  The summary 
document that emerged from Bali is known as the Bali road map: its key elements are 
included in the Bali Action Plan,23 which launched a process based on a “shared vision 
for long term cooperative action”.  The Bali Action Plan included, in addition to 
quantified emission reductions by developed countries (as in Kyoto 1), several new 
proposals for actions on mitigation of carbon emissions.  These proposals include 
“nationally appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) by developing countries; action on 
deforestation and forest degradation; sector-specific actions; and new market-based 
approaches aimed at enhancing cost-effectiveness.  In contrast to Kyoto 1, the Bali Plan 
proposed an increased focus on adaptation and technology transfer and contained 
enhanced proposals on availability of financial resources for both mitigation and 
adaptation.  Finally, it created an Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention, charged with completing its work in time for COP15 (the 
Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009).  It is not surprising that many 
countries came to Copenhagen believing that they were going to agree on a second 
stage of the Kyoto Protocol.   
Judged against those expectations, Copenhagen failed, as did the two year process of 
negotiation that began at Bali.  Taking a positive view, however, Copenhagen was the 
start point of a process that may lead to a comprehensive agreement on international 
action against climate change.  The conference at Durban (COP 17; 2011) agreed to a 
process of negotiations leading to a binding agreement by 2015, to be implemented by 
2020.  Many elements of the Bali road map are very much alive and are likely to be 
included in the proposed agreement.  Examples include: 
 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).  A NAMA is an action taken 
unilaterally by a developing country to cut GHG emissions.  The UNFCCC proposes to 





establish a registry for NAMAs seeking international support (World Bank, 2011).  
Proposals are still not finalized, but the intention is that the developing country will 
monitor progress and make periodic reports.  Some post-Copenhagen commitments 
made by non-Annex 1 countries might become NAMAs.  There is also potential 
overlap between NAMAs and future sectoral crediting mechanisms (section 3.3.3). 
 New Market Based Mechanisms (NMMs).  Agreement was reached at Cancún that 
one or more NMMs would form part of the future agreement (section 3.3.2). 
 Action on a sectoral basis.  As a minimum this means sectoral CDM (section 3.3.1). 
 Action to mitigate GHG emissions from destruction of forests. 
 The proposal first mooted at Bali for enhanced financial resources for mitigation and 
adaptation actions by developing countries is being actively developed (section 2.6).    
However, some analysts have suggested that there may be flaws in the UNFCCC process 
that will doom the proposed negotiations to failure.  This view gained traction after 
Copenhagen – more recently it was explored in a book by David Victor (Victor, 2011).  
Certainly, it is at least questionable whether the focus on solutions reached through 
global negotiations and global implementation of the agreed solutions can be revived.  
Victor’s view is that significant elements of any solution to the climate change problem 
may evolve outside the UNFCCC process: in particular, he sees advantages in a diversity 
of offset schemes, with a form of competition between them to determine which set of 
rules works best.  In my view, the outcome of the Durban conference signaled a degree 
of acceptance of this view.  If I am right, this acceptance of flexibility may ultimately 
prove to be the most important outcome of Durban.  However the hypothetical scheme 




2.6: THE UNFCCC REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCING 
The Copenhagen Accord contains a commitment by the developed countries to provide 
“scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate” funding to the developing 
world to support action on both mitigation and adaptation.  The level of funding agreed 
is up to $30bn for the period 2010-2012 and a commitment to mobilize $100bn per year 
by 2020.  The funds will come from a variety of sources – public and private; bilateral 
and multilateral; and including “alternative sources of finance”.  A significant portion 
will flow through a new entity to be known as the “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund”.24 
Responding to this commitment, the Secretary-General of the UN established a “High-
level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing” which reported25 to the Cancún 
conference (COP16) in 2010.  There seems to have been some dissent within the group - 
some of the report’s conclusions are couched in extremely cautious language, possibly 
to gloss over political differences.  It is hard to think of a non-political explanation for 
the proposal of a financial transactions tax as a source of funding for climate change 
mitigation, for example.  Another area where politics seems to have been involved is in 
assessing what proportion of a gross investment flow should be regarded as a net 
transfer to the developing world - an important issue, and one on which group members 
from developed and developing countries might legitimately have different views.   
The report develops scenarios for potential future flows, based essentially on different 
levels of carbon price (these scenarios are very similar to the Current Policies, New 
Policies and 450 scenarios used by the IEA and described in Chapter 1).  Most of the 
group’s conclusions are based on the medium price scenario, which assumes full 
implementation of the pledges made after Copenhagen, with a carbon price in the range 
                                                     






of $20-$25 per ton of CO₂e in 2020.  Estimates of potential revenues are expressed as 
ranges – often very wide – and the report notes that there is significant overlap – it 
would not be possible to implement all the proposals together.  It concludes that 
realistic estimates of potential net revenues to developing countries in the medium 
price scenario would sum to $80bn - $90bn: 
 Gross private sector capital flows of $100bn-$200bn per year might be generated, of 
which $10bn-$20bn could be regarded as net flows to the host countries. 
 Carbon markets might generate $30bn-$50bn per year, of which possibly $10bn 
could be regarded as net transfers to the developing world. 
 A 10% share of revenues from carbon taxes levied by developed countries and on 
auctions of emissions allowances could potentially mobilize around $30bn per year. 
 Carbon pricing for international air and sea transportation would bring in about 
$10bn per year, assuming that 25%-50% of revenues were earmarked for the fund. 
 Up to $10bn per year could be raised from other sources: examples given are the 
redeployment of fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries and a financial 
transaction tax. 
 The multilateral development banks (MDBs) are able to multiply incremental 
investments.  The group estimated that every $10bn of additional funding to MDBs 
would result in investment of $30bn-$40bn, with associated private sector flows 
providing even more.  Overall, net accruals to developing countries from investment 
by MDBs could reach $11bn per year. 
With additional sums provided by direct budget contributions, the task of raising 
$100bn per year is described as “challenging but feasible”.  In an interesting aside, the 
group notes that the credibility of the countries concerned – from both the developed 
and developing worlds – would be greatly increased if there were confidence that the 




2.6.1: The potential role of offset schemes 
The report of the Advisory Group is backed up by the reports of sub-groups, of which 
the most interesting – from the viewpoint of this research – is the Work Stream 8 report 
on the potential contribution of the carbon markets.26  This report estimates that during 
2005-2009 the CDM produced gross revenues from CERs of €5.8bn, based on an average 
CER price of €14.6 per ton (the corresponding figure based on CERs issued as of July 1 
2012 and using the same carbon price, would be just over €14 bn).  Estimates of 
potential future revenues are based on the carbon price scenarios mentioned in the 
previous section: it is assumed that, in the low price scenario, some Annex 1 countries 
set up domestic cap & trade schemes to provide demand for offsets while the medium 
price scenario assumes that most Annex 1 countries adopt cap & trade. 
Table 2.2 shows the estimated demand for offsets and resulting offset price in each 
scenario.  The last column shows the gross revenue from primary sales of offsets – the 
Working Group estimated that, in the medium price scenario, gross revenues of $30bn - 
$50bn would translate into net revenues to developing countries of $8bn - $14bn.27 
Table 2.2: Offset demand and price 
Scenario 
Offset Demand 
(Mt per year) 
Offset Price 
($/ton in 2020) 
Gross Revenue 
($bn per year) 
Low Price 500-800 10-15 5-12 
Medium Price 1,500-2,000 20-25 30-50 
High Price 3,000 50 150 
Source: UNFCCC  
                                                     
26http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/financeadvisorygroup/pid/13300.  
(accessed July 18 2012). 
 
27 In the case of the CDM, it seems to be generally accepted that a relatively small proportion of 
the revenue from sales of offsets accrues to a project’s host country.  In my view elimination of 




2.7: THE SITUATION TODAY - FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 
The situation today is confusing, with many different potential or actual sources of 
funds for GHG mitigation or adaptation.  A report for the US Congressional Research 
Service suggests that many donor governments believe that the existing environmental 
finance system has not produced satisfactory results and notes that no fewer than 15 
environmental finance mechanisms were announced between 2007 and 2009 
(Lattanzio, 2010).  The Climate Funds Update website28 lists 25 funding sources.  The 
proliferation of sources complicates the task of calculating how much aid flows to 
developing countries in the form of climate finance: however the largest provider of 
funds for environmental projects generally is the Global Environment Facility (GEF),29 set 
up in 1991 by the World Bank.   
In 1992, the GEF was charged with providing a financial mechanism to support the 
objectives of the UNFCCC - it has since been given a similar role for the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the 
UN Convention to Combat Desertification.  It supports the Montreal Protocol on ozone 
depleting substances, but does not have a formal role in that group.  It is now an 
independently managed body, with the World Bank retaining a role as financial trustee 
and providing administrative backup.  It provides grants and concessional finance for 
projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, 
the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants in developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition.   
In addition to expenditures made on its own account, the GEF manages two special 
funds set up by the UNFCCC – The Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special 
Climate Change Fund.  Both of these provide funding specifically earmarked for activities 
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related to adaptation, and the latter (aimed primarily at countries that are heavily 
reliant on fossil fuels) also to technology transfer. 
Funding for the GEF is provided by donor countries through a four year replenishment 
cycle.  The amount provided reached $3.13bn during the fourth replenishment cycle: 
the 5th cycle, covering the years 2010-2014 saw a sharp increase, with $4.35bn pledged.  
Project expenditure during the 4th cycle was about $725m per year (GEF; personal 
communication): expenditure during the 5th cycle is likely to reach about $1.1bn per 
year of which roughly half is likely to be related to climate change.  In almost all cases, 
GEF expenditure on a project is supplemented by co-financing provided by official 
development assistance, the government of the recipient country or the private sector 
through foreign direct investment.  Through 2009, co-financing amounted to more than 
four times the amount provided directly by the GEF. 
The multilateral development banks (MDBs) have been an increasingly significant source 
of climate mitigation funding in recent years, both through their own initiatives and 
through their participation in the GEF and its subsidiary funds. Expenditure by MDBs in 
2009 on climate mitigation projects amounted to $17bn (investment and lending).  
Projected expenditure in 2012 was expected to reach $20.8 bn.30  
2.8: CONCLUSIONS – THE FUTURE OF CARBON FINANCE 
This chapter is essentially descriptive rather than analytical: as such, it does not reach 
conclusions.  It does, however, suggest some comments on the system that has evolved 
through global climate negotiations and about the future development of that system.  
Chapters 3 through 5 of this research follow through on these comments. 
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Firstly, it is necessary to consider whether the process of global negotiations has failed.  
The Kyoto Protocol was hailed as a success but it failed to involve the key global player – 
the US – and the participation – or lack of it - by Canada and Australia has further 
frustrated the objectives of Kyoto.  Copenhagen was unquestionably a failure and other 
“successful” global agreements (Bali; Durban) are at best agreements to agree.  The 
current situation is that the parties have agreed to agree by 2015 on a program to be 
implemented by 2020.  Taken as a whole, Kyoto should be seen as partially successful 
and global negotiations since Kyoto as inconclusive. 
Secondly, the CDM EB has been able to improve the CDM scheme through a series of 
rule changes; similarly, the EU has (belatedly) recognized the importance of adjusting 
rules to better match supply and demand in the EU ETS.  However, neither scheme has 
been able to adapt to changes in the global economic situation that are the underlying 
cause of the recent collapse of the European carbon price.  The EU actions are an 
important step forward for two reasons: they signify recognition on the part of the EU 
that a scheme such as the EU ETS cannot be managed as a purely static entity; also, 
recognition that the EU, as by far the largest buyer of carbon offsets, can and probably 
should take control of the international offsets market.   
In fact, it is instructive to see the system that has evolved as a market: the product 
(offset credits) is produced by developers regulated by the EB; the market (the EU ETS) 
is regulated by the EU.  The system has failed because the two sets of regulators could 
not coordinate their actions.  It is too late to agree on coordination because the system 
is splintering as markets (emission trading schemes) proliferate and as some market 
operators attempt to achieve vertical integration through bilateral agreements that 
create competing regulation schemes on the production side.  This deintegration of the 
credits market could be reversed by an all-encompassing global agreement, but, as 
noted above, this may be unachievable.  Deintegration is not necessarily a bad thing, 




coordination to ensure a reasonable global balance of supply and demand for offsets; 
they must recognize, also, that they are dealing with a dynamic system that must be 





3: Lessons from the CDM and Proposed Solutions 
The successes and failures of the CDM provide lessons for the design of future offsets 
schemes.  A key measure of its success is the sheer scale of the funds steered in the 
direction of developing countries: as of June 31 2012, total investment in CDM projects 
had reached $204bn and CERs issued (assuming an average price of $15 per CER) were 
worth $14.4bn.31  Looking beyond the numbers, the successes and failures of the CDM 
have been analyzed in many research studies: often the conclusions reached have been 
severely critical.  In this chapter I review a selection of published research on the 
performance of the CDM and some of the proposals that have been made to improve it. 
3.1: THE CDM: ITS STRUCTURE AND RULES 
The CDM is described in some detail in section 2.3.1.  In summary, it has three 
objectives: to assist non-Annex B countries in achieving sustainable development; to 
“contribute to the ultimate objective of the convention” (which I interpret as simply to 
cut GHG emissions); and to cut the costs of emissions reductions in Annex B countries.  
The Kyoto Protocol itself said remarkably little about how the CDM was to operate.  The 
details were negotiated over the four years between its signature in 1997 and COP7, 
held at Marrakech in late 2001, when the CDM formally came into operation. 
The methodologies used to evaluate CDM projects are a work in progress: project 
analysis and validation proceed even while the rules are under debate.  The first 
comprehensive CDM rulebook (see http://www.cdmrulebook.org/home) was issued 
only in March 2008 by Baker and McKenzie, the international law firm, with the support 
of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and various UN bodies and national 
                                                     





governments.  In my view, the scheme’s multiple objectives and ad-hoc rulemaking 
process add considerably to its problems. 
3.1.1: Baselines and Additionality 
The issue of CERs to a CDM project raises the permitted level of emissions in annex 1 
countries.  This is the root of the CDM’s most important problem: if it fails to promote 
sustainable development or to cut the cost of emissions reductions, an opportunity is 
missed; but if CERs are issued in respect of emissions reductions that would have 
occurred even without the subsidy provided by the CDM, global emissions increase and 
real damage is done (Fischer, 2005).  To avoid this problem, a project must be 
“additional” – this means that “anthropogenic GHG emissions by sources are reduced 
below those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project 
activity”.32  The level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the 
project activity is known as the baseline.  Additionality “has probably been the most 
contentious point in the development of the CDM and also resulted in great confusion 
amongst project developers” (Wara and Victor, 2008).   
CDM rules permit four generic approaches to the determination of additionality: 
 Barrier analysis: a project is additional if barriers exist that would prevent its 
development without registration as a CDM project, and these barriers do not affect 
at least one alternative to the project. 
 Investment analysis: a project is additional if it fails to meet a standard profitability 
benchmark or if it is financially less attractive than at least one alternative project.  
 Common practice: a project is unlikely to be additional if projects of a similar nature 
are already common practice in the country or sector concerned. 
                                                     




 Positive lists: some categories of project are automatically deemed additional.  
Currently this applies only to industrial gas projects. 
Barrier analysis and investment analysis are equally valid - either may be used (or both), 
but in practice many large projects use financial analysis while small projects generally 
try to prove the existence of barriers.  Common practice analysis on its own does not 
amount to proof of additionality – it is used in conjunction with financial analysis or the 
barrier method as a credibility check (Schneider, 2007).  
3.1.2: The project evaluation process 
The CDM’s requirement for case by case assessment of projects requires a complex 
multi-stage project evaluation process.  A CDM project proposed for registration is 
assessed by a specialized consultant (the Designated Operational Entity, or DOE); a 
project design document (PDD) is posted on the UNFCCC website and the project must 
be approved by the CDM Executive Board (EB) and the Designated National Authorities 
(DNAs) of the host country and the country of the buyer of CERs.  Before any CERs are 
issued a second DOE must certify the quantity.  The complexity of this process has led to 
criticisms of the EB: either for subjecting projects to over-stringent assessments, leading 
to serious delays in project approval; or sometimes for taking insufficient time over the 
assessment process, enabling sub-standard projects to achieve registration.      
3.2: CRITICISM OF THE CDM 
The CDM “has been criticized for doing little to combat global warming; for being 
economically inefficient in requiring nations to cut emissions too quickly; for utilizing 
absolute emission caps rather than emissions intensity targets or a carbon tax; and for 
not committing the largest developing nations, most notably China and India, to binding 
emissions reductions” (Wara, 2008).  And those are just criticisms of its overall design: 




Much early criticism is based on research done before the scheme was fully operational.  
With small samples of projects to work with, most early work was theoretical in nature 
(Wara, 2008).  Some of the problems identified have not materialized and some that did 
have been eliminated by changes in rules.  However more recent research has 
highlighted major issues that cannot easily be resolved.   
3.2.1: Problems with additionality 
The fundamental problem with additionality is that its determination requires a 
comparison of real world emissions with a hypothetical baseline – the level of emissions 
that would have occurred in a world in which the project did not exist (Schneider, 2007).  
Once additionality is established, the baseline determines the number of CERs to be 
issued.  Recent research has uncovered many cases of project developers manipulating 
baselines, either to show that a project is additional when it is not, or to increase the 
quantity of CERs issued, thus maximizing revenues from their sale (Wara, 2008).  
Schneider (2007) reviewed prior research and analyzed 93 projects.  The majority of 
these used barrier analysis: in Schneider’s view, the barriers cited are often not 
credible; some are highly subjective; some could apply to almost any project (“exchange 
rate risk”, or “risk of a tariff decrease”); some are specific to the developer – for 
example, a developer with poor credit might face barriers raising finance; some ignore 
rules on supporting evidence – for example, 43% of projects that used barrier analysis 
give no evidence for the existence of barriers (Schneider, 2007).  
Problems with investment analysis include use of a benchmark rate of return based on 
the expectations of the developer – realistic or otherwise (the rule requires that it 




(Schneider, 2007)).  Important items may be omitted – Schneider quotes Axel 
Michaelowa that tax benefits for wind plants in India are systematically ignored33. 
Schneider found that Common practice analysis suffers from the lack of any definition 
of common practice.  Some project sponsors define prevailing practice very broadly and 
the technology under consideration very narrowly.   In my own research I found that 
many small hydro projects in China achieve CDM registration: yet, according to (LBNL, 
2008), 44,000 such projects existed in that country by 1997. 
By definition, a project is not additional if it would have been implemented without the 
revenue created by the sale of CERs.  By extension, if CER revenue makes very little 
difference to the project return, or the return including those revenues is still below the 
stated benchmark, it seems unlikely that the project is additional.  Several researchers 
have analyzed the effect of CER revenues on project returns: 
 Sutter and Parreño (2007) analyzed 16 projects: CER revenue had little impact of on 
project returns for eleven of them – these were judged unlikely to being additional.  
(Sutter and Parreno, 2007).  
 Schneider (2007)’s analysis of 93 projects is described above: he concluded that 
additionality is at least questionable for about 40% of all CDM projects – this applies 
to all renewable energy projects other than biomass, all fuel switch projects (coal to 
natural gas etc) and all energy efficiency projects (Schneider, 2007).  
 A study by Hoi Wen Au Yong looked at the increase in a project’s internal rate of 
return (IRR) due to CER revenue – referred to for convenience as ΔIRR.  A summary 
of his results for 222 projects is shown below (table 3.1).  Au Yong suggested that 
projects with a ΔIRR below 2% should be deemed non-additional as they would 
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probably have been built without CDM registration.  26% of his projects fell into this 
category (Au Yong, 2009).  
 Alexeew et al (2010) looked at 40 projects in India and found a strong correlation 
between ΔIRR and project type.  They found that for almost all wind and hydro 
projects the IRR (without CER revenues) of was greater than 10% and ΔIRR was less 
than 5 percentage points (Alexeew et al., 2010). 
Table 3.1: Increase in project IRR due to CER revenue 
CDM Project Type Median ΔIRR (%) 
Landfill gas 19.4  
Biogas 17.2  
Biomass Energy 5.5  
Fossil fuel switch 3.8  
Hydro 2.2  
Wind 2.2  
             Source: (Au Yong, 2009) 
There are several problems with general statements about additionality.  In some cases 
it is difficult to link cited statements to specific research findings – an example is David 
Victor’s statement that between one third and two thirds of CERs are issued to non-
additional projects (Victor, 2011).  The use of small samples of projects in early studies is 
mentioned above: the results may still be widely cited years later - a case in point is 
(Michaelova and Purohit, 2007).  A common problem arises when results are distorted 
by the choice of project types in the sample – this is particularly true of samples 
containing industrial gas projects, which typically receive very large numbers of CERs 
and have a negative IRR in the absence of CER revenue.  Sutter and Parreño found that 
over 70% of CERs were issued to projects for which registration has a high impact on 




gas projects in the sample.  In my view much criticism of the CDM amounts to criticism 
of industrial gas projects.  I provide further analysis of this issue in section 3.2.4. 
The combination of a positive project IRR in the absence of CER revenues and a low ΔIRR 
may be a sign of non-additionality: it is certainly characteristic of project types with high 
construction cost and significant non-CER revenues such as renewable energy projects, 
(which receive revenue in the form of tariffs for electricity generated) (Alexeew et al., 
2010; Au Yong, 2009; Schneider, 2007).  A particular weakness of the ΔIRR approach is 
that it depends on the assumed value of CERs.  Of the studies quoted, Alexeew et al 
(2010) used an arbitrary price of €10: the others gave no indication of what CER prices 
were used (see discussion of CER prices in section 2.4).   
Despite there being room for doubt about some of the quantitative analysis, the papers 
referenced above cannot be ignored.  David Victor’s view that one third to two thirds of 
CDM projects are non-additional (Victor, 2011) may be based on his general experience, 
but that is probably a reliable guide.  A Delphi survey made by Germany’s Oeko-Institut 
found that 86% of the experts consulted believed that carbon revenues are not a 
decisive factor in the investment decision for CDM projects; 71% believed that many 
projects would be implemented in the absence of the CDM (Cames et al., 2007).34 
3.2.2: Additionality and the role of host governments  
Most national governments play key roles in the energy sector.  They set energy policy, 
determine tariffs, enforce regulations and often own the assets employed in the 
industry, directly or indirectly.  Almost no developing country takes a pure laissez-faire 
approach to energy policy: even when assets are privately owned, government 
“guidance” to the owners carries considerable weight.  The impact on additionality 
arises in two ways: firstly, many investments are made in response to government 
                                                     




policy decisions, regardless of profitability: these projects are not additional as they 
would be made without CDM financing; secondly, profitability – and thus additionality 
as determined using financial analysis – depends on the tariff received for electricity 
generated (Gang He and Morse R, 2010).  Researchers have pointed to several examples 
of government policy effectively determining additionality: for example, the Chinese 
government has a policy objective to increase the use of gas in power generation yet 
Wara (2008) found that, as of the end of 2007, essentially all of the gas-fired generation 
projects then under construction in China had applied for registration as CDM activities, 
presumably on the grounds that they would not have been built in the absence of the 
CDM (Wara, 2008).  Government policy may favor gas fired plants because they pollute 
less.  Grid operators value the operational flexibility they provide - in a market system 
this can be recognized and valued through additional payments for plants that provide 
system regulation.  I doubt whether such payments exist in China.    
Similar issues are raised by coal-fired power stations based on supercritical or 
ultrasupercritical technology.  A steam turbine operates more efficiently at a higher 
steam temperature, burning less coal and emitting less CO₂ at the same power output.  
The cost and complexity of the plant increases, taxing the resources of less developed 
countries and increasing costs, but a government taking a long term view of energy 
strategy might want to switch to the new technology anyway.  This is the case in India, 
but India has successfully registered high efficiency power plants as CDM projects. 
The basic problem here is that, as Wara points out, the investment analysis approach to 
determining additionality treats all power projects as if they were being built by 
independent power producers operating in a competitive, deregulated market (Wara, 
2008).  It is hard to think of any developing country where this would be true: certainly 
it is not true in either China or India.  In a similar vein, He and Morse concluded that the 
benchmark based financial analysis methodology is incompatible with the actual market 




3.2.3: The Chinese wind controversy and the E+/E- rule 
The ability of governments to set electricity tariffs creates a paradox: the CDM is 
intended to reward investment in low emission technologies; but if a government sets a 
generous feed-in tariff to encourage investment in renewable generation, investors may 
lose access to CER revenues because the higher tariff makes the project economically 
viable and therefore not additional (Vasa and Neuhoff, 2011).   
To eliminate this problem, the UNFCCC created the so-called E+/E- rule, which states 
that the effect of a national policy intended to reduce GHG emissions (an E- policy) can 
be ignored in determining additionality if the policy was implemented after the 
Marrakesh conference (November 11, 2001)35; the effect of a national policy that favors 
a carbon-intensive technology (an E+ policy) must be ignored if the policy was 
introduced after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (December 11, 1997). 
Interpretation of this rule has proved difficult.  A notorious example is the EB’s rejection 
in late 2009 of ten Chinese wind generation projects as the tariffs used in determining 
additionality were lower than tariffs for earlier projects in the same provinces.  It 
seemed possible that the Chinese regulator had cut tariffs to ensure that the projects 
were eligible for the CDM subsidy and to reduce the subsidy provided by the Chinese 
government.36  In response to Chinese complaints of arbitrary treatment, the EB 
provided guidance37 to the effect that, if an E- policy has been changed after November 
11 2001, the additionality calculation must reflect the policy as it stood on that date.   
Independent researchers agreed that the ruling was not consistent with E+/E- (Vasa and 
Neuhoff, 2011).  The cost of a new technology typically falls with accumulated 
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experience – the reduction for a doubling of installed capacity is called the learning rate.  
For US wind plants the learning rate was 14.4% between 1982 and 2004 (Wiser and 
Bolinger, 2011).  A reduction of this magnitude would certainly justify a cut in a feed-in 
tariff.  He and Morse note that there is “no real way to know what is business as usual 
and what constitutes gaming of the CDM” (Gang He and Morse R, 2010).  The EB seems 
to have decided that the Chinese government was gaming the CDM and made policy on 
the fly to prevent this happening. 
3.2.4: Industrial gas projects  
About 45% of all CERs issued as of April 1, 2012 related to projects that cut emissions of 
HFC-2338 - a gaseous by-product of the manufacture of HCFC-22, which is a widely used 
refrigerant.  As HCFC-22 is an ozone depleting substance (ODS) its use is controlled 
under the Montreal Protocol – see box on next page. HFC-23 has a global warming 
potential of 11,700, meaning that during the first 100 years after emission, one ton of 
HFC-23 has the same effect on climate as 11,700 tons of CO₂.39  CDM projects that 
eliminate HFC-23 emissions are highly profitable: they receive 11,700 CERs for each ton 
of HFC-23 destroyed while their operating costs are low - they are variously estimated 
as less than $0.2 per ton of CO₂e (IPCC/TEAP, 2005) and $0.5 (Schneider et al., 2005).  
Total costs per ton of HFC-23 destroyed are $2,340 - $5,850 while revenue amounts to 
$234,000 (at a CER price of $20 per ton). 
Many researchers have expressed concern that this high profitability creates perverse 
incentives - plant owners can earn more from CER revenues than from sales of HCFC-22.  
An early concern was that new plants might be built just to reap CER revenues 
(Schneider et al., 2005) - as a countermeasure, the EB limited CDM registration to HCFC-
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22 plants that had operated for at least three years prior to the end of 2004.  To prevent 
other forms of manipulation it set a 3% cap on the baseline ratio of HFC-23 to HCFC-22 
produced: as of 2008, the average ratio at the nineteen CDM registered HFC-23 plants 
was 2.99% (Wara, 2008).   
Commercially used refrigerants – a primer 
 CFCs (chlorinated fluorocarbons): are potent destroyers of atmospheric ozone.  Their 
use has been discontinued under the Montreal Protocol (with a minor exception for 
essential uses).  In the short term they have been replaced mainly by: 
 HCFCs (hydrochlorofluorocarbons), which have less impact on the ozone layer and 
are seen as a transitional stage under the Montreal Protocol.  Eventually these will 
be replaced by:   
 HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons).  These have a low impact on the ozone layer. 
Both HCFCs and HFCs have high global warming potentials.  Accidental leakage and the 
release of refrigerant when units are scrapped result in significant quantities of these 
potent GHGs entering the atmosphere.  Research is ongoing to identify new refrigerants 
that combine low impact on the ozone layer, a low global warming potential and other 
required properties. 
The 2007 amendments to the Montreal Protocol provide that developed countries must 
eliminate the use of HCFCs as refrigerants by 2020 except for a very small allowance for 
servicing existing equipment; developing countries must freeze their output in 2013 at a 
baseline level equal to average 2009-2010 production then cut it to 2.5% of baseline by 
2030: all use of HCFCs as refrigerants must cease by 2030 in developed countries and 
2040 in the developing world.40   
                                                     




Further rule changes have been proposed,41 however the controversy has lost some of 
its relevance with the decision by the EU to ban CERs issued to these projects from the 
EU ETS with effect from 2013.  As this is the only significant market for CERs, these 
credits will lose most of their value. 
Is this a good thing?  The UNFCCC and the EU, with the best intentions, have shut down 
the only global program aimed at cutting emissions of a powerful greenhouse gas at a 
time when these emissions are growing fast.  Economic growth in developing countries 
raises consumers’ incomes and one of the first things they do is to step up their 
purchases of domestic air conditioning and refrigerators, many of which use HCFC-22 as 
a refrigerant.  Developing country consumption of HCFCs grew by about 20% per year 
during 1989-2007, with HCFC-22 accounting for 66.5% of all HCFCs (Velders et al., 2009).  
Developing countries are increasing output of HCFC-22 to meet demand, not because of 
some perverse incentive created by the CDM – and they have no incentive to limit 
emissions of HFC-23.  The CDM EB’s decision not to register new HCFC-22 plants means 
that the CDM ignores almost two thirds of HFC-23 emissions with their massive global 
warming potential (Montzka et al., 2010). 
Industrial gas projects, in a sense, are a triumph of the offsets concept: the average cost 
of emissions cuts has been reduced by focusing attention on the lowest cost method.  
However, academic analysts tend not to see things that way: they dislike industrial gas 
projects as they do not promote sustainable development and because the high level of 
subsidy provided by CER revenues is not a cost-effective way to cut emissions – Wara 
described this subsidy as a “massive waste of developed-world resources” (Wara, 2008).  
In some cases, researchers seem obsessed with “offset quality” – this is intended to 
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mean the extent to which a project contributes to sustainable development (see below) 
but it has become a code for inclusion or otherwise of industrial gas projects.   
3.2.5: Does the CDM promote sustainable development? 
One of the objectives of the CDM is the promotion of sustainable development in host 
countries – which raises the questions of what exactly sustainable development is, and 
how a project’s contribution to it can be evaluated.  The rules of the CDM make the host 
country responsible for this assessment.  It is apparent that many countries show no 
qualms about accepting projects – such as industrial gas projects - that are cheap to 
implement and quickly generate CERs for conversion into hard currency, even if they 
bring essentially no benefit other than the CER revenue (Sutter and Parreno, 2007).   
Some categories of project produce significant co-benefits that contribute to sustainable 
development.  For example, many renewable generation technologies emit no SO₂ and 
NOx during normal operation.  Where the baseline technology – the most likely to be 
used to meet an increase in electricity demand - is a coal fired generation plant, the co-
benefits of a renewable generation project are likely to include improvements in human 
health and improved agricultural productivity due to reduction in acid rain (Partridge 
and Gamkhar, 2012a).  In regions that experience frequent water shortages – Northern 
China, for example – the fact that a renewable generation project typically consumes no 
water during operation clearly enhances sustainability.   
The co-benefits identified above create economic value compared to the baseline, but it 
can be difficult to estimate that value.  In the special case of reductions in mortality due 
to cuts in air pollution linked to investment in renewable generation, (Partridge and 
Gamkhar, 2012a) provides estimates for Chinese projects by adapting a methodology 
that has been used to estimate the benefits of the Clean Air Act in the US (see (EPA, 
2011)).  The benefits turn out, in this case, to be less than the additional cost of 




Many projects create sustainability benefits that cannot be easily quantified.  Karen 
Olsen reviewed 19 studies and commented that many attempts to “measure” 
sustainability amount to ticking boxes (Olsen, 2007).  In fact, this is true of her own 
study with Jørgen Fenhann: the authors subjected 744 PDDs to thorough textual 
analysis, looking for indications of how each project contributed to sustainable 
development.  A ranking of project types by number of boxes ticked assigns the highest 
score to methane reduction projects (coal bed methane, agriculture, landfill gas, fugitive 
methane and cement), with an average of 3.4 benefits per project.  Renewable energy 
projects score 3.2 benefits per project while energy efficiency projects are considerably 
lower – surprisingly – with an average score of 2.0 (Olsen and Fenhann, 2008). 
The more sophisticated multi-criteria approach seems to provide little additional insight 
and is heavy on data requirements (Olsen and Fenhann, 2008).  Sutter and Parreño’s 
much-cited study uses multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) to assess the sustainability 
benefits of 16 projects (Sutter and Parreno, 2007).  In principle, MAUT uses a utility 
function for each measure of sustainability, rather than simply ticking a box.  In practice, 
the “utility function” amounts to a subjective weighting of the boxes. 
Several researchers identify tradeoffs between GHG mitigation and sustainable 
development.  Sutter and Parreño found evidence of such a tradeoff by plotting their 
indicator of sustainable development against the probability that a project is additional 
as determined by estimating the increase in the project’s internal rate of return (ΔIRR) 
due to revenues from the sale of CERs (Sutter and Parreno, 2007).  In my view, this 
finding depends on the extreme position on their plot occupied by two categories of 
project, both of which were assessed as having almost no sustainability co-benefits.  
One of these was landfill gas, which is surprising as Olsen and Fenhann (2008) put this 
type of project in their highest category for sustainable development.  The other was 
HFC-23 destruction, which arguably should not be eligible to receive offsets at all.  




Some studies on sustainability, in my view, raise an important moral issue: for example, 
Boyd et al (2009) proposed a number of solutions to the problem of projects that do not 
promote sustainability.  Most of these solutions amount to rejecting projects that steer 
funds to a poor country, are acceptable to that country’s government and contribute to 
the global goal of cutting GHG emissions but, in the opinion of the researcher, do not 
contribute adequately to sustainable development (Boyd et al., 2009).   
3.2.6: Technology transfer and technology “leapfrogging” 
The important role of technology transfer in cutting GHG emissions is enshrined in 
Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC, and also in Article 10(c) of the Kyoto Protocol. It is a little 
surprising that the CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate; 
however the transfer of clean technology to developing countries is widely seen as at 
least an ancillary benefit of the CDM.42  It is seen as a crucial element of environmental 
“leapfrogging” – enabling developing countries to adopt modern, clean technologies 
and plot a development course that avoids the environmental blight that is the norm in 
countries that industrialized early.  By moving quickly to adopt clean technologies they 
can avoid “technology lock-in” – the problem of becoming dependent on very long lived 
assets that use old and often dirty technology (Lewis, 2010; Perkins, 2003).  A coal-fired 
power station, for example, has an expected lifetime of fifty years. 
There is some disagreement over exactly what technology transfer is.  Much discussion 
of the topic misses the key role of “soft” technology transfer.  For example, in the US 
and Europe the differential in construction costs between a subcritical coal-fired power 
plant and a more efficient supercritical43 plant of the same size is about 4% (MIT, 2007): 
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in India it is 41% (see section 4.4.2 and table 4.3).  The likely reason is that the subcritical 
technology has been thoroughly assimilated by Indian firms while the supercritical has 
not.  Clearly, technology in the form of design drawings and the like has been 
transferred: still required before the cost differential approaches that found in the 
developed world is a lengthy program of personnel training and familiarization, 
adaptation of designs to local requirements and probably the construction of several 
plants.  Perkins (2003) wrote about the need for local development of technological 
capabilities, broadly defined as the knowledge, skills and expertise required to manage 
the process of technological change and for local firms to successfully absorb plant and 
equipment under local conditions (Perkins, 2003).   
Studies of technology transfer in actual CDM projects provide insights – see the 
summary below - though careful interpretation of results is required.   
 Effective leapfrogging depends on government policies directed towards clear 
objectives including capacity development (Perkins, 2003).  Host government 
policies must complement support from the CDM (Olsen and Fenhann, 2008).  
However a project that is implemented in response to incentives set up by the 
national government risks being adjudged not additional.    
 The CDM seems to be effective in transferring technology where this amounts in 
practice to little more than operator training and integration into a community 
(Dechezlepretre et al., 2008; Forsyth, 2005).  However the needs identified by 
(Perkins, 2003) are an order of magnitude more complex.  For supercritical power 
plants to be absorbed by the Indian energy sector will require coordinated actions 
by government departments, universities and technical institutions, over a long 
period.  It seems unlikely that the CDM can contribute much to this process. 
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 Many leapfrogging technologies require heavy investment in R D & D (Research, 
Development and Demonstration) before they become viable (Perkins, 2003) - talk 
of technology transfer is premature.  There is a question of whether governments or 
the private sector should pay for this research, and of the use of any resulting 
intellectual property.  Some researchers have suggested setting up dedicated 
research centers in developing countries – for example Ambuj Sagar’s idea of 
Climate Innovation Centers (Sagar, 2010). 
3.2.7: Transaction costs, registration delays and the least developed countries 
During the early days of the CDM, researchers were concerned about high transaction 
costs linked to the complexities of the registration process.  However the anticipated 
problem has not really materialized: many early researchers used low estimates of 
offset prices and sometimes analyzed very small projects.  For example, (Michaelowa 
and Jotzo, 2005) used a price of about €4 per ton.44  As the impact of these costs must 
depend partly on the ratio of transaction costs to project revenues, (including CER 
revenues), these studies gave a misleading impression of the importance of transaction 
costs, which have turned out to be less of an issue than was feared. 
However the issue should not be ignored.  Recent commentary on the future of the 
CDM has identified two important problems that are related to transaction costs: the 
first, and possibly the more important, is the buildup of lengthy delays in the project 
registration process.  In the early days of the CDM this process did not work well.  The 
quality of work done by the DOEs was variable; guidance provided to them was poor; 
and the EB was under-resourced and able to review only a small proportion of projects 
(Schneider, 2007).  Victor comments that the EB was initially staffed with diplomats 
chosen with an eye mainly for regional diversity rather than skill (Victor, 2011).  The EB 
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was rightly criticized for its inadequate review procedures and for its acceptance – often 
without review – of projects that in hindsight were clearly not additional.  However with 
better resources – human and financial – the proportion of projects called in for review 
increased.  With more attention being given to project reviews, a new problem arose: 
delays to registration began to build up.  The average time taken increased from 373 
days to achieve registration and 316 days from registration to first issuance of CERs in 
2007 to 572 days and 607 days respectively in 2009 (World Bank, 2010).  
The second issue that can be linked to complexity of procedures and high transaction 
costs is the tiny number of CDM projects located in the least developed countries.  
There is a “growing perception that the distribution of credit revenues is extremely 
inequitable” (Wara, 2008).  The problem arises partly because of the small scale of 
reductions that can be identified in such countries.  Transaction costs that might seem 
trivial in the context of a typical Chinese CDM project become an insurmountable 
barrier for the much smaller projects that might be developed in sub-Saharan Africa. 
3.2.8: Measures to simplify CDM procedures 
The need to simplify CDM registration procedures as a solution to the problems noted in 
the preceding section has become a kind of mantra.  Even Lex de Jonge – a previous 
Chair of the EB - writing in (World Bank, 2010), said that the CDM’s stringent verification 
procedures would not be able to cope with the number of projects needed to make a 
significant difference to the level of emissions in a post-Kyoto world.   
Starting in 2009, the EB responded to these criticisms by restructuring, bringing in 
outside experts to deal with the project backlog and simplifying its administrative 
procedures.  Further changes, including the use of standardized baselines and emissions 
factors, were agreed in outline at the Durban climate conference in 2011 (see (World 
Bank, 2012).  The streamlined procedures sound helpful and should lead to savings of 




time to registration has fallen sharply since simple measures such as bringing in extra 
assessors on a contract basis were implemented, in late 2009 (the chart is taken, with 
permission, from an analysis by UNEP Risoe – see http://uneprisoe.org/).  The EB might 
feel that it solved the worst of the problems that cause excessive delays three years ago. 
Chart 3.1: Average time (days) from start comment until registration 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe (http://uneprisoe.org/) 
The use of default assumptions for baselines and emission factors is also potentially a 
sensible reform.  Presumably estimates of emissions saved will become slightly less 
accurate – one might assume that a standardized factor is less likely to be “correct” than 
a custom-designed one - however the impact is likely to be small.  However it is 
worrying that a major study made by the World Bank Carbon Finance team refers to 
“the standardization of baseline emissions and its embedded additionality 
demonstration” as “the process of establishing the baseline also determines 
additionality” (Platonova-Oqab et al., 2012).  Setting the baseline determines whether 
or not emissions have been reduced: additionality depends on whether the reduction 















Section 3.2.1 summarizes problems with determination of additionality: the majority, 
and in my view the most difficult, come down to exaggeration of barriers, the use of 
dubious assumptions in financial analysis and (most important), the difficulty of 
determining whether a project would be implemented without the CDM subsidy.  
Standardized baselines have nothing to say about these issues.  They may speed up 
determination of additionality, but they will make it less accurate. 
Another measure aimed at simplifying registration procedures is the introduction of 
programs of activities (PoAs).  A PoA combines large numbers of dispersed activities that 
cumulatively may have a large effect on CO₂ emissions but individually would not justify 
the cost of CDM registration – the archetypal example is the distribution of compact 
fluorescent lightbulbs.45  The concept has been compared to franchising: each PoA is 
administered by a managing entity - typically a public sector body or an NGO.  The 
managing entity deals with the UNFCCC and is responsible for the registration process.  
It does not itself carry out activities that reduce carbon emissions – its role is to provide 
guidance and incentives for participants to undertake CDM program activities (CPAs).  
The participants may be small entities such as buildings undertaking energy efficiency 
programs; SMEs that do not have the resources to initiate a CDM project, or farms.     
PoAs have been eligible for registration since 2005, however detailed procedures were 
issued only in 2007.  Since then, a total of 269 have applied for registration but the 
process has been slow: as of April 2012, 18 PoAs had been registered. 46   Registration of 
a PoA includes enrolment of one sample CPA: by April 2012, only 4 had actually enrolled 
further CPAs, and no CPA had yet had been awarded CERs. 
                                                     
45 It appears that the distribution of compact fluorescent lightbulbs would be eligible, but 
creation of a national standard to make their use mandatory would not be. 
46 Much of my description of PoAs is taken from a guidance document issued by the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) – see http://cd4cdm.org/Publications/PrimerCMDPoA.pdf 




With no real track record to analyze it is hard to come to any categorical conclusion 
about PoAs, but the slow registration process and the small number that have enrolled 
CPAs – let alone generated CER revenue – makes it seem unlikely that PoAs are going to 
radically alter the fortunes of the CDM. 
3.3: THE FUTURE OF OFFSET MECHANISMS 
Climate conferences since Copenhagen have pointed to the importance of new market 
mechanisms (NMMs) as sources of finance for GHG mitigation in the developing world.  
The Durban climate conference, in 2011, deferred a decision on NMMs to the 2012 
conference in Qatar, but did agree on a timetable for negotiations.  These will be 
completed by 2015, with agreed new actions against climate change to be implemented 
by 2020.  It reiterated that these negotiations will consider the role of NMMs.  Whether 
the intention is to replace the CDM with an NMM or supplement it is unclear; however 
it does seem that offset mechanisms will continue post-2020 in some form.   
One approach the negotiators might take would be to retain the CDM and attempt to 
solve its obvious problems – summarized in section 3.2.  Emma Paulsson comments that 
many of the papers that she examined for her review of research amounted to problem 
solving (Paulsson, 2009).  The negotiations might also consider taking a radically 
different approach.  In fact, there is a good reason to prefer radical change to the CDM 
over piecemeal improvement - this is that a re-launched CDM might be far smaller than 
today’s version.  In my view, the research summarized in section 3.2 demonstrates that 
the most intractable problem of the CDM is its high proportion of non-additional 
projects.  Victor (2009) believes that insistence on strict additionality would eliminate 
many projects, raise transaction costs even higher and sharply reduce the role of the 
CDM in carbon finance.  It could no longer be the principal mechanism for engaging 
developing countries and would lose its relevance to the task of cutting GHG emissions 
sufficiently to slow the rate of climate change (Victor, 2009).  It is hard to argue with this 




the grounds that they should be dealt with using a command and control approach) and 
all projects that appear to have been built in response to government policy decisions 
(as they are, by definition, not additional), there would not be much left.   
A compromise between fixing the CDM and a genuinely radical alternative would be to 
move away from the project by project analysis and crediting of the CDM by adopting 
sectoral crediting.  The EU, for example, has indicated that it wants to negotiate one or 
more sectoral schemes with developing countries.  Another likely area for discussion will 
be the possibility of creating a link between issuance of offsets and the financial support 
that has been promised for NAMAs (nationally appropriate mitigation actions – see 
section 3.3.3).  Finally, the discussions will probably try to create a regulatory framework 
for the bilateral negotiation of NMMs such as the proposed Japanese BOCM.  In this 
section I examine the pros and cons of all of these then conclude with some discussion 
of a truly radical alternative. 
3.3.1: Sectoral Agreements and Sectoral Crediting Mechanisms 
Sectoral Agreements (SAs) have been discussed as a possible alternative to project 
based offset schemes for many years.  The original concept called for agreement at the 
level of an industry sector: targets might include emissions intensity – emissions per ton 
of cement produced, for example – or introduction of an efficient technology – percent 
of kilns using heat recovery technology – or even just absolute emissions levels.  Lewis 
distinguishes between a scheme aimed at firms working in a sector and a scheme aimed 
at influencing government policy (Lewis, 2010).  A policy-based scheme would take the 
form of a government level agreement between a developed country or countries47 and 
a host country, which would commit to adopt a specified climate-friendly policy.  Offset 
credits could be awarded to the host country government corresponding to emission 
                                                     




reductions that could be shown to result from the policy.  An obvious problem would be 
how to determine whether a specific policy is driving emission reductions (Lewis, 2010).  
Another problem would be determination of the baseline – the level of emissions that 
would occur in the absence of the policy.  Ideally, the policy would also meet host 
country objectives – for example, a policy of investment in renewable energy would cut 
GHG emissions: it would also cut pollution and save fuel imports (Wooders, 2011).  A 
policy-based SA could cover a whole national economy: following the failure at 
Copenhagen, several developing countries proposed targets for overall emissions 
intensity - these could become baselines for whole-economy SAs (Wooders, 2011).  The 
objective would be to create incentives for the national government to adopt policies 
that push the private sector into low carbon investments while avoiding the complexity 
of project by project verification (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011). 
An SA aimed at firms operating in a sector that enables a country to generate credits 
when the sector as a whole surpasses its targets is a Sectoral Crediting Mechanism, or 
SCM (Lewis, 2010).  The incentive provided by an SCM is unclear: the result achieved 
depends on actions taken by individual firms, but success is measured at the sector level 
– there is a lack of obvious incentives at the level where actions have to be taken (Lewis, 
2010).  On the plus side, a SCM would remove the need for project by project approvals, 
however crediting implies a baseline and would still require assessment of additionality 
– albeit at the sector level - while compliance must be verified if large numbers of 
valuable offsets depend on it.  The requirement for international MRV48 brings the issue 
of sovereignty into play.  Wooders (2011) warned that developing countries are 
suspicious of SAs – they tend to see them as imposition of emissions caps by stealth.  
Another potentially serious issue is that, in a sector producing a widely traded product 
                                                     




such as steel, it would be hard to avoid discussion of tariffs on imports from countries 
that are not in the agreement, leading to problems with the WTO (Wooders, 2011).   
Getting the baseline wrong would have worse consequences in the case of a SCM than 
allowing a single CDM project to get away with a dubious demonstration of 
additionality.  The sector-wide scale of an SCM means that, while it will make a bigger 
impression on GHG emissions than the CDM has if it is well designed, it will generate a 
much greater number of dubious offsets if it is not (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011).  Some 
protection against over-generosity could be built in by setting the baseline below BAU - 
this would have the added advantage of ensuring that the host government had to 
contribute to emissions cuts (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011).  Many researchers suggest 
that, if emissions turn out higher than the baseline, there should be no penalty – the 
host country is in a “no-lose” situation (Schmidt et al., 2008).   
3.3.2: Bilateral NMM proposals 
The Bali road map for action against climate change raised the potential role of new 
market mechanisms (NMMs) as a source of finance for GHG mitigation projects in the 
developing world: any new agreement on coordinated global action against climate 
change will almost certainly include some form of NMM.  However some countries or 
groups of countries are pushing ahead with bilateral or multilateral negotiations on 
offset crediting schemes.  It seems likely that at least one of these groups will reach an 
agreement first.  The most advanced of the schemes currently under discussion is the 
Japanese BOCM, while the EU has stated its intention to create one or more NMMs.  
 Japan is actively negotiating bilateral offsets deals.  It has committed to an 
ambitious 2020 target for emission reductions and is likely to use offsets to ensure 
compliance.  It could buy credits generated by existing Kyoto mechanisms but, 




known as BOCM, for Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism.49  Japan proposes to finance 
GHG mitigation projects in South East Asian countries and award itself offsets 
reflecting the emissions reductions achieved.  It is currently negotiating with several 
potential partners: according to CDC Climat,50 over 100 feasibility studies have been 
completed or are under way.  Japan hopes to issue the first BOCM credits in 2013.   
 The EU also proposes to negotiate bilateral deals with developing countries with a 
view to generating offsets that would be EU ETS eligible.  The EU proposal is not yet 
well defined, however the EU’s current view is that NMMs set up under bilateral 
agreements would most likely be sectoral schemes.  Damien Meadows, Head of the 
International Carbon Market unit at the EU Commission, writing in (World Bank, 
2011), indicated that the EU is advocating the creation of “new and more ambitious 
sectoral mechanisms” set up under new multilateral and bilateral agreements that 
should replace the CDM in the major economies of the developing world.  The CDM 
could co-exist with these NMMs but should focus on the least developed countries.   
Likely issues with bilateral NMMs include the timing of their introduction, possible 
problems of overlap between schemes and the extent to which the UNFCCC should be 
involved.  There is no obvious need for any scheme to increase the global supply of 
offsets prior to 2020 - there is already a significant oversupply (section 5.1.5).  However 
the Japanese BOCM is likely to issue its first offsets in the near future.  Some researchers 
are concerned at the prospect of a proliferation of offset units with different degrees of 
credibility and environmental integrity (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011).  A potential 
solution would require some degree of UNFCCC involvement in the content and 
administration of NMMs: at one extreme, evaluation and MRV could be entrusted to the 
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UNFCCC: at the other, a developed country could help an undeveloped one to adopt low 
carbon policies and award itself offset credits according to its own assessment of their 
success – in fact, there is no obvious reason why a market should be involved at all.   
Flues et al (2010) point out that an international authority may be less susceptible to 
political pressure and horse-trading than a national one (quoted in (de Sépibus and 
Tuerk, 2011)).  There is a strong case for common accounting principles and robust 
standards for MRV as well as coordination between schemes to avoid double counting 
of reductions - as a minimum, a framework agreement for bilateral and multilateral 
schemes should be agreed at the level of the UNFCCC (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011).   
3.3.3: NAMAs 
There is a great deal of overlap between the concept of an NMM and the concept of a 
NAMA, or “nationally appropriate mitigation action” – a term that apparently first 
cropped up in the Bali Action Plan (see section 2.5).  A NAMA is an action taken 
unilaterally by a developing country that is intended to reduce GHG emissions.  Different 
actions may be appropriate for different countries - the term is not well defined (World 
Bank, 2012).  Some NAMAs could receive financing from Annex 1 countries – in some 
cases a proposed NAMA may be contingent on such financing.  The UNFCCC proposes to 
establish a registry of NAMAs, with rules for monitoring and reporting of results. 
With a framework in place for registering NAMAs and at least outline rules for MRV, it 
would be possible for an individual NAMA to develop into a sectoral crediting 
mechanism (World Bank, 2012).  Vasa and Neuhoff point to a key difference between 
this approach and that taken by the CDM: if a NAMA based on a host government policy 
creates a favorable environment for a low carbon project, that project would probably 
be adjudged non-additional if submitted for CDM registration.  The CDM creates a 
perverse incentive not to implement such policies (Vasa and Neuhoff, 2011).  A NAMA-




subsidies for actions that developing countries are taking in their own interests such as 
the PAT (Perform, Achieve and Trade) scheme for trading of energy efficiency 
certificates being introduced by India (Wooders, 2011).  PAT is a market based scheme 
intended to incentivize energy efficiency measures: it would certainly contribute to 
cutting GHG emissions, but as the PAT scheme is being set up by the Indian government 
to meet its own domestic objectives, cuts resulting from it would not be seen as 
additional under the rules of the CDM. 
3.3.4: Getting away from the global approach 
A more radical approach would be to jettison the whole package of global agreements 
intended to lead to offset mechanisms covering all countries and all sectors of their 
economies.  In a recent book, David Victor suggested that negotiations between small 
groups of countries with similar interests – or interests that complement each other – 
are more likely to succeed than the global approach.  If they are seen to be successful 
and to be serving the interests of the participants, others will want to join (Victor, 2011).  
In the case of offset schemes, the EU operates the world’s biggest cap & trade scheme 
and the US, in Victor’s opinion, will eventually operate an even bigger one.  Given a 
sufficiently high price for credits (not the case today), access to offset markets linked to 
these schemes would offer host countries the possibility of generous subsidies for GHG 
mitigation projects.  Better still, many of these projects serve the interests of the host 
country by cutting pollution or saving energy imports and the subsidies on offer would 
bring in private sector investment, multiplying flows to host countries. 
Victor’s key argument for his proposal is that negotiations over a single global scheme 
will run into the problem that it is not obvious which set of offsets rules will work best.  
The CDM is the only scheme that has really been tried, and it is deeply flawed.  This lack 
of a clearly superior solution suggests to Victor that multiple offset systems should be 
encouraged to compete.  The Japanese BOCM should be seen as a positive step towards 




A paper by Keohane and Victor explores the institutional bases underlying alternative 
international climate regimes (Keohane and Victor, 2010).  They see such regimes lying 
on a continuum between comprehensive global arrangements and fragmented local 
deals - they use the term “regime complex” to mean an array of narrowly focused 
institutions and regulatory arrangements, at best loosely coordinated, but with a 
common aim.  In their view, differences in objectives and degrees of commitment 
inherent in the negotiating process and reflected in proposals for international 
agreements mean that key actors are likely to prefer a regime complex over any feasible 
agreement on a global integrated approach.  They suggest, also, that a regime complex 
is likely to be more effective in bringing GHG emissions under control.  
Taking offset schemes as an example, some other researchers agree that there is a lot to 
be said for diversity, provided that too much variety in the design of individual schemes 
does not compromise their environmental integrity (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011).  For 
example, developing countries would argue for the highest possible baseline: it is not 
difficult to imagine a country negotiating simultaneously with two potential partners to 
get the best baseline deal.  There is an argument for the continuing involvement of the 
UNFCCC – an encouraging development at the Durban climate conference in 2011 was a 
proposal that the UNFCCC should agree on a set of outline rules that would apply to 
schemes negotiated outside the UNFCCC process.   
Going beyond Victor’s concept of a diversity of schemes, it is worth asking whether 
project origination and cap & trade compliance should be completely deintegrated.  The 
recent changes in the EU’s rules on the eligibility of projects for EU ETS compliance are a 
significant precedent – they rub in the point that there are very few markets for offsets 
and those markets are effectively buyers’ cartels.  At present the only buyers of any 
significance are the participants in the EU ETS – and they buy what the rules of the EU 
ETS allow them to buy.  If the EU is prepared to take on rule making responsibility – as it 




UNFCCC hardly matter.  An agreement between the EU and Japan on standards for 
offset origination would close the market for sub-standard projects as effectively as a 
UNFCCC agreement – and might be a lot easier to negotiate. 
Victor’s concept for future offset schemes would completely reverse the logic that drove 
negotiation of the CDM, which ostensibly is not intended to cut emissions.  Its objectives 
are to bring down compliance costs for developed countries subject to mandatory 
emissions caps while promoting sustainable development.  If it involves the developing 
countries in the global effort to combat climate change, that is a bonus.  Victor believes 
that the difficult task of negotiating a framework for new offset schemes is not worth 
the effort unless the result makes a real dent in GHG emissions by pushing the fast 
developing countries towards a low carbon development path.  Reducing rich world 
compliance costs and promoting sustainable development are merely useful bonuses. 
This opens up the proverbial can of worms.  The Kyoto Protocol avoids imposing any 
sort of obligation on developing countries and at all climate summits since Kyoto the 
developing world has forcefully expressed the view that it should not be subject to 
restrictions on emissions because its pressing need for economic development overrides 
the long term need for reducing emissions; also because the developed world is 
responsible for most of the CO₂ in the atmosphere today and should make the sacrifices 
needed to reduce it.  These are essentially moral arguments and they have some 
validity.  However it is impossible to ignore the fact that a developing country – China - 
is the world’s biggest emitter of GHGs, and India is not far behind.  What is required is 
an approach that is likely to incentivize significant reductions from BAU emissions in 
these countries but does not involve setting a target and cannot be misrepresented as 




3.4: SUMMARY – LESSONS LEARNED AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A future offset scheme need not be a development of the CDM (but can learn from it), 
nor does it have to be agreed through the UNFCCC process.  There is obvious merit in 
the ideas outlined in the previous section: Sectoral Crediting as envisaged by the EU; 
NMMs negotiated independently of the UNFCCC process, such as the proposed 
Japanese BOCMs and the Californian proposals; and the idea of linking NAMAs to a 
market based scheme.  Victor’s ideas about the advantages of a diversity of schemes 
sound convincing.  A lot may depend on the success of the negotiating process currently 
under way and intended to finish in 2015.  It might succeed in agreeing on a global level 
successor to the CDM (though the precedents are not good – negotiations since Kyoto 
have produced many agreements, but no concrete results).  It might fail to agree on a 
successor to the CDM but produce comprehensive guidelines for bilateral schemes – 
David Victor would presumably say that that would be even better.  Possibly the only 
really bad outcome would be failure to agree even on guidelines. 
Without prescribing the details of a new scheme – which would be beyond the scope of 
this research – I outline below some guiding principles for an offset scheme that could 
replace or complement the CDM.  It could equally well become the basis of a bilateral 
scheme in the context of competing schemes envisaged by Victor.  In Chapter 4 I analyze 
two case studies and draw out lessons for a sectoral offsets scheme based on renewable 
energy; in Chapter 5 I consider the potential supply of offsets from a scheme such as 
that outlined and the potential demand, bearing in mind the warning by Vasa and 
Neuhoff that if a future offsets scheme is big enough to make a real impression, it is not 
clear how the resulting flood of CERs could be absorbed by the emissions trading market 




3.4.1: Guidelines for a future offsets scheme 
The guiding principles outlined below are essentially an attempt to bring together the 
positive features of the proposals described in section 3.3, taking account of the 
problems encountered with the CDM, as described in section 3.2.  It is intended to be 
applicable to a NMM negotiated at a global level, but could also guide bilateral 
negotiations in the context of scheme diversity as envisaged by Victor.  In the latter 
scenario, an agreed set of rules with minimal guidelines for evaluation and verification 
and allowing for coordination of competing schemes should be negotiated, either at 
UNFCCC level (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011) or in direct negotiations between 
administrators of competing schemes.  
 The overriding objective of a future scheme must be to reduce carbon emissions in 
developing countries.  The level of reductions targeted should be commensurate 
with the scale of GHG emissions in countries such as China and India.  It is not 
practical to base an offsets scheme on this scale on project by project review.  
Several researchers have pointed out the implications for assessment of 
additionality: for example, Grubb et al called for a change in emphasis from project-
by-project additionality to a broader focus on whether the scheme channels 
investment flows towards lower carbon choices on a large scale (Grubb et al., 2011).  
Lewis questioned whether a future scheme might be better structured to encourage 
larger scale reductions, with less inefficiencies in transaction costs, and less 
ambiguity over additionality (Lewis, 2010). 
 Future offsets schemes should cover individual sectors or groups of closely related 
sectors.  A major advantage of a sectoral scheme that has not been noted elsewhere 
is that rules for additionality can be designed round the characteristics of the sector: 
arguably, one of the reasons that the CDM has failed to guarantee additionality is 
that its rules are over-complex as they have to cover many dissimilar sectors.  




obvious low emissions alternatives: the hypothetical scheme analyzed in Chapters 4 
and 5, aimed at incentivizing the substitution of renewable generation for coal, is an 
example of this targeting approach. 
 An offset scheme provides a subsidy that is directly proportional both to power 
generated and to the expected emission saving.  A capital subsidy, by contrast, 
incentivizes investment and may result in poorly designed projects as developers 
receive the incentive payment regardless of project output.  India discontinued 
accelerated depreciation for investment in wind turbines – effectively a capital 
subsidy - in April 2012.  The Renewable Energy Minister, Dr Farooq Abdullah, stated 
that accelerated depreciation had incentivized companies to erect most of India’s 
wind generation capacity to cut their tax rather than to generate power.51  However, 
a capital subsidy in the form of a grant or soft loan might be appropriate in the case 
of a one-off project such as modifications to a transmission grid to accommodate 
more wind generation.  A future offsets scheme might be more effective if it 
operated in tandem with a fund that would finance projects that are not suitable for 
offset financing. 
 Additionality is vitally important – if additionality cannot be proved the scheme 
should not award offsets.  The suggestion made above that an offset scheme should 
incentivize performance rather than aim to remove barriers to investment implies 
that there is no need for the barrier analysis approach to determination of 
additionality.  Barrier analysis has, in any case, been much abused (Schneider, 2007).  
Rules for determining additionality should actively reward host country policies that 
incentivize investment in low carbon generation schemes, rather than excluding 
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them as the CDM does.  An approach to the assessment of additionality that is 
consistent with these requirements is proposed in Chapter 4. 
 Subsidies provided by the scheme should be generous enough to attract investment 
and should be reasonably predictable.  There is a strong argument for a floor price 
for offsets or for demand management through flexible application of emissions 
caps or possibly through some central purchasing agency.  Another possibility would 





4: Project analysis and case studies 
Asia’s economic tigers – a group of fast growing developing countries – have achieved 
impressive rates of economic growth in recent years.  An unwelcome side-effect has 
been rapid growth in GHG emissions (IEA, 2011), increasing the risk of disastrous climate 
change.  A series of global climate summits has failed to agree on an effective response 
– however, in my conclusions to Chapter 3, I suggest that an effective response does not 
have to be global.  A focused offsets scheme based on sectoral crediting could achieve 
significant cuts in global GHG emissions with only a few countries participating.  In this 
chapter I present two case studies that suggest design parameters for an offsets scheme 
focused on one sector – electricity generation – and one set of countries – fast 
developing countries that are largely dependent on coal for their energy supply. 
4.1: THE PROBLEM AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
IEA forecasts52 summarized in section 1.1 indicate that, by 2020, coal used in power 
stations will account for 31% of all global emissions of CO₂ from fossil fuel combustion - 
up from 24% in 1990.  The increase has occurred entirely in the developing countries.  
By 2020, emissions from coal fired power stations in China and India alone will account 
for 17% of global emissions from fossil fuel combustion (IEA, 2011).  A slowdown of the 
key Asian economies is possible, but these countries have shown they are capable of 
high growth rates and they are driven to achieve them: they are poor by western 
standards and must accord a very high priority to economic development.  Their chosen 
path to development involves industrial growth, which depends on growth in electricity 
supply.  I conclude that any realistic approach to cutting global GHG emissions should 
focus on cutting emissions per MWh generated in these countries. 
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Potentially, this could be achieved by increased use of nuclear power or “clean coal” – 
efficient coal fired power stations combined with carbon capture and sequestration 
(CCS).  However these are long term prospects, at best.  Another possibility is natural 
gas, which emits half the CO₂ of coal per unit of electricity generated.  Proven reserves 
of gas in these countries are limited, but both China and India are actively exploring for 
unconventional gas such as the shale gas that has revolutionized the US energy scene.  I 
discuss the possibility of unconventional gas as a partial solution to Chinese and Indian 
emissions problems in section 4.2.1.  However, even if the gas is there, development of 
the infrastructure that will be needed if it is to replace a significant proportion of coal 
for power generation will require huge amounts of capital and a lot of time.  With 
technological solutions and shale gas development both long term prospects – if they 
are going to happen at all – the only realistic option for cutting emissions from power 
generation in the relatively short term is renewable energy.   
The problem with renewable energy is that it is expensive – and coal is cheap.  The real 
problem, then, is financial: there is a need for a scheme or schemes to channel funds to 
the main coal consuming countries in the developing world to incentivize the use of 
renewable generation by covering at least part of the added cost compared to coal.  In 
section 3.4.1 I suggest that the incentive provided should be linked to the expected 
emission saving – this is the case with renewable generation as a project’s impact on 
carbon emissions and the added cost of electricity supplies are both proportional to 
power generated.  Also in section 3.4.1 I make the case for combining offsets with a 
fund able to make grants or soft loans as some projects - modifications to a transmission 
grid, for example – may contribute to cutting GHG emissions, but with no direct 
relationship between the subsidy required and the effect on emissions.  An important 
research objective is to examine the characteristics of renewable energy projects in 
developing countries to determine how different types of project might best be treated 




In this chapter I present empirical analyses of the economic characteristics of renewable 
generation projects in China and India.  These countries were chosen as case studies 
because of their size combined with their dependence on coal fired generation; 
however the conclusions concerning the design of a financing scheme aimed at 
incentivizing the use of renewable energy apply in other coal-dependent countries.  The 
two studies have been (or will be) published separately – see (Partridge and Gamkhar, 
2010, 2012b) and are reproduced in Chapters 7-9 of this document. 
The analysis in both case studies is based on samples of renewable generation projects 
drawn from the UNFCCC database of registered CDM projects.  The analysis excludes 
renewable technologies that are not represented in that database (geothermal, ocean 
energy and solar thermal generation).  Solar PV is an important energy resource for 
India, but as of April 2012 only two grid connected solar PV plants had been registered 
as CDM projects in India – we estimate their generation costs but the sample is too 
small to arrive at useful conclusions.  We did not assess biomass projects because our 
methodology cannot be applied to these plants: many of them supply process heat to an 
installation such as a sugar mill; as there is no market-based alternative source of 
process heat, there is no basis for estimating its value so the net cost of power 
generated by the project cannot be determined.  The same comment applies to 
combined heat and power plants, of which there are a few in the UNFCCC database for 
China.  The papers comment on gas fired power stations in China (Chapter 7) and on 
high efficiency coal fired plants that have been registered as CDM project activities in 
India (Chapter 9), however in this research I do not comment on these technologies. 
The methodology of the case studies is described in section 4.2 below.  The studies of 
China and India are summarized in sections 4.3-4.4.  To avoid proliferation of citations, it 
should be understood that these sections are summaries of papers published – or to be 




4.2: SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY 
The basis of our methodology is a comparison of generation costs between a renewable 
technology and a baseline.  In both China and India, coal is the most important energy 
source - it accounted for 72% of generation in China and 66% in India in 2009.  On 
current policies it will provide half of the expected increase in generation in China 
during the period 2009-2020, and 56% of the increase in India (IEA, 2011).  In both 
countries electricity demand is growing fast – all this points to the use of the marginal 
coal fired plant (i.e. the next to be built) as the baseline for comparison purposes as any 
increase in renewable generation will displace new marginal coal capacity.   
We use this cost comparison as the basis for calculation of the marginal abatement cost 
(MAC) for cuts in CO₂ emissions achieved by substituting renewable energy for coal fired 
generation in the same region.  We define the MAC of project p as: 
      
      
      
 (1) 
where Cp is the generation cost per unit of electricity generated by the project and Cb is 
the cost per unit for the baseline plant.  Ep is the volume of CO₂ emissions per unit of 
electricity generated by the project and Eb is the volume for the baseline plant. 
This relationship is an approximation: in reality, when some types of renewable 
generation (wind and solar, for example) are added to an existing national system, the 
volume of CO₂ emitted by conventional plants is affected as their patterns of operation 
change to compensate for the intermittency of the renewable resource.  A more 
accurate – but far less analytically tractable – approach to the calculation of MAC would 
define Ep and Eb as emissions per unit of electricity generated by the entire system with 
and without the project.  In section 9.2.4 I examine this effect in more detail and show 
that use of the simplified definition as presented above is likely to have a limited impact 




In Chapter 3, I point to the importance of additionality in the design of an offset scheme.  
By definition, a project is additional if it results in a reduction in GHG emissions in the 
country concerned and it would not be built without the subsidy.  The CDM – currently 
by far the largest carbon offsets scheme – has been criticized because a high proportion 
of projects accepted for registration are not additional (section 3.2.1).  One of the 
objectives of this research is to demonstrate the use of an alternative approach to 
determination of additionality intended for a sectoral crediting scheme in the power 
generation sector.  In summary, this is that a renewable energy project is non-additional 
if it would be economically rational to build it without a subsidy.  It is assumed that this 
is the case if the project’s generation cost is lower than the baseline.  This new approach 
to determination of additionality is discussed further in section 4.6. 
4.2.1: Could other fuels replace coal as the baseline? 
Based on the situation today, it is reasonable to assume that the baseline generation 
technology in both China and India is coal.  It is necessary to ask whether this 
assumption will always be valid – what is the prospect of another technology with lower 
carbon emissions per MWh generated replacing coal? 
Of technologies that are reasonably well developed, only three appear to have any 
prospect of usurping the role of coal in China and India during the next twenty years.  
One is nuclear; another is unconventional gas – particularly shale gas, which has 
dramatically changed the energy picture in the USA; the third possibility – at least in 
India - is that distributed generation based on solar and biomass could absorb much of 
the expected growth in electricity demand. 
India is something of a true believer in nuclear power, but its nuclear investment 
program starts from a low base and construction of a nuclear power station is a slow 
process.  The country has plans to increase nuclear generation tenfold between 2009 




production.  And like other countries, India is experiencing popular resistance to its 
plans for nuclear - an article in World Politics Review suggested that this could slow the 
planned growth in nuclear generation.53  The picture is similar in China, where IEA 
forecasts have nuclear providing 9.5% of electricity generated in 2035.  However China 
suspended its nuclear construction program for a year after Fukushima and may now 
proceed more cautiously.54   It seems unlikely that nuclear generation will seriously rival 
coal in either India or China in the near future. 
Natural gas is more promising: a recent IEA publication Golden Rules for a Golden Age of 
Gas (IEA, 2012) explores the possibility other countries will experience the same 
transformed energy outlook that the US has seen in recent years due to growth of 
output of gas from unconventional sources.  In a high production scenario that it calls 
the Golden Rules Case (because companies gain public acceptance of their activities by 
observing rules for environmental protection) the IEA forecasts rapid growth of gas 
production in both China and India – between 2010 and 2035 it expects these countries 
to increase their gas production by 390% and 120% respectively.  However in both 
countries demand also increases - natural gas has advantages for purposes as diverse as 
transport fuel and cooking.  Even if output increases as forecast, both countries are 
expected to remain large net importers of gas.  The report does not include forecasts of 
electricity production by fuel, but it seems very unlikely that either country will see 
natural gas taking over from coal as the baseline for power generation.  Possibly this will 
happen in a few regions of China: in India, the most that can be expected is more gas 
fired generation in polluted urban areas and more use of gas for peaking purposes and 
(taking advantage of its inherent flexibility) as backup to renewables. 
                                                     
53 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10717/indias-nuclear-energy-plans-face-post-
fukushima-hurdles (accessed 07/01/2012) 
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Distributed generation is widely regarded as the wave of the future: a cynic might add 
that it always will be.  However it has stirred up optimism in India, where almost 300 
million people have no access to the electricity grid (IEA, 2011).  The Indian government 
puts a high priority on rural electrification and sees distributed generation as potentially 
contributing to this objective.  The main technologies involved are relatively simple and 
there is more scope for individual initiative and competition than in the gas business, 
with its underlying natural monopoly.  There are also negatives: there are some large 
vested interests behind extension of the grid, which would maintain the key roles of the 
state owned companies and the private sector concerns that have invested in power 
generation.  The government has prioritized distributed generation for rural areas, but 
will have a hard time maintaining focus when the problems in the grid connected sector 
are so pressing and the lobbying power of its protagonists so overwhelming. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that distributed generation as a way to meet the energy 
needs of rural areas will grow rapidly.  It will not supplant coal as the baseline power 
source: what it might do is to enable India to grow its economy while expanding energy 
supply to all sectors of the population.  If distributed generation can free up the grid 
connected sector to put less emphasis on a frenetic growth rate55 and more on 
infrastructure, meeting peak load requirements and integration of renewables, the 
economy will benefit.  The need to maximize investment in renewables and cut the use 
of coal would still be a key driver of India’s energy policy, leaving the analysis presented 
in this research still valid. 
In China there is less scope for increased use of distributed generation, if only because 
the power distribution grid has covered practically the whole country.  Successive rural 
electrification programs over more than 50 years have brought electricity to 98% of the 
population (Pan et al., 2006). 
                                                     




Both China and India have policies in place to increase generation from fuels other than 
coal: but in both cases the need for increased electricity output is huge and none of the 
fuels considered is likely to make much of a dent in it.  I conclude that coal is the 
appropriate baseline for this analysis. 
4.2.2: Renewable energy projects – data source and samples 
The case studies presented here are based on samples of projects taken from the 
UNFCCC database of CDM project activities (see http://cdm.unfccc.int).  This unique 
dataset now includes more than 4,000 registered projects located in developing 
countries.  For each of them a project design document (PDD) is posted on the UNFCCC 
website.  Data in the PDDs have been reviewed by international consultancy firms 
specialized in the field and although the assessment methods used by the UNFCCC have 
developed over the years, there is a high degree of consistency in presentation.  
Researchers have made surprisingly little use of this database, although it appears to be 
the only source of actual data on renewables projects in the developing world that are 
fully validated by private, UN certified agencies, internally consistent and cover a 
sufficient number of projects that statistically useful samples can be obtained. 
The sample of Chinese renewable energy projects covers 100% of grid-connected 
projects using wind or small hydro that were proposed for CDM registration prior to 
April 1 2009 and had achieved registration by March 1 2010.  Of the 441 projects, 
twenty six could not be used as the PDD did not provide sufficient data,56 leaving a 
usable sample of 434 – see table 4.1.  The twenty six unusable projects included 
nineteen wind farms and seven small hydro schemes.  They were mostly early projects: 
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need to provide financial data; the others used investment analysis but the PDD provides 
insufficient information to permit a proper assessment.  For example, four projects provided 




they included twenty of twenty eight projects proposed for registration through 
November 2006 but only six out of 432 projects proposed after that date.   
For Indian projects, the sample comprises 100% of wind and small hydro projects 
registered as of 12/31/2011.  Several of these are “split” projects – i.e. two or more sub-
projects share the same UNFCCC reference number.  As with the China sample, a 
number of projects – mainly early projects - lacked data: for example, seventeen of the 
60 wind projects (including split projects) that requested registration in 2005-2007 could 
not be used, but for 2008-2011 the figures are two out of 199.  For hydro, 27 out of 41 
2005-2007 projects could not be used but only three out of 46 of the 2008-2011 
projects.  Table 4.1 provides a summary of both the Indian and Chinese samples used. 
Despite the bias towards early projects, there is no indication that the omissions create 
any distortion of our results.  The statistical tests used are described in Chapter 8. 
Table 4.1: Project samples 
Number of Projects 
India China 
Wind Hydro Wind Hydro 
Registered projects 249 87 136 305 
Split projects included 10 0 N/A N/A 
Projects not usable 19 30 19 7 
Total sample of CDM projects 240 57 117 298 
Source: UNEP Risoe 
4.2.3: Estimation of generation cost  
Our estimates of generation cost for both baseline plants and renewable technologies 
are built up from the formula: 
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energy content of the fuel used, the delivered cost of coal and the efficiency of the 
plant.  Estimates of operating cost elements other than fuel are obtained from various 
sources – the most important are project PDDs (as many CDM projects use a coal fired 
power station as a baseline) together with (MIT, 2007; Mott McDonald, 2006).  For a 
wind or solar plant, fuel cost is obviously zero: operating costs and plant load factor 
(power generated during an average year as a proportion of the maximum possible) for 
renewable energy projects are given in project PDDs.   
Capital cost is estimated using the annual capital charge (ACC) methodology (Merrett 
and Sykes, 1973) to spread the construction cost of a project over its lifetime.  The ACC 
calculation requires estimates of cost of equity and cost of debt as inputs: for India, this 
research relies on published values used by the regulatory authorities to set tariffs (see 
http://cercind.gov.in/Current_reg.html); while for China, project PDDs provide 
information on standard figures used by the authorities.   
We adjust our estimated cost of wind generation to reflect costs linked to the 
intermittent nature of wind power.  Grid operators incur costs to provide a capacity 
reserve for low wind periods; there are also problems with the supply of reactive power 
(though control systems fitted to modern wind turbines have led to improvements in 
this respect).  Estimation of integration costs requires a complex simulation of the 
complete supply system: no such exercise has been attempted in either India or China.  
A review of fifteen European and US studies (Holttinen et al., 2009) shows that 
integration costs per MWh increase with the proportion of supply to the grid 
contributed by wind.  No simple relationship is apparent, but a conservative estimate of 
integration costs when wind accounts for up to 5% of total supply,57 based on the 
studies reviewed in Holttinen et al, would be $1.50 per MWh.  We add this $1.50 to our 
estimated cost of wind generation for all locations. 
                                                     




Another consideration related to the integration of wind into the supply system is that 
the grid must have the flexibility to transition from wind to conventional generation 
when required.  India’s Southern regional grid is essentially isolated - this means that 
wind generation in the South, which has 42% of the country’s wind capacity,58 must be 
backed up by spare conventional capacity in the South.  The North, East, West and 
Northeast grids (known as NEWNE) are adequately interconnected and synchronized.  
Our generation cost estimates are essentially levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) – i.e. 
the average cost over the life of the plant discounted back to the base year.  We simplify 
the calculations involved by assuming that most variables remain constant in real terms 
over the life of the plant: the main exception is the price of imported coal (in estimates 
of future costs for India) – our approach to forecasting international coal prices is 
described in section 4.4.2.   
4.2.4: Cost of coal 
The single largest element of the operating cost of a coal fired power plant is the cost of 
coal.59  For China, we assume that coal from Shanxi province with a GCV (Gross Calorific 
Value – a measure of the coal’s energy content) of 5,000 kcal/kg is used throughout the 
country.  Chinese mining companies sell coal to power stations at a mix of spot-related 
prices (which are published) and contract prices (which are not).  Our estimates draw on 
online sources such as http://www.interfax.cn/news/21141.  For India we estimate 
generation cost for both domestic and imported coal.  Coal India Limited (CIL) publishes 
domestic coal prices – see http://www.coalindia.in/Business.aspx?tab=2.  For all 
locations we assume the quality characteristics of typical grade supplied by CIL to 
thermal power stations (sample taken at Dadri power station for a study of emissions 
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from energy activities in India).60  For imported coal we base cost estimates on the 
published specifications and prices of benchmark grade Indonesian coal with GCV of 
6322 kcal/kg (most Indian coal imports are from Indonesia). 
An important component of the delivered cost of coal – sometimes greater than the 
cost at the pithead – is transport from mine to power station.  In the case of domestic 
coal, we define supply regions for both China and India: the delivered cost of coal is 
assumed to vary between supply regions but not within a region.  For both countries, 
new power plants in the principal coal mining regions are assumed to be located at the 
pithead – transport costs are zero.  Other supply regions are defined in terms of 
distance by rail from the mines.  For India, freight costs to each supply region are 
estimated based on distances and rail freight rates, which are published.  For China, rail 
freight rates are not published – we use rates taken from a study published in 2003, 
adjusted using appropriate inflation rates (Meier, 2003).  We estimate the delivered cost 
of imported coal (for India only) using a simplifying assumption that freight rates from 
any Indonesian port to any Indian port are the same. 
Coal costs include duties and similar charges that have the nature of payments for the 
use of a resource (e.g. mineral royalties).  Revenue or profit based taxes are not 
included as they are not part of the cost of energy supply to the country – they reflect 
only how the government chooses to allocate costs and benefits between stakeholders.  
4.3: CASE STUDY 1 - RENEWABLE ENERGY IN CHINA 
The first of the two case studies was published as (Partridge and Gamkhar, 2010).  The 
analysis is based on supply areas that correspond to the regional divisions of China’s 
electricity grid, excluding the sparsely populated Tibet Autonomous Region.  We assume 
that marginal supplies come from mines in Shanxi province, which is the source of a 





third of all coal transported across provincial boundaries (LBNL, 2008); new power 
stations in the North and Northeast are assumed to be at pithead locations with supply 
costs in other regions depending on distance from Shanxi.  The marginal plant in China is 
a 2X600MW supercritical61 coal fired unit. 
Our principal results for cost of generation and MAC are shown in table 4.2.  Note that: 
 Coal fired power stations in China have very low generation costs, though their coal 
cost is close to international price levels.  The main reason is the low construction 
cost of Chinese plants.  A comparison with the IEA publication Projected Costs of 
Generating Electricity: 2005 Update (IEA, 2005) indicates that construction costs per 
MW of power stations in China are less than half the average level in the OECD. 
 In much of China, small hydro plants have lower generation costs than coal-fired 
plants.  Their MAC is therefore negative (though hydro costs are site-specific so the 
range is wide).  Our proposed approach to determining additionality would suggest 
that most small hydro projects in China should be assessed as not additional.  
According to the China Energy Databook (LBNL, 2008) there were over 44,000 small 
hydro stations in China at the end of 1997 - clearly the Chinese authorities thought 
these stations were worth building even without the CDM subsidy. 
 The cost of wind generated power varied erratically over the period of the study 
(2006-2009).  In 2009 a sharp (18%) increase was associated with a fall in the 
average capacity factor of Chinese wind plants.  We speculate that this was linked to 
saturation of the transmission grid in Inner Mongolia - the region with the highest 
concentration of wind plants.  However, over the period, wind power in all regions is 
significantly more expensive than coal: MACs are positive and, based on our 
generation cost criterion, wind generation should be deemed additional.  Note that 
our China case study assumed the same 40 year project life for all generation 
                                                     




technologies.  The same approach is taken by (IEA, 2005), but is not entirely realistic: 
a more reasonable estimate of the life of a wind turbine would be 20-25 years.  
Table 4.2 shows the effect on generation cost and MAC of assuming that the life of a 
wind project is 20 years. 
Table 4.2: Generation cost and MAC by year and project type (China) 
  Number of 
Projects 
Generation Cost (US¢/kWh) MAC (US$/tCO₂e) 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Coal 2006 N/A 2.9    
 2007 N/A 3.5    
 2008 N/A 4.2    
 2009 N/A 4.5    





2006 4 6.4 1.5 40.6 19.4 
2007 41 6.7 0.9 38.0 11.1 
2008 61 7.2 1.1 37.0 11.6 
 2009 11 8.5 1.1 49.5 11.6 





2006  7.4  51.4  
2007  7.7  48.8  
2008  8.2  48.8  
 2009  9.8  63.4  
       
Hydro 2006 8 2.5 0.8 (5.0) 10.8 
 2007 56 2.5 0.7 (13.1) 9.7 
 2008 212 2.8 1.0 (19.8) 12.3 
 2009 23 3.6 1.4 (12.7) 15.6 
Note: SD – standard deviation. 
The figures shown for coal are the averages for China’s six grid regions.  
 In early 2006, when carbon prices on the European market peaked, the wind power 




price.  A wind generation plant receiving CERs would have been a marginally 
economic proposition even without the feed-in tariffs offered by the Chinese 
government.  After the sharp fall in European permit prices that occurred in mid-
2006 such plants would have required a favorable feed-in tariff as well as CER 
revenue to break even.  
4.4: CASE STUDY 2 - RENEWABLE ENERGY IN INDIA 
We apply the methodology used in the China case study to a sample of renewable 
energy projects in India.   The approach adopted is more complex than that of the 
earlier study, for two principal reasons: firstly, our estimates of generation costs and 
MAC in China are based on historic data and an assumption that costs remain constant 
in real terms; for India we use explicit forecasts of generation cost by technology out to 
2020.  The second reason for the extra layer of complexity in our research on India is 
that Indian energy policy is in transition – for some years the marginal plant has been 
the 500MW subcritical unit designed by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) fueled 
by domestic coal.  However some recent plants have adopted supercritical technology 
and imports of coal are growing rapidly as output of domestic coal seems to have 
reached a plateau.  We make analyses for two baselines – the BHEL 500MW subcritical 
plant and a modern supercritical unit.  We calculate generation costs for all locations 
assuming that a typical grade of domestic coal will be used; for coastal locations we also 
consider the use of imported coal as an alternative. 
4.4.1: Cost estimates for renewable generation 
Renewable generation technologies are characterized by relatively high capital costs, 
low operating costs and zero fuel costs (at least for the technologies considered here).  
For the projects in our database, the annualized capital cost accounts for 75% of total 




costs depends partly on the extent to which capital costs fall as developers gain 
experience of the technologies concerned. 
As our project sample covers a longer time period (from 2005 to 2011) than the sample 
used for the China case study, we can use regression analysis to identify time trends.  A 
learning curve analysis of capital cost per MW for wind projects shows a 13.3% learning 
rate – i.e. capital cost per MW (in constant INR) decreases by 13.3% for a doubling in 
cumulative capacity installed.62  The 95% confidence interval is 10.0% - 16.6% (Partridge, 
2012b) – the learning rate of 14.4% during 1982-2004 found by Wiser and Bolinger for 
the US wind industry falls well within this confidence interval (Wiser and Bolinger, 
2011).  In the US case, the cost curve flattened after 2004, trended upwards until 2009 
then turned down in 2011 (based on a small sample of 2011 projects).  Wiser and 
Bolinger related this pattern to increases in plant costs linked to the general economic 
situation, not specifically to the wind turbine market.  India seems to have escaped the 
impact of this overheating, possibly because it coincided with a period of rapid 
development of the domestic wind turbine industry at a time when it was focusing on 
its local market.  
A similar analysis for small hydro plants shows some indications of a learning effect, but 
this is significant only at the 10% level and the 90% confidence interval for learning rate 
spans a range from 51% to -3%. 
Analyses of generation costs show different pictures for the two technologies: wind 
generation cost exhibits a learning effect (the learning rate is 13.3%, as for construction 
cost); there is no significant scale effect and costs are lower in the South.  For hydro, 
there is no significant learning effect – this is not surprising as the technology used in 
these plants has changed only incrementally over many decades – and some scale 
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effect.  Generation costs are lower in the North.  The final models for both wind and 
small hydro are shown in Chapter 8. 
Two grid connected solar PV plants in India have been registered as CDM projects as of 
March 2012.  Their generation costs, based on the methodology employed for the wind 
and hydro cost estimates given above, are INR 11.2 and INR 14.4 per kWh.  With such a 
small sample of projects we cannot estimate a time trend, however a recent McKinsey 
and Co report forecasts that LCOE for large solar PV installations in India will fall to INR 5 
per kWh in 2020 (figures in 2012 currency) (Aanesen et al., 2012). 
4.4.2: Cost and emissions estimates for coal fired plants 
We base our emissions estimates for Indian coal on a CO₂ emission factor of .0967 tons 
CO₂ per GJ (NCV basis) reported by (Roy et al., 2009): for imported coal we use the IPCC 
default emission factor of .0946 t/GJ.  By implication, we are assuming that the 
reduction in CO₂ emissions per MWh of generation by a renewable technology is equal 
to the average emissions per MWh of a coal fired plant, which is not strictly true.  The 
output of a wind (or solar) plant varies continually due to the intermittent nature of the 
underlying resource; when wind power is added to a system, conventional generation 
plants on the system must continually vary their output to ensure that supply and 
demand remain in balance.  The thermal efficiency of a coal fired plant is reduced by 
operating it at less than full load, so its emissions per MWh generated are higher.  We 
examine evidence from US studies – particularly (Kaffine D et al., 2011) – and show that 
the error introduced by use of the average emissions rate is relatively small (see section 
9.2.4 and table 9.2). 
Generation cost estimates for coal fired plants are dominated by the cost of fuel.  In our 
cost model, the annual capital charge accounts for 19% of generation cost, operating 
costs other than fuel for 9% and coal for 72% (for subcritical plants burning domestic 




Pithead prices for domestically mined coal in India are published: the price delivered to 
the power plant includes the cost of rail freight, which depends on distance.  We define 
supply regions (see Map 1) and estimate costs based on rail distances to mines that, on 
the basis of an analysis of output projections, we believe can expand production over 
the next decade.  New power plants close to these mines (all of which are located in 
Eastern and Central India) are assumed to be located at the pithead.  Delhi and nearby 
industrial regions are about 900km from a supply source; 1,300km covers the West and 
Southeast coast plus most of India’s other industrial regions.  Incremental supplies to 
Bangalore and the South West of India must travel more than 1,700km by rail.  We 
exclude Assam and the isolated Northeastern region from our analysis.  For forecasting 
purposes we assume that both pithead prices and freight cost per kilometer remain 
constant in real terms from 2012. 
Estimates of LCOE are based on forecast costs over the lifetime of a new plant - about 
forty years.  We assume that domestic coal prices remain constant in real terms over 
this period, however this would not be a realistic approach to forecasting international 
coal prices as these are highly volatile – see chart 4.1.63  We define two scenarios that 
we believe provide upper and lower bounds for import prices.   
The lower price scenario is based on the fact that coal is a quintessential commodity: it 
is traded in a competitive market; global reserves are large and OPEC type price controls 
are not feasible due to the diversity of current and potential producer countries.  In the 
long term prices should fluctuate around the long run marginal cost of new supplies, or 
LRMC, which may change over time (Pindyck, 1999).  Mott McDonald (UK consulting 
engineers) based coal price forecasts for a report on the economics of supercritical 
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plants in India on a LRMC for Pacific basin exporting countries of US$40 per ton64 (Mott 
McDonald, 2006).  Between 1980 and 2004 international coal prices approached this 
level several times then fell back (chart 4.1).  This commodity type price behavior lends 
credibility to the Mott McDonald approach. 
Since early 2004 prices have risen far above $40, driven by demand from booming Asian 
economies.  It is likely that proposed or recently opened mines in higher cost regions 
such as Mongolia and more remote parts of Australia have pushed LRMC up to about 
$50 per ton (IEA, 2010, quoting data from Marston and IHS Global Insight).  Our lower 
bound forecast has the Indonesian benchmark price declining to about $50 per ton 
(2010 Dollars) fob loading port in 2020, and then remaining constant in real terms. 
Chart 4.1: Australian Coal Price Index 
Price index for Australian steam coal, 6667 kcal/kg, fob Port Kembla, US$/t 
 
Source:  IMF 
                                                     




































































































For our upper bound price scenario we adapt forecasts made by the IEA for its annual 
World Energy Outlook.  The IEA forecasts prices for a number of scenarios: we use the 
New Policies Scenario, which is based on energy-related policies announced (but not yet 
implemented) by both OECD and non-OECD countries (IEA, 2011).   
Chart 4.2: Price scenarios for internationally traded coal (US$/t) 
 
Note: prices shown are delivered price to an Indian port in US$ of 2012.  To simplify the 
calculations we assume that freight costs to all Indian ports are the same. 
The capital costs of coal fired power plants should also, in principle, fall in response to 
learning effects.  Our estimates for the construction costs of coal-fired plants in India are 
shown in table 4.3: for comparison the table shows figures from an MIT report (The 
Future of Coal (MIT, 2007)), and from a report by Mott McDonald for the British High 
Commission in India (Mott McDonald, 2006).  The three sets of figures cannot be 
directly compared as they relate to different countries and different years during a 
period when plant costs fluctuated from year to year through a boom period followed 
by financial crisis65.  However we believe that the estimates are consistent for each 
                                                     
65 The Mott McDonald report was published in 2006: its construction cost estimates assume all 
imported components erected on site using Indian labor; cost estimates in the MIT report 
(published in 2007) are for US projects; our construction cost data are taken mainly from 














source, so we can compare the cost differentials between subcritical and supercritical 
plants.  We find that the cost differential between the two technologies is higher in 
India than in developed countries.  In our view this is because the Indian subcritical plant 
uses Indian technology and Indian firms have lengthy experience of building plants to 
this design; the supercritical design is new to India and uses foreign technology.  If this is 
the correct explanation, the high cost differential is presumably a temporary 
phenomenon.  For forecasting purposes we assume that the capital cost of subcritical 
plants remain constant in real terms – the technologies involved have been in use in 
India for decades and further reductions due to learning are likely to be insignificant.  
However for supercritical plants we assume a small reduction in capital cost (15% 
learning rate) during 2015-2020. 
Table 4.3: Estimates of Construction Costs 
US$ per kW Subcritical Supercritical Difference (%) 
Assumed in this research 652 920 41% 
From (MIT, 2007) 1280 1330 4% 
From (Mott McDonald, 2006) 1224 1293 6% 
4.4.3: Generation cost comparisons 
For all the technologies under discussion we estimate actual generation costs for 2009-
2012 and projected costs to 2020.  The results are summarized in chart 4.3 – detailed 
numerical results can be found in Chapter 9.  In Chart 4.3, cost estimates for coal are 
based on subcritical technology through 2012: for later years we assume that a 
supercritical plant is the marginal unit.  Cost estimates for domestic coal are for 
locations approximately 1,300km from the mine.  Generation cost forecasts for wind 
assume a continuation of the learning effect observed over the period 2005-2011: for 
small hydro and domestic coal, costs are assumed to be constant in real terms from 




Chart 4.3: Generation cost comparisons - INR(2012))/kWh 
 
Source: (Partridge, 2012a) 
4.5: CONCLUSIONS – MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS 
In principle, the MAC is the carbon price at which the project would be economically 
viable without further subsidy.  A negative MAC implies that no subsidized feed in tariff 
or other production-linked incentive is required: based on our proposed criterion for 
additionality, there should be no question of awarding offsets. 
We estimate marginal abatement costs for projects in India coming on line in 2012, 
2015 and 2020.  The many variations of baseline plant, source of coal and supply region 
means that a full listing of results would be extremely complex.  The most important 
results are summarized in tables 4.4a and 4.4b below, taken from Chapter 9.  The key 
conclusions are that: 
 MACs for small hydro are negative for all combinations of baseline plant type, coal 
source and price scenario - the same result as was obtained from historical data for 
China.  In fact, hydro generation costs in the two countries are very similar.  An 
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Table 4.4a: Marginal Abatement Cost for India ($/tCO₂); plant startup 2012 
LRMC Scenario 
Subcritical Supercritical 
Domestic Imported Domestic Imported 
Wind: West Coast 24.3 20.4 27.0 22.3 
 Southwest 9.2 9.6 10.6 10.4 
 Southeast (Tamil Nadu) 14.2 9.6 15.7 10.4 
  
 
   
Hydro: Delhi/North (4.9) N/A (6.6) N/A 
 South & West Coasts (5.7) (11.7) (6.8) (13.3) 
 Southwest (10.8) (11.7) (11.9) (13.3) 
IEA Scenario 
 
Wind: West Coast 24.3 5.2 27.0 7.1 
 Southwest 9.2 (5.5) 10.6 (4.8) 
 Southeast (Tamil Nadu) 14.2 (5.5) 15.7 (4.8) 
 
 
   
Hydro: Delhi/North (4.9) N/A ( 6.6) N/A 
 South & West Coasts (5.7) (31.3) (6.8) (33.3) 
 Southwest (10.8) (31.3) (11.9) (33.3) 
Table 4.4b: Marginal Abatement Cost for India; plant startup 2015/ 2020 
($(2012)/tCO₂) 
Plant startup year & price scenario 
2015 2020 
LRMC IEA LRMC IEA 
Wind: West Coast 22.4 3.4 18.8 (1.4) 
 Southwest 11.2 (7.8) 8.2 (12.0) 
 Southeast (Tamil Nadu) 11.2 (7.8) 8.2 (12.0) 
 
 
   
Hydro: Delhi/North (6.6) (6.6) (6.6) (6.6) 
 South & West Coasts (8.6) (27.6) (7.8) (28.1) 
 Southwest (8.6) (27.6) (7.8) (28.1) 
Note: Estimates for 2015/2020 are for a supercritical unit.  It is assumed to burn 




 For wind generation the picture is more complex: for a baseline plant burning 
domestic coal (not shown in table 4.4b), MAC is always positive, reflecting the low 
coal price.  For the same reason, MAC is always positive for plants burning imported 
coal in the LRMC scenario, ranging between $27.0 and $8.2 per tCO₂e.   
 In the IEA scenario, for a plant burning imported coal, regional differences are 
important.  The lower cost of wind generation in the South results in negative MACs 
throughout the period covered, implying that no issuance of offsets or other subsidy 
is required to ensure viability; however, in the rest of India, MAC is about $7/ ton in 
2012, falls to about half this value in 2015 and is marginally negative in 2020. 
Based on McKinsey’s estimates of the generation cost for solar PV (Aanesen et al., 
2012), MAC for solar in 2020 will be $42/tCO₂e in the IEA scenario and $62 in the LRMC 
scenario – in both cases compared to a supercritical plant burning imported coal. 
Our estimated MACs can be compared to carbon prices on the EU ETS, where annual 
average prices of EUAs have ranged between $37.85 per tCO₂e in 2008 and $10 in 2012 
to date.  Comparisons can be made with the IEA’s projected carbon prices - in its New 
Policies scenario (the basis of our IEA scenario), the IEA expects a price of about 
30/tCO₂e in 2020 in the EU, New Zealand and Australia, with lower prices in China and 
Korea (assumed to introduce carbon pricing by 2020) (IEA, 2011).  The report of the 
UNFCCC’s High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing66 makes three carbon 
price projections for 2020: $10-$15; $20-$25 and $50.  The first two of these are 
consistent with the implementation (with different degrees of enthusiasm) of pledges 
made after the Copenhagen conference and are therefore more or less consistent with 
the IEA’s Current Policies and New Policies scenarios.  These comparisons suggest that, 
if international coal prices remain high, the hypothetical offsets scheme considered here 
would provide an adequate subsidy to ensure the viability of wind power in India.  





Our LRMC scenario is based on coal production economics, not macroeconomic 
modelling: however lower international prices in this scenario could result from a 
significant reduction in international coal demand, which would be consistent with a 
sharp slowdown in the Asian “tiger” economies.  In a world where growth in these 
economies remained slow in the long term, the subsidy provided by issuance of offsets 
could be insufficient to ensure the viability of wind power in India. 
4.6: CONCLUSIONS - ADDITIONALITY 
Based on the proposed methodology, small hydro projects would be assessed as not 
additional; solar PV is clearly additional; and wind projects in India are marginally 
additional – their eligibility to receive offsets should be regularly reviewed.  A review 
process is particularly important where imported coal is the marginal fuel – possibly a 
future offsets scheme could allow for a review of additionality every five years based on 
an updated set of price forecasts.  As we made no analysis of cost trends for wind 
generation in China we cannot say whether the same conclusion would apply there, but 
it seems possible that it would, as Chinese coal prices are close to international prices.  
The case studies demonstrate the feasibility of determining additionality based on a cost 
comparison between the project and the marginal new conventional plant in the 
country concerned.  The proposed criterion is that a project cannot be additional if it 
generates electricity more cheaply than this baseline, as it would then be economically 
rational to implement the project without the subsidy provided by the issue of offsets. 
The investment analysis methodology used by the CDM EB defines a project as 
additional if it fails to meet some standard profitability benchmark or if it is financially 
less attractive than at least one alternative project (see section 3.1.1).  There are some 
similarities with the approach proposed here, but there are some key differences:  
 The CDM methodology focuses on profitability, which depends on the tariff received 




India, many generation schemes are built by industrial companies that intend to use 
the output in their other operations.  In both cases – regulated tariffs and captive 
schemes – there is scope for obfuscation of a project’s true economics. 
  The CDM methodology compares projects that are not real alternatives: in both 
China or India there is a near-permanent need to increase electricity output; the 
appropriate comparison in economic terms is between renewable generation and 
the marginal new plant.  The CDM methodologies prescribe laborious calculations of 
average generation costs, yet a new wind farm does not displace power from (old) 
coal, hydro and nuclear plants.  Typically in India and China, if more electricity is 
supplied by wind farms, there is a reduced need for new coal fired plants.67   
 In India – and several other countries – the marginal plant will in future be fueled by 
imported coal.  All PDDs for Indian renewable generation schemes use domestic coal 
as the benchmark.  The low price of domestic coal is arguably a concealed subsidy to 
Indian industry: its use as a benchmark requires the UNFCCC to provide 
countervailing subsidies to competing technologies. 
 The complexity of the cost comparisons made for wind generation in the IEA 
scenario underline the fact that additionality is a dynamic concept.  The analysis 
required by the CDM methodology is essentially static. 
The underlying problem with the CDM’s investment analysis approach (see section 
3.2.1) - is that it treats all power projects as if they were set up by independent firms 
operating in a competitive, deregulated market (Gang He and Morse R, 2010; Wara, 
2008).  In reality, power markets in China and India are tightly controlled, yet the CDM 
methodology either assumes that they are fully competitive or requires the EB to guess 
                                                     
67 A wind or solar project that supplied an isolated grid in a rural area might displace power from 
a diesel generator set.  Note that the CDM EB is introducing standardized estimates of baseline 




the tariff that would apply if they were.  The methodology proposed here assumes that 
decisions are made by the government based on its rational economic objective to 





5: The supply and demand for carbon offsets 
A quick analysis of the likely architecture of the international offsets market after the 
end of the Kyoto compliance period (12/31/2012) gives the impression that little will 
change.  The EU has confirmed that the ETS will remain a central element of its efforts 
to cut emissions at least until 2020, and some preparations have been made for the 
post-2020 period: as the EU ETS accounts for about 97% of all emissions trading today, 
the new schemes set up by Australia and New Zealand will not change the picture much.  
The WCI - the ETS set up by California and a few Canadian provinces - might, but at 
present it looks as if that scheme will be very self-contained, with few offsets sourced 
outside the USA and Canada.  The CDM also will carry on, and changes recently 
implemented by the CDM Executive Board have dealt with at least one of its serious 
problems – the long delays experienced in registering a project (see section 3.2.8).   
Based on the analysis described in this chapter, this appearance of continuity is 
misleading.  The rules of the EU ETS – by far the largest market for CERs – create a hard 
ceiling to demand for offsets from scheme participants.  In fact, recent rule changes 
have sharply reduced the scale of the market for CERs from most sources (section 5.1.2).  
Meanwhile, the CDM is creating a huge and expanding supply: the measures that have 
successfully cut registration delays in the CDM can only accelerate this buildup and may 
make the scheme’s most serious problem – its failure to ensure additionality of many 
projects – even worse (section 3.2.8).  CER prices are now so low that the CDM no 
longer provides an incentive for developing countries to invest in GHG reduction. 
However the advantages of offset schemes as a financing mechanism justify efforts to 
either radically overhaul the CDM or to design a replacement.  Successive climate 
conferences have reiterated proposals to create new market mechanisms - usually 
referred to as NMMs - and design work on some possible schemes is well under way 




outline of a NMM operating in the electricity generation sector.  In this chapter I 
consider the potential scale of such a scheme.   
I start from an analysis of the growing oversupply of credits (CERs and ERUs) issued to 
projects registered under the two offset schemes created by the Kyoto Protocol – the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).68  For convenience 
I refer to both CERs and ERUs as Kyoto Credits, or KCs.  This initial analysis takes the 
story up to 2020 - the end of phase 3 of the EU ETS and the year when the new global 
GHG reduction agreement anticipated in the Durban agreement is supposed to come 
into operation.  For the post-2020 period I estimate the potential global demand for 
offsets and the potential supply from a hypothetical scheme that awards offset credits 
to projects that substitute renewable generation technologies for coal.  My overall 
conclusion is that a sectoral scheme of this type would be feasible and would provide 
significant volumes of funding for GHG mitigation.  
It should already be clear that this chapter will be heavy on abbreviations and acronyms.  
Readers should refer to the list located at the end of this document for a summary of 
abbreviations that relate to emissions trading schemes. 
5.1: SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR KYOTO CREDITS DURING 2008-2020 
The market for offsets during the period 2008-2020 is likely to be dominated by 
currently existing schemes.  On the demand side, phase 2 of the EU ETS lasts from 2008 
to 2012, while phase 3 covers the years from 2013 to 2020.  A few other schemes such 
as those set up by Australia and New Zealand will also be important.  Forecasts of 
demand depend largely on analyses of the ceilings on offset usage set by the rules of 
these schemes.  Several such analyses are available as KCs are traded securities so 
                                                     
68 I should add RMUs issued in respect of carbon absorbed by forests and other sinks, but the 




forecasts of supply and demand in the short to medium term are of interest to the 
investment community.  My estimates of demand for KCs during 2013-2020 draw on 
studies made by analysts in investment banks69 and by the Carbon Finance team at the 
World Bank, which produces annual reports entitled State and Trends of the Carbon 
Market – the most recent is the 2012 edition (World Bank, 2012).  Where estimates 
from different sources disagree I take an average; for a few datapoints – for example, 
offset demand in the Australian emissions scheme – I make my own calculations from 
economic data.  My estimates are presented in section 5.1.1, for EU ETS demand, and 
section 5.1.3 for non-EU schemes.  Table 5.1 summarizes the key elements of both.   
Supply over this period will be dominated by offsets awarded to CDM and JI projects.  
Likely issuance is very well documented by the Danish UNEP Risoe Center,70 which 
maintains records of all CDM and JI projects and KCs issued.   
5.1.1: The EU schemes 
The EU was embarrassed by the clear oversupply of EUAs issued in the first phase of the 
EU ETS (2005-2007) and took steps to ensure a tighter supply during the second phase, 
which ends in 2012.  Supply in the first year of the period was indeed tight – actual 
emissions in 2008 exceeded the number of EUAs issued to scheme participants by 8.3%.  
However 2008 was the year that the global financial crisis took hold: EU emissions fell as 
economic activity waned and in the next three years the ETS saw net long positions – 
EUAs issued exceeded actual emissions.  For 2008-2011 in aggregate - the first four 
years of phase 2 of the ETS – the scheme was about 1.5% long (Koeppl et al., 2012).   
                                                     
69 Key sources are Trevor Sikorski of Barclays Capital and a research team at CDC Climat.  A 
related source is ICIS Heren – a market intelligence service.   
70 The UNEP Risoe Centre works with the UN Environment Program (UNEP) to maintain 





During 2008 and 2009 prices of EUAs fell sharply, then for almost two years from mid-
2009 they stabilized and varied within a narrow range - it appears that ETS participants 
were taking advantage of the banking provisions of the scheme to build inventories of 
permits in anticipation of a tighter market in phase 3.  The first five months of 2011 saw 
a 20% increase in the EUA price, in line with a general strengthening of commodity 
prices, but this brief spurt of optimism came to an end as the Eurozone crisis worsened.  
The price of December 2012 EUA futures fell by 50% over the year.71   
The surplus of EUAs during 2008-2011 implies that the theoretical demand for KCs in the 
EU ETS during that period was negative.  However EU ETS participants have contracted 
to buy large volumes of KCs –their low price provides an economic incentive to use KCs 
for compliance and bank surplus EUAs for use in the third phase of the scheme.  Adding 
in the demand from Japan, New Zealand and a few other countries, the result is a rough 
balance of supply and demand for KCs during 2008-2012 (table 5.1).   
This balance conceals the real problems in the offsets market, which appears to be 
approaching a crisis.  The impact of weak demand due to economic factors has been 
exacerbated by a surge in supply.  Most projects registered by the end of 2012 will be 
grandfathered into the third phase of the EU ETS, so developers are making huge efforts 
to register their projects before the deadline.  Responding to pleas from developers but 
with truly awful timing, the CDM Executive Board has finally got its act together and 
speeded up the registration process.  1,103 projects were registered in 2011 – up by 
37% from the 2010 total.72  The result is a post-2012 market in massive oversupply: CER 
prices fell by 62% over the course of 2011 - even more dramatic than the 50% fall in EUA 
prices (see chart 5.1), cutting the subsidy to GHG mitigation projects in the developing 
                                                     
71 In 2011 futures accounted for about 92% of secondary trading volumes in both KCs and EUAs.   
Unless otherwise indicated, all prices quoted for both KCs and EUAs are prices of futures with 
December 2012 delivery.  Source is Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Futures Europe. 




world and removing much of the financial incentive to invest in new projects.  The EU is 
considering reducing the number of EUAs to be auctioned in order to address the 
oversupply issue, but there is considerable opposition – for example from European 
steelmakers – and detailed plans have not yet been published (as of July 9 2012). 
Chart 5.1: EUA and CER prices (EUR/t) 
 
   Source: ICE Futures Europe 
5.1.2: EU restrictions on offset usage 
The oversupply problem is compounded by changes in the EU ETS that apply from 2013.  
An important change, introduced by direct regulatory action (EU Regulation 550/2011) 
is that CERs issued to projects that incinerate industrial gases (HFCs and N₂O) will no 
longer be accepted for compliance purposes.73  Other changes introduced in the most 
recent amendments to EU Directive 2003/87/EC include: 
                                                     
















 The limit on offset usage for phase 2 (including aviation in 2012) of 1,419 Mt74 will 
be replaced by a limit of 1,611 Mt for phases 2 and 3 combined.  
 KCs from any project registered before the end of 2012 will be accepted for 
compliance during 2013-2020 (except for projects that incinerate industrial gases).  
However KCs from projects registered after 12/31/2012 will only be eligible if the 
project is located in a country on the UN list of least developed countries and small 
island developing states (referred to collectively below as LDCs).   
 As the Kyoto Protocol requires that an AAU must be cancelled for each ERU issued, 
and AAUs are valid only for the Kyoto compliance period (2008-2012), the EU is 
somewhat pedantically taking the view that no more ERUs may be issued after 2012. 
As industrial gas projects account for 68% of CERs issued to date and LDCs for only 0.1%, 
these changes dramatically reduce the availability of offsets for EU ETS compliance.  
However it is too late to repair the damage to CER prices resulting from the oversupply 
of credits.  A recent estimate by analysts at UNEP-Risoe is that projects already in the 
registration pipeline will generate 6,984 Mt of CERs during 2013-2020, of which 2,549 
Mt will be ETS-eligible.  However, I estimate that no more than 714 Mt of offsets will be 
used for compliance in the EU ETS – less than a third of the ETS-eligible supply. 
The EU ETS applies to about 41% of the EU’s GHG emissions.  As the Kyoto commitments 
apply to all sectors, the EU member states have agreed to cap emissions in sectors 
(transport, for example) that are outside the ETS.75  The caps apply at country level as it 
is not practical to monitor and control emissions from individual sources in these 
sectors.  KCs can be used for compliance up to an annual limit equal to 3% of 2005 
emissions and, to further complicate the picture (nothing is simple in the EU), twelve EU 
                                                     
74 Different analysts estimate slightly different figures – there is uncertainty about, for example, 
the status of sub-sectors that a country has included in its cap unilaterally. 




countries may use an additional 1% of offsets but these must come from projects in 
LDCs.  These restrictions amount to a theoretical maximum demand for KCs from EU 
governments of 815 Mt during 2013-2020.  The source restrictions that apply to offsets 
in the ETS do not apply to this scheme, though some EU countries have announced that 
they will observe them voluntarily.  
5.1.3: Offset demand beyond the EU 
There are other sources of demand for KCs.  The RGGI and the New Zealand scheme are 
already operating, however the RGGI does not accept KCs while the New Zealand 
scheme is relatively small.  During 2013-2020 some other countries plan to introduce 
GHG cap & trade schemes (though in most cases, political difficulties cast some doubt 
over the outcome); in some cases these schemes will accept KCs and may constitute 
significant new sources of demand.  The schemes are described in section 2.2.3 – I 
provide below an assessment of their likely demand for KCs during 2013-2020: 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) limits power sector emissions in a 
number of states in the Northeastern US.  It accepts offsets, with a ceiling of 3.3% of the 
total emissions cap.  Currently only offsets generated by projects located in the RGGI 
states themselves can be used (see http://www.rggi.org/). 
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) will operate from January 2013, initially with 
California and Quebec as members – see http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/.  
Technically each state runs its own cap & trade scheme and will accept offsets up to an 
annual limit of 8% of the compliance obligation.  Protocols to cover eligibility of offset 
credits are under development: the current expectation is that offsets generated by 
projects in specified sectors located in the US, Canada or Mexico will be accepted.  A 
committee is considering how to include offsets based on sectoral schemes, including 
REDD based forestry projects, in developing countries – the states of Acre (Brazil) and 




(World Bank, 2012).  Plans allow for acceptance of offsets from CDM projects subject to 
case by case agreement – there could also be a knock on effect if WCI offset projects are 
set up in Mexico or other developing countries.  My base case forecast assumes zero 
demand for KCs from WCI members during 2013-2020, with a possible upside of 20 Mt. 
Both Alberta and British Columbia have GHG emission reduction targets and schemes 
that involve use of offsets.  In both cases only offsets generated in-state are accepted. 
Japan’s plan to introduce cap & trade has been put on hold, but many Japanese 
companies participate in either the JVETS or the Keidanren scheme.  Both are voluntary 
and both allow unlimited use of KCs.  The Japanese government is also likely to be a 
significant buyer of offsets during the next several years.  The country’s efforts to cut 
emissions to its Kyoto target of 1,186 Mt by 2012 (6% below the 1990 level) have not 
been conspicuously successful - the preliminary estimate of 2010 emissions (see 
http://www.nies.go.jp//whatsnew/2011/20111213/20111213-e.html) was 1,256 Mt - a 
reduction of only 0.4% – and this was before the shutdown of Japan’s nuclear capacity 
following the Fukushima disaster.  It appears that Japan can meet its Kyoto target only 
by buying large numbers of KCs and AAUs. 
The country faces a far more difficult task to reach the level of 946 Mt by 2020 that it 
committed to after the Copenhagen climate conference.  The IEA forecasts that Japan’s 
CO₂ emissions in 2020 will amount to 1,132 Mt based on current policies or 1,101 Mt 
assuming implementation of confirmed new policies (IEA, 2011).  In the latter scenario, 
assuming a linear rate of reductions, the cumulative shortfall over 2013-2020 would be 
about 600 Mt.  That is assuming that the target remains in place: recent press stories 
indicate that the Japanese government may revise its 2020 commitment.76  






In line with agreements at recent global climate conferences, Japan is developing a New 
Market Mechanism (NMM) to generate offsets from projects agreed bilaterally with 
other South East Asian nations.  I assume in my forecasts that the government will stick 
to its current 2020 emissions target and that this NMM (called the BOCM, for Bilateral 
Offset Credit Mechanism – see section 5.2.1) will provide between 50 Mt and 300 Mt, 
with the remaining requirement being met by purchases of either KCs or AAUs. 
Australia passed the necessary legislation to set up a cap & trade scheme in November 
2011.  The Australian scheme will start life in July 2012 with a fixed price on carbon (it 
will essentially be a carbon tax), transitioning in 2015 to cap & trade.  During the fixed 
price phase domestic offsets will be allowed, with KCs accepted from 2015 up to a limit 
of 50% of the required reduction from a reference case, subject to the same restrictions 
on project types as the EU scheme except that RMUs will be accepted.  An analysis by 
Barclays Capital77 indicates that demand for KCs could be up to 430 Mt during 2015-
2020, with significant downside.  My own calculation gives a range of 200Mt-400Mt, 
which seems broadly consistent with the Barclays Capital analysis. 
Until the Australian scheme commenced operating on July 1, 2012, the New Zealand 
ETS was the only national level mandatory scheme outside the EU.  It is a significant 
purchaser of KCs as there is no quantitative restriction on their use for compliance and 
their current low price means that they are cheaper than New Zealand emissions units 
(NZUs) that are sold by the government at a fixed price.  KCs are accepted subject to the 
same restriction on industrial gas projects as the EU ETS.  Unlike the EU ETS, the New 
Zealand scheme accepts RMUs.  The scheme is likely to use about 40 Mt of KCs during 
2008-2012 (estimate by Barclays Capital).  I estimate that usage during 2013-2020 will 
be between 60 Mt and 100 Mt. 






In Chapter 2 I describe plans by several non-Annex 1 countries (Korea, Mexico and 
Brazil) to set up emission trading schemes.  None of these are likely to permit the use of 
KCs as offsets until at least 2020 – they will not be discussed further in this section.  
Switzerland’s semi-voluntary scheme (firms that choose not to participate must pay a 
carbon tax) is likely to be linked to the EU ETS – probably from 2014.  Switzerland has 
purchased CERs to cover part of its Kyoto commitment under a unique agreement 
between the government and Swiss business organizations: a private foundation called 
the Climate Cent Foundation uses the proceeds of a charge on fuel imports to purchase 
KCs.  It also operates domestic offset schemes (World Bank, 2012).  Arrangements post-
2012 depend on the EU ETS linkage.  I assume KC usage in a range from zero up to 15Mt, 
which is consistent with an estimate in (World Bank, 2012). 
5.1.4: Cap & Trade in China 
After the Copenhagen conference China made an unconditional commitment to reduce 
the emissions intensity of its GDP to 40% - 45% below its 2005 level by 2020.  A key 
element of China’s plan to achieve this target will be a cap & trade scheme - the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has announced that pilot 
schemes will be set up in five cities and two provinces – see (World Bank, 2012).  
Judging by comments made by Chinese officials, a national scheme will be introduced – 
possibly by 2015, more likely by 2020 – if the pilot schemes show that the idea is 
workable in Chinese circumstances.  For more detail of the proposals see section 2.2.4. 
In July 2012 the NDRC released outline regulations for the creation of tradable offsets.78  
Eligible projects must be either registered CDM projects that have not yet generated 
offsets, projects permitted by the Chinese authorities to apply for CDM registration that 
have not yet been registered, or projects that adopt NDRC methodologies (not specified 
                                                     





in detail yet, but apparently based on the CDM rulebook).  Several market analysts79 
have pointed out that the export of CERs issued to Chinese CDM projects must be 
approved by the NDRC and that approvals issued to existing projects will be exhausted 
by about the end of 2015.  The same Bloomberg story quotes Pradeep Perera - an 
energy expert at the Asian Development Bank – as saying that China may impose 
restrictions on export of CERs.  Perera leads the ADB team that is providing advice and 
funding for the pilot schemes mentioned above.   
This raises a very interesting issue: China is the source of 60% of the offsets traded on 
the markets linked to the EU ETS.  If it wants to count reductions achieved by CDM 
projects towards a domestic target it cannot simultaneously export those reductions in 
the form of CERs – this would amount to double counting.  It looks very much as if China 
intends to subsume existing CDM projects into a domestic offset scheme to support its 
cap & trade plans.  A researcher at DTU (the Danish Technical University) noted that the 
CERs from all Chinese CDM projects registered or in the validation pipeline as of late 
2010 would cover about 15% of the country’s GHG reduction commitment (Luetken, 
2010).  Luetken’s suggestion that China might set up a scheme to invest in GHG 
mitigation projects in Africa and import credits seems to me unlikely (but if it happened 
it would certainly shake up the global carbon market).  
5.1.5: The overall supply and demand balance 2008-2020 
Table 5.1 summarizes my forecasts of supply and demand for KCs during phases 2 and 3 
of the EU ETS.  For 2013-2020 the forecasts are presented as a range: in general, the 
“minimum” demand estimates are a relatively conservative base case forecast assuming 
slow recovery from the current economic crisis in Europe, while the “potential” demand 






figures are the maximum permissible under EU rules or my assessment of the upper end 
of the likely demand range from non-EU schemes (see section 5.1.3).   




  Minimum Potential 
Demand    
 EU Governments 262 400 800 
 EU ETS 897 714 714 
 Total EU  1,159 1,114 1,514 
     
 Switzerland 15 0 15 
 Japan 125 50 300 
 New Zealand 40 60 100 
 Australia 0 200 400 
 US & Canada 0 0 20 
 Other Annex B 22 0 20 
 Total Demand 1,361 1,424 2,369 
     
Supply    
 EU ETS eligible CDM 434 2,549 2,549 
 Other CDM 668 4,435 7,255 
 JI 288 0 0 
 Total KC Supply 1,390 6,984 9,804 
     
Surplus/(Deficit) - Total 29 5,560 7,255 
Supply projections in table 5.1 are from the analysis by UNEP Risoe of projects in the 
CDM and JI pipelines (http://uneprisoe.org/).  For EU ETS-eligible CERs, this analysis is 
likely to be accurate as a very high proportion of the projects that will generate these 
CERs is already in the pipeline.  The JI and non-ETS-eligible forecasts may be less 




Risoe estimate of CERs issued to projects not yet in the registration pipeline.  The 
forecasts are subject to great uncertainty, however some conclusions can be drawn: 
 My forecast of EU ETS demand during 2008-2012 is 897 Mt CO₂e: analysts’ estimates 
range from 865 Mt to 1,161 Mt.  The range does not reflect major differences in 
approach by different analysts: given that AAUs, EUAs and KCs can all be used for EU 
ETS compliance, and all are in surplus; actual demand for KCs will depend largely on 
what European companies see as their least cost (or most convenient) choice.  The 
EU ceiling for phase 2 offset use is 1,419 Mt.   
 EU firms hedge their compliance needs by buying EUAs or KCs in advance of 
requirements.  Sometime in phase 3 of the EU ETS (2013-2020), advance purchases 
will be sufficient to cover expected demand through to 2020.  Analysts differ in their 
views on when this will happen: CDC Climat believes that it could be late 2013 – 
others see a later date.  A survey by ICIS Heren80 noted that market prices for ETS-
eligible and non ETS-eligible CERs are essentially equal – the looming surplus of ETS-
eligible KCs means that the market sees no reason to apply a price premium.   
 For non-EU ETS eligible KCs the oversupply is even worse: they will be accepted by 
the ETS for 2012 compliance (until April 2013); after that a market exists until mid-
2015, which is the final date for nations that ratified the Kyoto Protocol to establish 
compliance.  In reality, most countries already own all the offsets they will need.   
It seems likely that, in the fairly near term, KC prices will fall almost to zero.  It is not 
clear how this prospect can be reconciled with the projected carbon price in 2020 of 
$30/t in the IEA’s World Energy Outlook (see section 4.5) unless the IEA anticipates large 
scale purchases of KCs to meet compliance requirements in new cap and trade schemes.   






This final price collapse would mean that the Kyoto offset schemes would no longer be a 
viable source of finance for GHG mitigation projects.  This would be a somewhat 
ignominious end for the CDM: for all its faults, it has provided significant funds for 
investment in much needed GHG mitigation projects in the developing world.  According 
to estimates made by the Carbon Finance team at the World Bank, the value of CERs 
under contract has reached $28bn and total investment in the projects concerned will 
total more than $130bn if all projects are completed as planned.81  No other scheme has 
even come close to those totals.  As of July 1 2012, 4,296 projects have been registered 
and a further 4,443 are in the pipeline.  Apart from its success in incentivizing low 
carbon investment, it seems likely that the CDM has helped the European economies by 
cutting the cost of GHG mitigation in countries with EU ETS obligations.  Whether it 
achieved its objective of promoting sustainable development is debatable, but there is 
no doubt that all that investment in developing countries has promoted some kind of 
development. 
5.2: OFFSETS POST-2020 
The focus on new market mechanisms (NMMs) in climate change negotiations makes it 
likely that offset schemes have a future beyond 2020, but it is not clear what form they 
might take.  However, the EU’s liking for sectoral schemes (and their advantage – see 
Chapter 4 – that rules and methods of determining additionality can be tailored around 
specific types of project) make it likely that large scale offset schemes post-2020 will be 
organized on a sectoral basis.  In this section I analyze the potential scale of an offsets 
scheme that would operate during the period 2021-2035 for projects that substitute 
electricity generated using renewable technologies for electricity generated from coal.  I 
provide what have to be seen as very approximate forecasts of offset supply from 
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projects of this type and of the potential demand for offsets from developed countries.  
My forecasts are based on projections of emissions reductions and electricity generated 
by type of technology taken from the long term energy sector projections in the IEA’s 
annual World Energy Outlook – the most recent version was published in November 
2011 (IEA, 2011).  I show that an offsets scheme of the type envisaged is feasible and 
that it could be designed and managed to match offset supply to likely demand. 
5.2.1: New Market Mechanisms 
The Bali road map for action against climate change mentioned the potential 
importance of new market mechanisms (NMMs) as a source of finance for GHG 
mitigation projects in the developing world.  Any new agreement on coordinated 
international action against climate change is likely to include some form of global 
NMM, however some groups of countries are pushing ahead with their own proposals 
for bilateral or multilateral agreements on offset crediting schemes.  It seems likely that 
at least one of these groups will reach an agreement first.  Bilateral NMMs could 
potentially significantly alter the supply and demand for offsets during the period I am 
considering.  The most advanced of the schemes currently under discussion is the 
Japanese BOCM, while the EU has stated its intention to create one or more NMMs.  
 Japan’s shortfall against its 2020 target for emission reductions is 155 Mt: this could 
become a cumulative shortfall for 2013-2020 of about 600 Mt (section 5.1.3).  It 
could fill the gap by purchasing non ETS-eligible CERS, which are cheap.  However, 
with an eye to the longer term, Japan is preparing an alternative known as the 
BOCM, for Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism.82  Japan proposes to finance GHG 
mitigation projects in South East Asian countries and award itself offsets for the 
emissions cuts achieved.  It is currently negotiating a number of bilateral deals - 
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according to CDC Climat,83 over 100 feasibility studies have been completed or are 
under way - and hopes to issue the first BOCM credits in 2013.  My forecasts assume 
that BOCM credits will cover half of Japan’s cumulative shortfall during 2013-2020 
(they also assume that Japan will not simply eliminate that shortfall by changing its 
emissions target – see section 5.1.3). 
 The EU also proposes to negotiate bilateral deals with developing countries with a 
view to generating EU ETS eligible offsets that would not be subject to the 
restrictions that apply to the use of KCs during 2013-2020.  The EU proposal is not 
yet well defined, however the EU’s current view is that NMMs set up under bilateral 
agreements would most likely be sectoral schemes (as described in section 3.3.1).   
While the Japanese BOCM is likely to issue its first offsets in the near future, the current 
huge oversupply of KCs means that there is no need for an increase in the global supply 
of offsets prior to 2020.  In the following section I discuss the prospects for a 
hypothetical NMM that would operate from 2020.  I assume that the KC surplus that will 
exist in that year can be reduced or eliminated by demand management measures or 
will be soaked up by new cap & trade schemes operating post 2020. 
5.2.2: Offset supply post-2020 
The most likely scenario for offset supply post-2020 seems to include coexisting NMMs, 
each covering only one sector or possibly a group of sectors with similar characteristics.  
In this scenario the CDM would survive (if it survives) in a much reduced form focused 
on project types and host countries not covered by any NMM - possibly LDCs.  This 
outcome is more or less what David Victor expects (Victor, 2009).  In this section I 






estimate the potential supply of offsets from a hypothetical global NMM aimed at 
incentivizing investments in electricity generation using renewable technologies. 
I have not attempted to design a scheme in any detail, though my review of criticisms of 
the CDM in Chapter 3 at least provides a checklist of problems to be avoided.  I assume 
that my hypothetical scheme would award offsets in proportion to the emissions saved 
relative to the marginal new generation plant in the country concerned.  The two case 
studies presented in Chapter 4 examine CDM projects in China and India - two key 
countries where the marginal plant is coal-fired.  I believe that the lessons of these two 
cases can be applied in other coal-dependent countries (South Africa and Indonesia, for 
example) but not necessarily elsewhere.  However, for simplicity, I estimate the 
potential supply of offsets as if the scheme applied to all non-Annex 1 countries. 
I calculate the scheme’s potential for offset creation on the basis of the IEA’s forecasts 
of electricity generation in the New Policies scenario, taken from the current World 
Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011).  The scheme is assumed to apply to increases in generation 
from 2012: i.e. all renewable generation plants in operation during 2012 are covered by 
the CDM; all new plants by the new scheme.  To illustrate the methodology used I 
provide below (table 5.2) an example of the IEA’s electricity generation forecasts.  
Referring to table 5.2, a brief description of the method used to estimate potential 
offset creation for (say) wind in India is: 
 I estimate generation for each technology in 2012 by interpolation and calculate the 
increase in wind generation from 2012 for each year after 2012. 
 I assume that any increase in wind-generated electricity displaces the same quantity 
of generation using coal - the marginal generation technology.  Using an estimate of 
CO₂ emissions per kWh for a coal fired plant (see India case study in section 4.4.2 for 
how this is derived) I calculate emissions avoided by the increase in wind generation. 




Table 5.2: Electricity generation by technology – India (TWh) 
 1990 2009 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Coal 192 617 898 1,080 1,231 1,431 1,716 
Oil 10 26 24 19 14 13 12 
Gas 10 111 148 243 319 418 536 
Nuclear 6 19 44 65 110 145 184 
Hydro 72 107 147 208 290 338 352 
Biomass & Waste - 2 7 19 47 83 122 
Wind - 18 41 63 98 139 183 
Geothermal - - - - 1 1 2 
Solar PV - - 9 23 49 94 140 
CSP - - 1 2 5 9 15 
Marine - - - - - - 1 
Total Generation 289 899 1,319 1,723 2,162 2,671 3,264 
Source: (IEA, 2011) 
This calculation provides an estimate of the maximum potential for offset creation – 
there is no intention to present the results of the calculations as a practical offset 
scheme.  Applying this methodology to the IEA’s estimates of generation through 2035 
for all non-Annex B countries, I arrive at the figures shown in table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3: Forecast supply of credits from renewable energy projects (million tons CO₂e) 
Project type 2013-2015 2016-2020 2021-2035 
Biomass 131 542 5,633 
Hydro 791 2,742 17,949 
Solar 31 234 3,885 
Wind 486 1,422 9,752 
Other Renewables 21 79 797 




5.2.3: Offset demand and the supply/demand balance 2020-2035 
The IEA forecasts of CO₂ emissions for various regions can be used to obtain some idea 
of the potential demand for offsets after 2020.  A subset of these forecasts is shown 
below (table 5.4).  
Table 5.4: CO₂ emissions by Annex 1 countries (Mt) 
 1990 2009 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
EU 27 4,035 3,529 3,542 3,377 3,186 2,981 2,827 
OECD NAM 5,578 6,152 6,418 6,233 6,050 5,865 5,650 
Total Annex 1 15,180 15,032 15,685 15,397 15,039 14,678 14,288 
Source: (IEA, 2011) 
To gain an idea of the scale of potential demand for offsets during 2020-2035 I rely on 
analogies with the EU schemes – both the ETS and the more recent targets allocated to 
EU governments for emission reductions in non-ETS sectors.  So far these EU schemes 
are the world’s only large scale user of carbon offsets – they provide at least some 
indication of how a wider scale scheme might operate.  I implicitly assume that all Annex 
1 countries will accept GHG emissions caps after 2020 - a highly dubious assumption, 
but it provides an upper bound estimate.  I proceed as follows: 
 Total Annex 1 emissions in 2020 are 15,397 Mt.  The EU ETS applies to 41% of total 
EU emissions – I adopt this same percentage for the Annex 1 countries.  Total 2020 
emissions for the whole of Annex 1 would be 6,315 Mt in an emissions trading 
scheme and 9,082 Mt outside the scheme. 
 Assuming that the target for total ETS emissions in 2035 is also 41% of total Annex 1 
emissions in that year, and assuming a straight line profile of emission reductions 




 During phase 2 of the EU ETS the ceiling on use of offsets is 13.6% of total permitted 
emissions from ETS sectors over the period.  Applying this ceiling to the Annex 1 
countries in 2021-2035, the offsets ceiling is 12,390 Mt. 
 For non-ETS sectors, the EU permits total annual offsets usage of 3% of 2005 
emissions in assessing compliance with its reductions targets.  Applying this 
percentage to 2020 non-ETS emissions for the whole of Annex 1, over fifteen years, 
the ceiling on offsets usage in non-ETS sectors would be 4,087 Mt for 2021-2035. 
 For ETS and non-ETS sectors in combination in all Annex 1 countries, the potential 
demand for offsets during 2021-2035 would be 12,390 + 4,087 = 16,477 Mt, or 1,098 
Mt per year.   
As already noted, I see this figure as an upper bound estimate.  It can be compared to 
forecasts made by the offsets sub-group of the High-level Advisory Group on Climate 
Change Financing (section 2.6).  These range from global demand for offsets in 2020 of 
500-800 Mt per year in a low carbon price scenario up to about 3,000 Mt assuming a 
high carbon price.  In a medium price scenario (the assumed carbon price is $20-$25 per 
tCO₂e, which is broadly compatible with my own figures), the forecast range of offset 
demand is 1,500Mt – 2,000 Mt - this is somewhat higher than my own forecasts, but not 
disproportionately so.  The most likely reason for the difference is that the sub-group 
assumed a higher ratio of offsets used to emission reductions actually achieved. 
5.3: MANAGING OFFSET SUPPLY 
The demand estimate presented in the preceding section is less than half of my estimate 
of potential supply of 38,016 Mt from an offset scheme confined to the renewable 
energy sector (table 5.3), with significant additional volumes likely to be generated by 
offset schemes in other sectors.  Even adopting unreasonably optimistic assumptions 
about new cap & trade schemes that might operate after 2020, the potential supply of 




for investment in renewable energy – a repeat of the situation we are seeing today.  In 
this section I consider how the rules of a renewable energy NMM could be drawn to 
bring supply more in line with demand.  It turns out that there are a number of ways to 
achieve this, and most of them would improve the environmental and economic 
integrity of the scheme. 
Firstly, in section 5.1.4 I described China’s tentative plan to introduce a national cap and 
trade scheme by 2015 in order to reduce the country’s GHG emissions.  This plan is 
clearly welcome in itself – one suspects that the Chinese leadership is concerned that 
the country is being cast as a climate change villain as well as being worried by the 
vulnerability of some parts of the country to changed climate and – particularly – to 
rising sea levels.  Several analysts have suggested that China might voluntarily withdraw 
from the CDM in 2015 or 2020.84  As China is the largest single source of CERs, removing 
Chinese projects from a proposed renewable energy NMM would be a big step towards 
bringing future offsets supply and demand into balance. 
In Chapter 4 I presented case studies of CDM projects based on renewable electricity 
generation technologies in India and China.  A common feature of the two studies was 
that the generation cost of small hydro projects is below the cost of coal fired 
generation - the likely alternative in both countries.  In the conclusions to Chapter 4 I 
suggested that hydro projects should not be awarded offsets as they are very probably 
not additional.  There is at least anecdotal evidence of real barriers to small hydro 
projects – for example, in many regions lack of transmission capacity limits the number 
of projects that can be built.  These barriers add to costs, but the costs are not related to 
the amount of electricity generated.  Direct financial aid to break down barriers might 
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well be justified, but a subsidy per MWh – which is what an offset scheme provides – is 
not.  I would suggest removing all hydro projects from the proposed NMM.85 
The case study on India suggested that the rate at which the costs of wind generation 
are falling could bring them close to parity with coal fired generation (based on 
imported coal) within a few years.  Whether or when this happens depends on the 
future course of prices of coal in international trade.  I would suggest that any 
renewable energy NMM agreement should contain, from its outset, a commitment to 
keep wind generation costs under observation and to remove new wind projects from 
the NMM in any country if they reach cost parity with coal. 
Finally, proposals for sectoral crediting mechanisms (SCMs) sometimes suggest that 
setting a ratio of offsets to GHG reductions would deal with the additionality problem.  
This is a somewhat dubious proposition: if a project is not additional it should receive no 
offsets – by awarding half the number of offsets you first thought of you presumably do 
half the damage to the environment, but you are still giving offsets to a non-additional 
project.  However, an advantage of awarding offsets on a less than one for one basis is 
that the ratio could be adjusted to avoid providing an excessive subsidy to a project that 
needs only a small additional incentive to become profitable – see, for example, my 
comments on wind projects in India in section 4.5.  It is also true that adjusting the ratio 
of offset credits to GHG reductions achieved could be justifiable as a means of sharing 
the burden of the subsidy between the host government and the international 
community.  This reasoning could justify providing one offset for two or three tons of 
avoided emissions to a wind project: technologies such as solar PV, for which generation 
cost appears to be far higher than the coal fired alternative, should receive one credit 
for each ton of CO₂ eliminated.  
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The effect on offset supply of the suggested measures is summarized in table 5.5 below. 
Table 5.5: Offset supply (Mt) – alternative scenarios 
  Offset Supply 
Base Case Supply 38,016 
Supply Management Measures  
 Withdrawal of China (18,957) 
 Omit Hydro (excl China) (9,931) 
 Apply one for two ratio to 
Wind 
(1,469) 
Revised Supply 7,659 
Potential Demand 16,477 
5.4: CONCLUSIONS – OFFSET SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Table 5.5 shows the results of these possible supply management measures.  It would 
not be appropriate to present these suggestions as even a rough outline of a possible 
NMM.  Not only are my estimates of offset supply and demand during 2020-2035 highly 
uncertain but it is unlikely that all Annex 1 countries would participate in this or any 
other offset scheme.  My estimate of offset supply can be seen only as a rough estimate 
of maximum possible supply from one of several sectors that might be suitable for a 
global NMM.  However, even with these provisos, the supply/demand analysis in this 
section demonstrates the feasibility of designing a NMM that would incentivize 
investment in electricity generation using renewable technologies. 
A vitally important issue in the design of any new scheme is the need for some form of 
offset supply/demand management.  The situation today is that supply of CDM projects, 
and therefore of offsets, has ballooned, possibly reflecting a supply curve (relating 
supply of projects to carbon price) that is significantly higher than was suspected.  An 
alternative explanation is that the oversupply reflects the number of projects accepted 




CDM (see section 3.2.1).  If a project is going to be built anyway, it is economically 
rational to apply for CDM registration if the expected revenue from sale of CERs exceeds 
the transaction costs of the registration process – an extremely low hurdle.  At the same 
time, economic problems in Europe have cut the level of emissions to the point where 
the number of EUAs issued exceeds total compliance demand: the theoretical demand 
for CERs is zero (see section 5.1.1 and (Koeppl et al., 2012)).   
In the absence of effective supply/demand management the ever-present threat of 
complete price collapse must eventually threaten the viability of the market, and 
certainly must reduce the incentive offered to project developers – or, at least, those 
whose investment decisions really do depend on the availability and size of the CDM 
subsidy.  I suggest ways that this could be achieved: an obvious measure would be to 
disallow offsets from developing countries that choose to operate their own cap & trade 
schemes.  Most important of these would be China, but Korea and some other countries 
are considering similar schemes (section 2.2.3).  Other supply management measures 
would include disqualifying projects that are judged non-additional and awarding offsets 
to projects that are only marginally additional at a ratio of less than one offset per ton of 
CO₂e emissions saved.   
The implication is that additionality – as determined by comparison of generation cost 
with baseline cost – should be seen as a dynamic, not a static concept.  The rules of any 
future offsets scheme must recognize this by allowing for periodic reviews of project 
eligibility, with possible resets of the ratio of offsets to emissions reductions.   
After all supply management measures the proposed scheme would generate 7,659 
million tons of offsets over fifteen years – that is close to 0.5 bn tons per year, or 
roughly double what the CDM has provided per year since 1/1/2010.  This is a maximum 
level that is unlikely to be reached.  At an offset price of $20 per ton, the contribution to 
carbon finance globally would be just over $10bn per year, or 10% of the $100bn 




6: The Way Forward – discussion and conclusions 
Climate change is a complex problem.  The process of global negotiations and the 
system of agreements and organizations that have emerged from those negotiations are 
correspondingly complex.  This complex system shows signs of failing: a better approach 
for the future might be to identify the key elements of the problem, assign priorities, 
and then look for simple solutions to each individual element.   
In section 1 of this research I break down the emissions problem by sector and type of 
country: it is clear that a very high priority must be assigned to cutting emissions by the 
energy sector in the developing world. Breaking this emissions category down further, it 
becomes clear that the fastest emissions growth rates occur in a small number of rapidly 
growing countries in Asia that are heavily dependent on coal for power generation.  
During the period from 1990-2035, forecast emissions from coal fired power stations in 
China will increase by 740%: in India the increase is expected to be 600% (IEA, 2011).  
Cutting these countries’ reliance on coal for power generation could have a significant 
impact on global GHG emissions.  An analysis of possible alternatives to coal in China 
and India presented in section 4.2.1 indicates that technologies such as nuclear cannot 
provide the required growth in electricity supply in the necessary time frame.   
An alternative that is available now is renewable energy.  However electricity from 
renewable sources is expensive and its costs are front end loaded – in India in 2009, the 
initial investment cost per MW of wind generation was almost 70% higher than the cost 
of a coal fired plant (figures from generation cost model – see Chapter 4).  At this point 
the problem becomes one of finance.  A scheme that would channel funds to the 
developing world to incentivize the use of renewable generation by covering part of the 
added cost would contribute significantly to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions.     
In designing an incentive scheme for this purpose there are good reasons to adopt a 




have theoretical advantages (Coase, 1960; Montgomery W D, 1972): they also have the 
practical advantage that private sector funds channeled through offsets are probably 
more reliable in the long term than direct government to government flows (Victor, 
2011).  The agreements reached at recent climate conferences – Cancún in 2010 and 
Durban in 2011 – have included proposals for new market based mechanisms (NMMs).   
This research presented here sets out to clarify the key parameters of an offsets scheme 
that would provide financial incentives for investment in renewable generation in 
developing countries that are reliant on coal.  The research comprises a “bottom up” 
analysis of renewable generation projects in China and India, aimed at clarifying how 
they might fit into an incentives scheme; and a “top down” study of the potential scale 
of the scheme.  The research also includes a review of criticisms that have been made of 
the CDM: this arrives at the conclusion that the criticism that many CDM projects are 
not additional is a valid one.  The research proposes an improved methodology for 
assessment of additionality and analyses its effectiveness. 
6.1: LESSONS FROM THE CDM 
I review criticisms of the CDM in the existing literature and consider some proposed 
solutions.  I conclude that: 
 The overriding objective of a future offsets scheme must be to reduce carbon 
emissions in the fast-developing countries.  The level of reductions targeted should 
be commensurate with the scale of emissions in these countries – this would imply a 
scheme significantly larger than the CDM.  It is not practical to base such a large 
offsets scheme on project by project review, as is the case with the CDM (Grubb et 
al., 2011).  Current efforts to improve the environmental integrity of the CDM while 
maintaining its basic structure can only result in turning it into a niche scheme, too 




 Many problems identified during the early years of the CDM have been dealt with 
through changes in the rules of the scheme; however one very serious criticism has 
not - many CDM projects are not additional.  When an offset is issued to a non-
additional project, global emissions actually increase.  A key design criterion for 
future offset schemes must be that they should guarantee additionality.   
 A future offset scheme should not follow the example of the CDM by trying to cover 
all project types in all sectors.  Sectoral crediting mechanisms – offset schemes for 
projects in one sector only – have been much discussed.  The EU, in particular, has 
championed these schemes.  A sectoral scheme would avoid the need for project by 
project assessment but must guarantee additionality for the sector. 
 David Victor has taken the radical view that, as the only large scale carbon offsets 
scheme (the CDM) has not worked well and there is no clear agreement on what 
should replace it, there are advantages in encouraging a diversity of schemes (Victor, 
2011).  In this context of scheme diversity, some analysts suggest that a set of rules 
with guidelines for project evaluation and the coordination of competing schemes 
should be agreed at UNFCCC level (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011).  An alternative view 
is that this is unnecessary.  There are very few markets for offset credits and the EU, 
which operates by far the largest, has already shown its willingness to impose its 
own rules by disallowing some types of project.  Beyond about 2020 there are likely 
to be fewer than half a dozen significant markets for offsets.  Their operators should 
ideally agree on common rules for eligibility – this would be easier and more 
effective than achieving any agreement at all at UNFCCC level. 
 Not all types of project are suitable for offset financing, which seems best suited to a 
situation where the need for subsidy is proportional to the expected emission 
saving.  For example, a wind farm’s impact on carbon emissions and the added cost 
of electricity supplies are both proportional to power generated; however 




better suited to funding by means of a grant or soft loan.  This suggests that a future 
offsets scheme would be more effective if it operated in tandem with a fund that 
would finance projects that are unsuitable for offset financing. 
 Finally, one of the most important lessons to learn from the CDM is that an offset 
scheme is ineffective if the price of offsets is too low to create an incentive for 
investment in low carbon projects.  There is a need to dynamically manage the 
supply of offsets to ensure that the scheme offers continuing adequate incentives.  
6.2: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
I present case studies of renewable energy projects in China and India, based on 
comparisons of generation costs between the projects and a baseline.  The comparison 
provides a basis for calculation of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) for cuts in CO₂ 
emissions achieved by substituting renewable energy for coal fired generation.   
The case studies enable me to test a proposed methodology for the assessment of a 
project’s additionality.  I note in section 6.1 that a key criterion in the design of an 
offsets scheme is that it should award credits only to projects that are additional: a 
project is additional if it results in a reduction in GHG emissions and it would not be built 
without the subsidy provided by the credits.86  I suggest that a project is not additional if 
it would be economically rational to build it without the subsidy.  It is assumed that this 
is the case if the project’s generation cost is lower than the baseline.   
The India case study looks at Marginal Abatement Costs and additionality in the context 
of increasing consumption of imported coal.  As the price of coal in international 
markets has been highly volatile in recent years, forecasts of generation cost require a 
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“anthropogenic GHG emissions by sources are reduced below those that would have occurred in 




systematic approach to forecasting the future price of coal - in the case study I use a 
scenario based approach.  Given the impossibility of making accurate forecasts of coal 
prices on the international market over the lifetime of a project, the agreement setting 
up an offset scheme for the generation sector should allow for periodic review of prices. 
Based on the proposed methodology, I conclude that small hydro projects in both China 
and India should be assessed as not additional (they are currently the largest category of 
CDM project in both countries); solar PV should be assessed as additional; and wind 
projects in India are marginally additional – their eligibility to receive offsets should be 
regularly reviewed.  In my view, this analysis shows that the proposed approach to 
assessment of additionality is feasible and offers several advantages over 
methodologies permitted by the CDM.  It requires an appropriate choice of baseline and 
accurate assessment of generation costs but in the context of a sector based scheme, 
this analysis could be made annually rather than project by project. 
Where a category of project is assessed as non-additional it would not be appropriate to 
award offset credits, but in some cases genuine barriers to investment might exist that 
would justify some other form of subsidy.  I suggest that the appropriate solution to this 
problem lies in direct funding through grants or soft loans.  I suggest in section 6.1 that a 
future offset scheme might be linked with a fund able to make grants of this nature. 
6.3: SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE OFFSETS MARKET 
I present two analyses of the supply of offsets and the potential demand.  The first, 
relating to the years 2013-2020, is based on forecasts made by the World Bank Carbon 
Finance Team and by analysts working in investment banks.  It assumes that the carbon 
markets during the period in question will be dominated by schemes that already exist 
or are firmly planned.  The second – an analysis of potential supply of offsets from a 
sector specific scheme to operate after 2020 and of potential global offset demand – 




The picture that emerges for the earlier period is one of serious oversupply leading to 
market collapse.  The EU has tried to deal with the problem by drastically restricting the 
eligibility for EU ETS compliance of offsets awarded to some project types, but the 
measures are too little, too late.  Considering only EU ETS credits, projected supply 
during 2013-2020 significantly exceeds the upper end of the range of projected demand.  
The market price of offsets has fallen sharply – the most recent price (07/24/2012) is 
€3.15 – this compares to a peak in 2005 of over €32 per ton.  At this price level, the CDM 
does not offer an effective incentive for investment in renewable energy projects. 
My analysis of the potential scale of an offsets scheme to operate during the period 
2021-2035 assumes a hypothetical scheme for projects that substitute electricity 
generated using renewable technologies for electricity generated from coal.  I combine 
this with a forecast of potential demand for offsets from developed countries during the 
period.  Both supply and demand forecasts are based on projections of emissions 
reductions and electricity generated by type of technology taken from the long term 
energy sector projections in the IEA’s annual World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011).   
My initial conclusion is that this hypothetical scheme could also suffer from oversupply 
of offsets.  I assess the scope for supply management measures to reduce this potential 
oversupply: firstly, in section 5.1.4 I describe China’s tentative plan to introduce a 
national cap and trade scheme to reduce the country’s GHG emissions.  Several analysts 
have suggested that China might voluntarily withdraw from the CDM in 2015 or 2020.87  
As China is the largest single source of CERs, removing Chinese projects would be a big 
step towards bringing offsets supply and demand into balance.  Similar considerations 
would apply to Korea and some other developing countries that are considering 
introducing cap & trade schemes (section 2.2.3).   
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In Chapter 4 I present case studies of CDM projects based on renewable electricity 
generation technologies in India and China.  A common feature of the two studies is that 
the generation cost of small hydro projects is below the cost of coal fired generation: 
based on my proposed approach to assessment of additionality, hydro projects should 
not be eligible to receive offsets.  I would propose removing all hydro projects from the 
proposed NMM.88 
Finally, a generation technology with costs close to the costs of the marginal 
conventional generation technology could receive less than one offset per ton of CO₂ 
emissions saved.  This policy would provide additional assurance that projects on 
average are additional.  Based on the conclusions of my India case study (Chapter 4), it 
might be appropriate to restrict offsets awarded to wind generation projects in this way 
as wind generation costs are close to parity with coal fired generation based on 
imported coal.  I would suggest that any renewable energy NMM agreement should 
contain, from its outset, a commitment to keep these costs under observation. 
After taking account of realistic measures to restrict eligibility, a hypothetical scheme 
focused on incentivizing investment in renewable energy would contribute less than half 
of the estimated global demand for offsets.  The gap leaves room for offset schemes in 
other sectors and for the probability that not all developed countries will participate in 
cap & trade schemes that allow international offsets.  The scheme could generate 7.7 bn 
tons of offsets over fifteen years – about 0.5 bn tons per year, or roughly double what 
the CDM has provided per year since 1/1/2010 (this is a maximum level that is unlikely 
to be reached).  At an offset price of $20 per ton, the scheme would contribute just over 
$10bn per year in financing for low carbon projects in the developing world.   
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6.4: THE NEED FOR REVIEW 
At several points in this summary of my conclusions I point to the need for any future 
offsets scheme to allow for periodic review of its operations – a feature that is 
completely missing from the CDM.  A successful offsets scheme should be managed as a 
flexible and dynamic system – it is unlikely that a system of this nature could ever result 
from politically contentious negotiations involving 194 countries. 
 To avoid oversupply, it is essential that the scheme should incorporate some form of 
offset supply/demand management, based on a periodic review of supply trends 
and of likely demand as countries set up or modify cap & trade schemes. 
 Additionality, as assessed using my proposed methodology, depends on the 
expected future course of coal prices.  Any renewable energy NMM should contain, 
from its outset, a commitment to keep these prices under observation and to 
remove a technology from the scheme if its generation cost reaches parity with coal.     
 Similarly, the additionality of projects based on technologies that are close to cost 
parity with coal should be reviewed periodically and the ratio of offsets to emissions 
reductions reset. 
In conclusion, I have not attempted to present in this dissertation a detailed design for a 
future offset scheme.  However my analysis of a hypothetical scheme that would aim to 
incentivize the replacement of coal fired generation in developing countries with 
renewable energy indicates that such a scheme is feasible and it could be managed to 
avoid the problems of oversupply of offsets followed by price collapse that have 
affected the CDM.  Effective supply management would ensure that the subsidies 
provided by the scheme would be generous enough to attract investment and 
reasonably predictable.  Depending on the level of participation by developed countries, 


















7: The role of offsets in a post- Kyoto climate agreement: the power 
sector in China89 
7.1: INTRODUCTION 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), created by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
is a market-based mechanism intended to cut the cost of compliance with greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission reductions mandated by the Protocol.  Kyoto requires developed 
countries (the “Annex 1 countries”) to cut emissions, but the CDM enables them to 
offset their commitments by paying for projects that cut emissions in the developing 
world.  The rationale is that the cost of cutting emissions is believed to be lower in 
developing countries.  A second objective of the CDM is to promote sustainable 
development in poorer countries; a third is to involve the developing countries in an 
international effort to limit GHG emissions.   
To date – mid-March, 2010 - over 2,000 projects have been registered under the CDM; 
China – the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gases - is the biggest user of the CDM 
with other key developing countries such as India not far behind; and over 385 million 
certified emission reductions (CERs) have been issued, meaning that projects registered 
under the CDM have been responsible for cutting GHG emissions by 385 million tons.  In 
each case, the developing country concerned has confirmed that the project promoted 
sustainable development. 
These figures seem impressive, however it has been suggested (Schneider, 2007; Wara 
and Victor, 2008) that some of the 385 million tons of “registered and verified” emission 
cuts are not real - that the CDM actually increases the level of global emissions by 
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allowing Annex 1 countries to avoid cutting without substituting real cuts elsewhere.  
Sathaye and Phadke (2006) show that projects using imported technologies to cut 
emissions in developing countries may cost more than cuts in Annex 1 countries, raising 
the cost of emissions cuts while enriching the provider of the technology. 
We have not attempted to assess the validity of these criticisms as regards the totality 
of the CDM.  Instead we focus on one key sector – grid connected electricity generation 
– and on three generation technologies: wind, small hydro and natural gas combined 
cycle (NGCC).  In this paper we report results of our analysis of CDM projects in China.   
Our analysis makes use of data from the project design documents (PDDs) for CDM 
projects available on the UNFCCC website: this valuable resource provides a wealth of 
financial and engineering detail on over 2,000 projects.  We analyzed all registered 
projects in our focus categories that were proposed for registration prior to a cut-off 
date of April 1 2009.  Our objectives were to make the most accurate possible 
assessment, given the limitations of the data, of each project’s value to the host country 
and whether it contributed to the objectives of the CDM; to assess whether the 
criticisms mentioned above apply to these projects; and to consider whether it is 
possible to design a market-based or hybrid scheme for this sector that would perform 
better than the CDM has.   
Our results indicate that, in the electricity generation sector, the CDM has partially 
succeeded.  It has not achieved the level of environmental integrity that its designers 
intended, but has promoted sustainable development. 
 The great majority of wind and NGCC projects in our sample were correctly 
assessed: the issuance of offsets for these projects does not add to global emissions. 
 However, the majority of small hydro projects should not have been registered.  The 




 All three types of projects that we evaluated produce significant benefits to human 
health by cutting harmful emissions of SO₂ and other pollutants.  In our view this 
contributes to the CDM objective of promoting sustainable development. 
The focus of the paper reflects our view that electricity generation is the key to emission 
cuts in developing countries: electricity is vital to development; electricity generation 
using coal is the largest single contributor to GHG emissions; and the long operational 
lifetime of a coal-fired power station means that its emissions are effectively locked in 
to the global emissions total for up to 50 years
90
.  We hypothesize that it is possible to 
design an offset scheme restricted to this sector that would make a significant 
contribution to reducing GHG emissions, achieve a high level of environmental integrity 
and provide developing countries with incentives to participate in the global effort to 
ward off climate change.  In our view, the CDM does not deliver those outcomes partly 
because of its awkward approach to project assessment.  The approach adopted in this 
paper provides a more penetrating assessment of the economics of an offset project 
and provides an indication of how a redesigned scheme specifically for the electricity 
generation sector could improve on the CDM, at least in countries where new plant is 
coal-fired.  
Section 2 of the paper provides a description of the CDM program and a review of 
criticisms made by past researchers.  Our methodology is described in section (3); 
results are in section (4), while section (5) lists our conclusions and some suggestions for 
further research. 
                                                     
90 This statement needs some explanation: it is clear that large reductions can be achieved in 
many sectors – not least in forestry and land use – while some developing countries make little 
use of coal in electricity generation.  However, our view is that this sector provides a unique 
opportunity in that the developing countries have a real and well-recognized need for rapid 
growth in generation capacity to underpin their development objectives.  By subsidizing this 
growth in exchange for the adoption of low carbon generation technologies the developed 




7.2: THE CDM 
CDM projects are subject to an elaborate verification process intended to ensure their 
environmental integrity.  Sponsors must show that their project is “additional” – i.e. it 
achieves cuts in GHG emissions relative to a business as usual baseline and would not 
proceed in the absence of CDM funding.  If a project is profitable without CDM subsidy it 
will eventually be built: if CERs were issued to that project, the firm that bought them 
would avoid making cuts in its own operations but no compensating cuts would be 
made elsewhere because the project would have been built anyway.  The net result is 
that emissions are higher than they would have been without the CDM (Schneider, 
2007).   
The CDM provides for three approaches to proving additionality: investment analysis, 
barrier analysis and common practice.  Investment analysis demonstrates that the 
proposed project is financially less attractive than at least one alternative or fails to 
meet a commercial benchmark, while barrier analysis demonstrates that it faces barriers 
that prevent its adoption and that do not affect at least one alternative.  In some 
countries (India, for example) most large projects use financial analysis while small 
projects try to prove the existence of barriers.  This is not the case for electricity 
generation projects in China: of the 460 projects we evaluated, only four relied on 
barrier analysis. 
Common practice demonstrates that a technology is not commonly used in the relevant 
sector or region.  On its own, common practice does not prove additionality – it is used 
in conjunction with financial analysis or the barrier method as a credibility check 
(Schneider, 2007).  Schneider noted that project sponsors may define the control group 
of prevailing practice very broadly and the technology under consideration very 
narrowly.   As an illustration, 370 small hydro projects had achieved CDM registration in 




according to the China Energy Databook (LBNL, 2008), more than 44,000 such projects 
were operational in China as of the end of 1997. 
7.2.1.  Assessment of emission reductions  
The key to calculation of the emissions reductions due to a CDM project is the baseline – 
the level of emissions that would have occurred if the project did not exist.  If the 
baseline is set too low, global emissions are increased because too many CERS are 
issued, while if it is too high returns on CDM investment are reduced and presumably 
fewer such investments will be made.  If the baseline is determined correctly, overall 
emissions do not change but the reductions are shifted from a developed to a 
developing country (Fischer, 2005).  The UNFCCC has adopted a number of standardized 
methodologies for definition of the baseline  – for example, projects in our sample 
should use the consolidated baseline methodology for grid-connected electricity 
generation from renewable sources (UNFCCC, 2009)91.  
7.2.2.  Assessment of sustainability benefits 
The UNFCCC’s project approval process does not include an evaluation of sustainability: 
the host countries can define their own criteria and vet projects before proposing them 
to the UNFCCC.  The looseness of both definition and verification of the sustainable 
development benefits of CDM projects has resulted in frequent criticism of the program.  
In this paper we define and quantify at least one such benefit.   
7.2.3.  Project categories 
The verification process for additionality and emission reductions has been severely 
stretched by the need to cater for a very wide range of project types.  The charts below 
provide a breakdown of projects registered as of March 2010 in five categories: 
                                                     




 Our focus category: natural gas combined cycle (NGCC), wind and small hydro.     
 Energy efficiency. 
 Other energy, including gas from landfill, coal mines and agricultural sources, 
fugitive gas (mainly flaring of associated gas from oil production), geothermal and 
tidal energy and combustion of biomass. 
 Destruction of industrial gases (HFCs, PFCs and N₂O). 
 Other – many of these projects cut CO₂ emissions from cement production (chart 
7.1; table 7.1).
Chart 7.1. CDM projects registered - 
mid-March 2010 
 
Chart 7.2. Expected cumulative CERs to 
be issued through 2012  
 
Chart 7.3. CERs issued - mid-March 2010 
  
As of mid-March 2010 about 94% of 
registered CDM projects were energy 
related, according to the UNEP 
database1, while 4% were projects that 
destroy industrial gases.  Our focus 
sectors account for 44% of registered 



































gas projects – and the speed with which they can be put in place - is demonstrated by 
the proportions of CERs issued as of the same date: industrial gas destruction – 4% of 
registered projects – accounts for 75% of CERs issued (Chart 7.3).  This imbalance should 
be reduced as more energy projects come on stream.  Based on projects currently in the 
pipeline, cumulative CERs issued through 2012 will split 26% industrial gases and 72% 
energy related (Chart 7.2). 
Table 7.1. Analysis of Registered Projects (Source: UNEP Risoe) 
 Hydro Wind Gas All Other Total 
China 370 165 19 197 751 
Rest of World 192 132 26 961 1,311 
Total 562 297 45 1,158 2,062 
Note: this table includes all projects registered as of March 14 2010.  Our sample is 
limited to projects that were proposed for registration as of April 1 2009. 
7.2.4.  Criticism of the CDM 
Our first objective in this paper is to assess whether criticisms of the CDM apply to 
projects in our focus category, based on an analysis of actual projects.  We are 
particularly concerned by criticisms that some projects achieve registration that are not 
“additional” – i.e. they cause a net increase in global GHG emissions (Schneider, 2007; 
Wara and Victor, 2008). 
In the early years of the CDM researchers criticized the flexibility permitted to project 
developers in choosing how to assess additionality (Fischer, 2005): however in recent 
years the ongoing process of approval of standardized methodologies for review has 
reduced the scope for abuse.  However, the CDM covers a wide range of projects - a 
large number of methodologies would be needed to cover them all.  The early criticism 
of excessive flexibility is still valid in some instances.  Another of Fischer’s criticisms that 




are better understood by investors than by those charged with verification (Fischer, 
2005).  The UNFCCC’s assessors often have no choice but to accept data provided by the 
project sponsor. 
A report published by the NGO International Rivers92 states that few, if any, of the 
hydro schemes that apply for CDM registration could realistically claim that they would 
not be built without CDM credits.  More than a third of those approved at the time of 
the report (November 2007) had been completed at the time registration was granted 
and almost all were already under construction.  In China, which has been a prolific 
builder of small hydro schemes for over 50 years, the International Rivers report noted 
no substantial increase in the number of projects under construction since pre-CDM 
days. 
Another common criticism of CDM projects - a lack of “quality” of emissions reductions 
– in our view applies primarily to industrial gas projects.  These projects account for 
three quarters of total CERs issued to date: they dominate the CDM but do nothing to 
promote sustainable development – a key objective of the CDM.  The gases concerned 
contribute significantly to the greenhouse effect, but project costs are typically so low 
compared to the value of CERs issued that the economics of the underlying industrial 
processes are distorted, creating incentives to game the system that some participants 
may find irresistible.  At worst, projects may have been built to emit GHGs with the 
objective of generating revenue from the sale of CERs awarded for cleaning them up93 
(Olsen, 2007; Sutter and Parreno, 2007; Wara, 2007).     
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93 Michael Wara noted that “HFC-23 emitters can earn almost twice as much from CDM credits 
as they can from selling refrigerant gases — by any measure a major distortion of the market” 
(Wara, 2007).  Concerned that countries might actually raise their output of these gases in order 




Suggested solutions to this “quality” problem have included rating of CERs based on 
sustainability of the projects that generated them (Nussbaumer, 2009; Schneider, 2007) 
- the Annex 1 country that buys the credits could be required to maintain a specified 
average sustainability rating.  (Resnier et al., 2007) suggested taxation of CER revenues 
with higher taxes on less sustainable projects.  However it is worth bearing in mind 
Carolyn Fischer’s view that it is arguably better to lower the cost of emissions reductions 
by encouraging participation in the CDM by developing countries than it is to devise 
ever more complex rules for project approval, particularly in view of the nascent 
institutions and governance systems in many of these countries (Fischer, 2005).   
If the baseline is determined correctly, the CDM does not change overall emissions but 
the reductions are shifted from a developed to a developing country.  The implicit 
assumption is that emissions can be cut more cheaply in the developing world so the 
shift enhances overall welfare by reducing the overall cost of GHG reduction (Fischer, 
2005).  Some researchers have questioned this assumption.  Sathaye and Phadke (2006) 
compared the costs of cutting emissions of CO₂ in India and the US by switching from 
coal to natural gas fired generation(Sathaye and Phadke, 2006).  They concluded that 
emission reductions achieved in this way are more expensive in India, mainly because of 
the high capital cost of plants based on imported technology.  The implication of their 
research is that the CDM, at least in this narrowly defined area, reduces overall global 
welfare while enriching the provider of the technology. 
During the early days of the CDM, many researchers were concerned that projects 
would be burdened with high transaction costs.  This issue has turned out to be less 
important than was feared, partly because the carbon price set by the EU ETS has been 
high enough that for all but the smallest projects, revenues from the CDM have been 
                                                                                                                                                              
plants.  However in 2005 the UNFCCC weakened this ruling and allowed new plants to register, 




significantly higher than transaction costs.  The level of these costs seems to have been 
reasonable, though there are likely to be variations across countries and by project size 
(Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). 
Of more concern are the conflicts of interest inherent in the CDM format.  An issue that 
has been frequently raised is that the designated operational entity (DOE – the 
consultant that evaluates a CDM project) is selected and paid by the project participants 
(Schneider, 2007).  Even worse, in our view, are the conflicts created when host country 
governments own assets that compete with CDM projects.  Governments must monitor 
and enforce domestic regulations - particularly important in the electricity sector are 
tariff setting, environmental regulation and the regulation of market competition 
(Williams and Kahrl, 2008).   
Finally, it is clear that the UNFCCC needs to invest in capacity building in Non-Annex 1 
countries to ensure effective monitoring and enforcement of domestic regulations with 
direct and indirect relevance for the CDM projects (World Bank, 2006). 
7.3: METHODOLOGY 
We define a baseline generation plant for each regional grid and use the generation cost 
of the baseline plant as basis for calculation of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) for 
CDM projects in the same region (China excluding the Tibet Autonomous Region has six 
grid regions).  A new plant is the appropriate baseline as electricity demand in China is 
growing.  The baseline plant is therefore the marginal new conventional plant, which is a 
1200MW supercritical coal fired unit (the IEA report Cleaner Coal in China noted that 
about 60% of all newbuilds in China are large supercritical units (IEA, 2009)).  Its location 
within the region matters because the cost of transporting coal from mine to power 
station is a significant element of generation cost.  In each grid region we determine – 
somewhat subjectively – the likely location of a new plant, either at the mine (North and 




We define the MAC of project p as: 
      
      
      
 (1) 
where Cp is the generation cost per unit of electricity generated by the project and Cb is 
the cost per unit for the baseline project.  Ep is the volume of emissions in CO2 
equivalent per unit generated by the project and Eb is the same parameter for the 
baseline project.  Our approach to calculation of these parameters is described below. 
7.3.1.  The sample of CDM projects 
Our sample comprises 100% of grid-connected generation projects in China based on 
wind turbines, small hydro or NGCC technology that were proposed for registration as 
CDM projects prior to a cut-off date of April 1 2009 and had achieved registration by 
March 1 2010.  Of the 460 projects, twenty six could not be used as the PDD did not 
provide sufficient data94, leaving a usable sample of 434 projects – see table 7.2. 
Table 7.2. Details of Sample (Source: UNEP Risoe) 
Project Type Registered Sample 
Commercial scale gas 19 19 
Wind farms 136 117 
Hydro 305 298 
Insufficient data (26)  
TOTAL 434 434 
                                                     
94 Of the 26 unusable projects, 4 used barrier analysis to assess additionality, so the PDD did not 
need to provide financial data; all the others used investment analysis but provided insufficient 
information to permit a proper re-evaluation.  For example, four projects provided data in US 
Dollars but did not include an exchange rate.  For these projects one can calculate a generation 
cost in USD but it is not possible to make a valid comparison with the baseline generation cost, 




The 26 unusable projects included 19 wind farms and seven small hydro schemes.  They 
were mostly early projects: they included 20 of 28 projects proposed for registration 
through November 2006 but only six out of 432 projects proposed subsequently. 
7.3.2.  Method of calculation: generation cost and emissions saved 
The cost of electricity can be calculated from the energy content of the fuel used, the 
delivered cost of the fuel and the characteristics of the plant.  The formula we use is: 
                                                             
Where capital cost is an annual capital charge95 based on an appropriate discount rate 
(see comments below on risk) and operating cost is the total cash operating cost of the 
plant excluding fuel.  Both capital and operating cost are expressed as cost per 
megaWatt hour (MWh) based on the plant’s expected annual output, but we implicitly 
treat these costs as fixed – any costs that are clearly volume-related (such as pre-
treatment of coal) are included in the fuel cost per ton.  The efficiency of the baseline 
plant is based on figures in (MIT, 2007)96 while capital and operating costs are obtained 
from Chinese official sources97.  For the CDM projects we use the figures given in the 
PDD.  We assume that all cost elements remain constant in real terms.  As mentioned 
below, our objective is to evaluate projects based on their value to the host country, not 
on the return to investors.  We therefore exclude from our calculations all taxes, tax 
                                                     
95 Also called equivalent annual cost.  It is “the annual cash flow sufficient to recover a capital 
investment, including the cost of capital for that investment, over the investment’s economic 
life” (Brealey et al., 2006). 
96 The assumed heatrate of a supercritical plant burning Chinese coal is 2,098 kcal/kWh. 
97 Thermal Power Engineering Design Reference Cost Index produced by the China Institute of 
Power Planning and Design.  This appears not to include insurance – we used figures from a 
number of PDDs.  We also added the additional costs of flue gas desulfurization obtained from 
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credits and subsidies, which we see as primarily intended to influence the return to 
investors.   
In principle, generation cost should be adjusted for cost of transmission, particularly for 
wind and small hydro projects.  A proper evaluation of these costs would require a 
complex simulation of the Chinese grid.   However, many small hydro schemes are 
located in remote areas that are undersupplied with electricity: the project might well 
be the lowest cost means of supplying the area and actually save on transmission costs.  
On balance, it seems reasonable to make no adjustment.  Wind projects, however, are 
essentially suppliers to a regional grid and the cost of connection to the grid cannot be 
ignored.  Our adjustment for wind intermittency (see below) includes an element for 
added transmission costs. 
Our estimates of fuel prices are based on figures for the pithead price of coal for power 
generation in 2006 given in the China Energy Databook (LBNL, 2008).  We assume that 
this price applies to Shanxi mixed coal with a GCV (gross calorific value) of 5000 kcal/kg, 
which we use as our standard.  From 2007 coal prices were liberalized – generators 
negotiated contract prices for much of their supply and bought the rest at spot-based 
prices.  Precise figures are not available – not least because large volumes of coal were 
produced by mines that were operating illegally - but we have made what we believe 
are reasonable estimates – see chart 7.4. 
Chart 7.4. Pithead Price of Shanxi coal (RMB/ton) 
To this pithead price we add preparation 
(washing) costs98 obtained from (You and 
Xu, 2010) and estimated rail and sea freight 
from Shanxi to the power plant location. 
                                                     




For gas prices, we have no alternative but to take the price for each project from the 
PDD and keep it constant in real terms.  Chinese gas imports are purchased under long 
term contracts and contract price formulae (usually there is a link to oil prices) are 
confidential.  In any case, only about half the gas-based projects in our sample pay 
international prices and the relationship of domestic gas prices to international (LNG) 
prices is not clear to us.   
For the baseline coal-fired plant and for CDM plants fueled by natural gas we can 
estimate emissions of CO₂ per MWh from efficiencies and operating characteristics.  We 
assume the default emissions factors published by the IPCC99.  For wind and hydro, 
operational emissions are zero.  We follow a UNFCCC rule in ignoring leakage emissions 
(emissions of greenhouse gases that result from operation of the project or the baseline 
plant but do not occur at the plant location - examples include emissions of methane 
from a coal mine during operations, or emissions related to energy used to run the 
pumps that pressurize gas pipelines).  The UNFCCC rule is to ignore negative leakage 
(when leakage from a project is less than leakage from the baseline plant).  All projects 
that we consider have negative leakage. 
7.3.3.  Project risk and related issues 
The levelized cost methodology is the traditional approach to project evaluation in the 
electricity generation sector.  Projects are compared on the basis of generation cost, 
with expected cash costs over the project life discounted to take account of the time 
value of money.  This is a rational way to choose between investments when cash flows 
are predictable or when cost-plus regulation effectively equalizes risk between projects; 
however, it can produce perverse results when different technologies have different risk 
                                                     




profiles (IEA, 2005).  For example, a project with high capital costs but low operating 
costs might have a very different risk profile to one where the opposite is the case.   
Even in well-established power markets, the move away from a risk-leveling approach to 
regulation is reducing the value of levelized cost as a decision tool (IEA, 2005).  Its 
relevance in the fast-changing Chinese market is somewhat dubious.  A commercial firm 
contemplating an investment would very likely estimate the project return in a number 
of scenarios, or calculate a wide range of sensitivities, and would use a project hurdle 
rate that reflected the perceived risk.  In a paper such as this one, it is not feasible to 
apply sophisticated risk analysis methodologies to each and every project.  Our 
methodology balances simplicity – so we can use the data available from the UNFCCC– 
and recognition of risk differentials.  
The investment analysis method of assessing CDM projects compares the project’s 
financial return with some benchmark.  The benchmark rate (“hurdle rate”) enters our 
generation cost calculation as a required return on capital, used in calculating the 
annual capital charge.  In broad terms we can reflect differences in the risk profiles of 
technologies by using different hurdle rates.  For coal and gas fired plants we use the 
standard set by the Chinese government,100 which is an internal rate of return (IRR) of 
8% in real terms - more or less in line with benchmarks used by major energy companies 
in the developed world.  For wind and small hydro projects we adjust that rate to reflect 
the lower proportion of debt financing that is appropriate for a project with intermittent 
revenues.  For these projects we use 8.7%, which allows for a move from (say) 70% debt 
financing to 50%.  The adjustment method used is taken from (Brealey et al., 2006). 
                                                     
100 The PDD for CDM project No 1734 quotes the Chinese Interim Rules on Economic Assessment 
of Electric Power Engineering Retrofit Projects on this subject.  Small hydro projects in China are 
assessed using a 10% hurdle rate: we have not followed this as we regard the higher rate as a 




Our base case assessments are based on a 40 year life for all projects.  This is realistic for 
coal, gas and hydro projects but less so for wind (though (IEA, 2005) generally assumes 
the same life for all types of plant).  As a sensitivity, we recalculate generation cost for 
wind projects assuming a 20 year life. 
Wind does not always blow: a grid that obtains a significant amount of electricity from 
wind incurs costs to maintain a constant supply voltage and frequency.  This is becoming 
a problem for China, where wind is the fastest growing generation technology101.  There 
is no doubt that it adds to China’s electricity supply costs. 
“Integration cost is the extra investment and operational cost of the non-wind part of 
the power system when wind power is integrated” (Holttinen et al., 2009).  It can be 
divided into balancing costs (additional operating costs) and investment costs 
(investment in non-wind backup capacity and in extensions to the grid).  Estimation of 
integration costs requires a hugely complex exercise in simulation: we can obtain some 
idea of potential costs in China by reviewing simulation exercises made in other 
countries.  
 Large grids or those with good connections to their neighbours have lower balancing 
costs.  The IEA Wind study (Holttinen et al., 2009) found costs of about €0.3/MWh in 
Norway, which has good interconnections with grids in neighbouring countries.  The 
UK - a relatively small and isolated market – would incur balancing costs of 
€1.4/MWh with wind contributing 5% of supply, rising to €3.4/MWh with 20% of 
supply from wind.  The Chinese grid is huge, but linkages between regions are poor.  
                                                     
101 Chinese wind capacity doubled in 2008 for the fourth successive year; in 2006 it provided 
0.1% of China’s electricity supplies (Williams and Kahrl; 2008); it now provides 1.3% (Louis 
Schwarz, writing in Renewable Energy World on March 10 2009 - see 
www.renewableenergyworld.com).  The Chinese government, as of end-June 2009, was said to 
be considering setting a target for renewable energy to provide up to 20% of total electricity 




We deduce that balancing costs are minimal in most of the country but high in some 
areas with concentrations of wind generation capacity. 
 The two Chinese grid operators have incurred huge investment costs in recent 
years, but our view is that these investments are largely due to rapid demand 
growth and greater need for flexibility102.  “Costs related to the intermittency of 
wind generation should not be confused with the costs of adapting the grid to more 
efficient operation with private sector participation and more decentralized decision 
making” (IEA, 2005).   
Our assessment is that wind intermittency costs in China are high but will be temporary.  
Balancing costs in certain isolated regions are currently significant but will be far lower 
as connections between grid regions improve.  High investment costs are mainly related 
to expansion and the need for flexibility, though some new transmission links may be 
brought forward to cope with wind-related problems.  As a rough estimate, we include 
in our model an integration cost for Chinese wind generation of €1.5 (US$2.0) per MWh 
equal to the balancing cost incurred by the relatively isolated UK grid with 5% wind 
penetration. 
Two of the gas-fired plants in our sample sell steam to district heating systems.  We net 
off from plant costs the revenue received for steam supplies, but our MACs for these 
plants are high, implying that the additional costs are not fully offset by revenues 
received.  Note also that our figures for emissions saved by these plants are 
                                                     
102 Every electricity grid needs backup to meet sudden peaks in demand, or in case a plant has 
to shut down for operational reasons.  If we assume (reasonably) that these operational risks 
are not correlated with changes in wind strength, small amounts of wind generation have a 
negligible effect on overall downtime risk.  (Holttinen et al, 2009) concluded that an efficient 
grid that can access backup generation capacity over a wide area can handle wind generated 
electricity up to 20% of total supplies with little or no additional investment.  In most of China, 




underestimated because the alternative source of steam for a municipal heating system 
is probably a small coal fired boiler - many such boilers in China are major sources of 
local pollution as well as GHG emissions.  Because of these distorting factors, we have 
excluded these plants in calculating averages for Chinese NGCC plants. 
7.3.4.  Comparison of our methodology and that required by the UNFCCC  
Before registering a CDM project, the UNFCCC Executive Board must verify its 
additionality (i.e. that it would not be built without the CDM subsidy and will achieve a 
real reduction in emissions of GHGs).  Most large projects demonstrate additionality by 
the financial analysis method – i.e. they estimate the financial return to the investors in 
the project and demonstrate that some alternative plant configuration would give a 
better return.  A weakness of this approach is that the principal determinant of a 
project’s return is its feed-in tariff - the price at which it sells power to the grid.  In many 
countries the government effectively decides which projects are built and also sets the 
tariff.  The UNFCCC methodology verifies only whether the government has allowed the 
investors to make a profit.  If anything, the government has an incentive to set a low 
tariff to ensure the project’s eligibility for the CDM, as the CER revenue stream adds to 
national income.   
Our preferred measure, the MAC, is based on the cost of electricity generated by the 
project.  A generation cost lower than baseline provides a benefit to the host country: a 
rational government should seek to capture that benefit by setting tariffs that allow low 
cost projects to be profitable.  This implies that a project with a generation cost below 
baseline (i.e. a project with a negative MAC) would be built even without CDM funding 
and is therefore not additional103.   
                                                     
103 The UNFCCC’s Executive Board (EB), which reviews CDM projects, has recently been paying 
more attention to tariffs.  At its February 2010 meeting, an unusually large number of projects 




In fact, we find a significant number of CDM projects in China with negative MACs.  We 
also find projects with MACs that are higher than observed CER104 prices.  Theory 
indicates that, over the long term, the market price for CERs should be close to the cost 
of cutting emissions in Annex 1 countries as emitters arbitrage between making cuts and 
buying permits.  If MACs are consistently higher than the value of CERs generated, the 
implication is that emissions cuts could be made more cheaply in annex 1 countries.  
This contradicts the rationale for the CDM that emissions cuts in a developing country 
cost less (although Sathaye and Phadke concluded that the cost of emissions cuts 
achieved by substituting gas-fired plants for coal is higher in India than in the United 
States (Sathaye and Phadke, 2006)). 
7.3.5.  Method of calculation: sustainability benefit 
As the host government decides which projects can be proposed for CDM registration, 
one would expect that a project with higher than baseline generation cost after taking 
account of CER revenue would be denied support.  As large numbers of such projects 
are proposed for registration, governments may be considering project benefits beyond 
simply generation cost.  The value of a project’s contribution to sustainable 
development may provide an explanation. 
                                                                                                                                                              
projects were still under review, of which 25 were wind or hydro projects in China for which the 
EB had questioned the tariff applied.  In our view, this amounts to second-guessing the Chinese 
regulator based on inadequate information.  It would be better to look directly at generation 
costs (and insist on adequate information being provided). 
104 Strictly speaking, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is based on EUAs (EU Allowances) 
while CDM projects receive CER (Certified Emission Reductions) credits.  CERs and EUAs are 
interchangeable for purposes of compliance with the EU ETS and trade on the same markets.  
Logically their prices should be identical, but in practice the market price of CER futures is €1 - 
€2 below that of EUA futures, either because of lower liquidity or greater risk of non-delivery.  
For both instruments, prices quoted in this paper are futures price for December 2009 




The UNFCCC does not define what “sustainable development” means, which is hardly 
surprising – it is hard to define and harder to quantify.  However, a project that 
generates electricity using a zero or low emission technology reduces the cost to the 
Chinese economy of health problems related to pollution from burning coal.  In 
principle, the improvement to health can be valued.  
A simple approach to quantifying the value of this benefit is to calculate (Resnier et al., 
2007): 
                
 
 (2) 
Where, (Exti) is the value of external damage avoided per kilowatt hour of electricity 
generated by project i; (Empi) is the level of emissions of each pollutant p avoided per 
kilowatt hour of electricity generated by project i and (Dcp) is the damage cost per unit 
of emission of pollutant p.  
 Avoided emissions: emissions of SO₂ and primary particulates (fly ash) can be 
calculated from the sulfur and ash content of the coal - our calculations are based on 
Shanxi coal with a sulfur content (after washing) of 0.74% and an ash content of 
10.04%.  Our baseline plant is fitted with flue gas desulfurization (FGD) that removes 
85% of SO₂ - a conservative assumption in that, while all new large power plants in 
China must be fitted with FGD, their profitability can be maximized by simply not 
running it.  There are indications that this is indeed happening (Williams and Kahrl, 
2008).  We assume that 99.5% of fly ash is removed from the flue gas by 
electrostatic precipitation and that new power stations use the best available low 
NOX burner technology but not selective catalytic reduction (SCR) as required for 
new sources in the US.  For gas-fired plants, we assume zero emissions of SO₂ and 
TSP (total suspended particulates). 
 Our estimates of Dcp - the damage cost per ton of pollutant - are based on 




methodology is described in Economic Evaluation of Environmental Impacts: a 
Workbook (Asian Development Bank, 1996).  His dose-response functions are from 
US sources, notably (Pope et al., 2002; Pope et al., 1995) and unit values for 
damages were adapted from a study made in the early 1990s in New York State 
(Rowe et al., 1995; Rowe et al., 1996) using the benefit transfer methodology 
(Krupnick et al., 1996).  Valuations are based on specific endpoints such as all cause 
mortality, estimated using the willingness to pay (WTP) approach.   
In recent years researchers have cast doubts on some aspects of these methods: the use 
in a developing country of dose-response functions from the US has been questioned 
and the validity of benefit transfer has been disputed (Hammitt and Zhou, 2006; Liu et 
al., 1997; Ostro, 2004; Wang and Mullahy, 2006); some researchers have considered 
using quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or years of life lost (YOLL) rather than mortality 
(Kenkel, 2006); WTP is preferred in the developed world, but the alternative adjusted 
human capital (AHC) approach has been more widely used in China (Zhang et al., 2010). 
Meier estimated unit damage costs per ton of pollutant for 31 Chinese states and 
municipalities.   We allocate these states and municipalities to grid regions and calculate 
a population weighted average for each grid region, updated for changes in population 
and per capita GNI since 1999.  Table 7.3 shows the data for New York State and Meier’s 





Table 7.3 Unit damage costs (1999$/1000ton/person)  
 TSP SO₂ NOX 
New York State (Rowe et al)    
Local 0.212 – 0.317 0.042 – 0.085 0.063 – 0.085 
Regional 0.106 - 0.317 0.021 – 0.042 0.042 – 0.063 
Distant 0.042 – 0.085 0.001 – 0.021 0.011 – 0.021 
    
Shanghai (Meier)    
Local 0.023 – 0.034 0.005 – 0.009 0.007 – 0.009 
Regional 0.006 – 0.019 0.001 – 0.003 0.003 – 0.004 
Distant 0.001 – 0.002 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 
    
Shanghai – total externality 
(1999$/ton) 
2339 479 611 
Source: Meier P., 2003 
Note: data from Rowe et al were adjusted to 1999$ by Meier. 
Our 2007 externality valuations are shown in table 7.4.  They are clearly subject to a 
wide margin for error but they provide an indication of the health benefits of low-
emission generation technologies.  The criticisms in the papers mentioned above 
indicate that our estimates are likely to be on the high side. 
Table 7.4. Externality valuations (2007 RMB/ton) 
Grid Region Population (m) (2007) TSP SO₂ NOX 
China Central 367 14,379 3,806 3,609 
China East 224 33,395 8,865 8,378 
China North 255 22,214 5,718 5,617 
China Northeast 121 7,959 2,077 1,998 
China Northwest 96 4,475 1,197 1,116 





7.4.1.  Generation Cost and MAC 
Table 7.5. Generation cost and MAC by year and project type 
  Number of 
Projects 
Generation Cost (US¢/kWh) MAC (US$/tCO₂e) 
  Mean Standard Dev’n Mean Standard Dev’n 
Coal 2006 N/A 2.9    
 2007 N/A 3.5    
 2008 N/A 4.2    
 2009 N/A 4.5    
       
Wind 2006 4 6.4 1.5 40.6 19.4 
 2007 41 6.7 0.9 38.0 11.1 
 2008 61 7.2 1.1 37.0 11.6 
 2009 11 8.5 1.1 49.5 11.6 
       
Hydro 2006 8 2.5 0.8 (5.0) 10.8 
 2007 56 2.5 0.7 (13.1) 9.7 
 2008 212 2.8 1.0 (19.8) 12.3 
 2009 23 3.6 1.4 (12.7) 15.6 
       
Natural 
Gas 
2007 9 4.9 1.2 27.5 18.7 
2008 7 6.1 0.6 23.9 13.1 
 2009 3 6.5 N/A 26.5 N/A 
Notes: (a) The figures shown for coal are the averages of China’s six grid regions.  
(b) Average costs for gas exclude two gas-fired combined heat and power plants. 
 Small hydro is significantly cheaper than the coal baseline - its average MAC is 
negative for all years (though costs for these projects are site-specific so the range is 
wide) (Table 7.5).  We conclude that the majority of small hydro projects should be 




share of Chinese power generation: according to the China Energy Databook (LBNL, 
2008) the number of small hydro stations in China at the end of 1997 was over 
44,000 - clearly the Chinese government thought these stations were worth building 
even without the CDM subsidy. 
 As a sensitivity, we looked at the effect of varying project life for wind only as our 
standard assumption of 40 years is probably too generous for this project type.  The 
increase in costs when the total investment must be spread over a shorter life is 
significant (Table 7.6). 
Table 7.6. Effect of changing project life (wind projects) 










2006 6.4 40.6 7.4 51.4 
2007 6.7 38.0 7.7 48.8 
2008 7.2 37.0 8.2 48.8 
2009 8.5 49.5 9.8 63.4 
 The European carbon price peaked at €32.9 (US$40.6) in April 2006, then collapsed.  
Over the period of this study it has ranged between €32.9 and €8.2, with a mean of 
€20.0 and a standard deviation of €4.6 (US$26.6 and US$6.1 at the average 
exchange rate over the period).  An average Chinese wind farm that benefited from 
the CDM subsidy would have been a marginal economic proposition at the peak, 
with CER revenues exactly equal to its generation cost disadvantage.  However, at 
the price levels that have held since May 2006 one has to assume that the Chinese 
government, which has encouraged an impressive surge of investment in wind 
generation, sees some value in diversifying the country’s mix of generation 
technologies that is not captured by our study.  This could be that a wind generation 




its flue gas desulfurization system.  China has experimented with air cooling for 
power stations in the water-short North of the country but air cooling significantly 
reduces the efficiency of a plant.  If the government is looking to the time – possibly 
not far into the future – when the marginal generation plant in Northern China is air-
cooled, it is looking at a wind power MAC significantly lower than our estimates. 
 Generation costs for all project rose over the period.  Higher fuel costs are the main 
cause for coal and gas-fired plants, while capital cost inflation affects all project 
types.  However, for all categories of CDM project, a declining plant load factor (PLF) 
significantly raised unit costs.  PLF is the ratio of actual output to the plant’s 
maximum theoretical output.  A low PLF means that plant fixed costs, including 
capital recovery, are spread over a smaller amount of output (we assumed an 85% 
PLF for the coal-fired baseline plant) (Table 7.7). 
Table 7.7. Average PLF by year (%) 
 Wind Hydro Gas 
2006 25.0 49.0 N/A 
2007 25.2 47.0 41.0 
2008 25.6 45.0 40.0 
2009 23.9 42.0 35.0 
The sharp decrease for wind in 2009 could reflect grid problems caused by rapid growth 
in wind capacity.  According to a report in Interfax China Energy Weekly dated 
September 1, 2009, the power grid in Inner Mongolia – China’s most favored wind 
region – is unable to cope with a surge of wind plant construction.  Wind power creates 
control problems for grid operators (see section 3 of this paper: methodology) and wind 
is expected to account for 15% of electricity supplies in Inner Mongolia by the end of 
2009.  The decreasing PLFs for hydro and gas are harder to account for.  A simple 




engineers today are using less optimistic assumptions in the light of experience with 
earlier projects.  Our project data could be biased as our sample cut-off (projects 
proposed by April 1 2009 and registered by March 1 2010) excludes eight projects 
proposed by the former date that had not achieved registration by the latter.  As 
generation cost is a key factor in the investment analysis method of determining 
additionality, further research is needed on this issue. 
We compared our generation cost figures calculated from PDD data with estimates in 
Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: 2005 Update (IEA, 2005), which contains data 
for plants currently under construction or planned, mainly in OECD countries.  
Differences in assumptions between the two sets of data are too great to allow of 
meaningful analysis, but a very obvious difference is that, for all technologies, we find 
lower construction costs in China.  For coal and hydro the difference is startling – 
Chinese construction costs per kilowatt are less than half OECD levels.  Our estimate of 
the construction cost of a coal-fired plant in China is taken from the Thermal Power 
Engineering Design Reference Cost Index produced by the China Institute of Power 
Planning and Design.  Very similar figures are given in (Lan et al., 2007) and in a report 
from the China Power Regulatory Commission (see 
http://www.chinamining.org/News/2006-07-20/1153374414d105.html).  The Chinese 
cost figures owe something to low Chinese wages, but an important reason why the 
figures are so low must be the learning curve effect of building these plants in very large 
numbers. 
This indication that capital costs are lower in China than in the OECD contrasts with the 
findings of Sathaye and Phadke that the cost of cutting CO₂ emissions in India by 
substituting gas-fired generation for coal was higher than in the US, largely because of 
the high capital cost of imported equipment.  Their costs for India were based on figures 
provided to the government for regulatory purposes, while their US data are from an 




near future: for the present we note that the economics of emissions cuts may be very 
different in the two countries. 
Table 7.8. Comparison of generation cost estimates 
  Generation Cost Construction Cost 
 Year US¢/kWh US$/kW 
Coal (without CCS)    
 (IEA, 2005) 2003 4.4 1,312 
 This Paper 2006 2.9 531 
     
Gas (NGCC)    
 (IEA, 2005) 2003 5.1 644 
 This Paper 2007 4.9 440 
     
Wind    
 (IEA, 2005) 2003 8.1 1,430 
 This Paper 2006 6.4 1,215 
     
Hydro    
 (IEA, 2005) 2003 7.9a 2,055a 
 This Paper 2006 2.5 894 
Note:  (a) Average excluding outliers (two projects in Germany and Japan). 
7.4.2.  Sustainability and the valuation of health benefits 
A common criticism of the CDM is that it does not boost sustainable development in the 
host countries.  The net effect on sustainability of, for example, a hydro scheme, is 
arguable, but all the projects that we analyze clearly produce significant and 
quantifiable benefits to human health due to their lower levels of pollution compared to 
coal-fired plants.  In fact, this is only one of a number of ancillary benefits of these 
projects: they have lower water usage per kWh generated (particularly important in 




electrification.  Most of these effects on sustainability are practically impossible to 
quantify, but we have attempted to quantify the health benefits. 






% of MAC 
Adjusted 
MAC 
Wind 38.0 2.0 5.3% 36.0 
Hydro (13.1) 1.3 N/A (14.4) 
Natural Gas 27.5 2.7 9.8% 24.7 
Table 7.9 above shows unweighted averages of the health benefits for the three types 
of projects.  Benefits are specific to the region in which a project is located - a cut in 
pollution in a region with high population will have a greater absolute financial effect 
because of the greater number of people affected.  In China, some wind farms and most 
gas-fired power stations are located in heavily populated coastal regions, while most 
hydro projects are in sparsely populated provinces such as Yunnan.  We believe that this 
accounts for the differences in value of health benefits between project types 
(population by region in 2007 is shown in table 7.4). 
We can use our cost and benefit figures to analyze whether these projects provide 
overall benefits to their host countries.  Table 7.10 below lays out the overall costs and 
benefits of each type of project per ton of CO₂e avoided, using 2007 data.  The CER 
revenue shown is the average EUA price since April 2005. 







Net Cost / 
(Benefit) 
Wind 38.0 2.0 26.6 9.4 
Hydro (13.1) 1.3 26.6 (41.0) 




 Wind generation produces a negative net benefit.  We suggest above that the 
Chinese government may be motivated by some benefit of wind power that is not in 
our analysis: as many of these projects are located in the North of China – a region 
that is increasingly plagued by water shortages – this may be wind’s zero water 
requirement in operation. 
 Natural gas plants are close to neutral in net benefit terms, without taking into 
account the value of the added flexibility that they bring to the grid. 
 Hydro schemes in China are so profitable that they should not be in the CDM at all. 
7.5: CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our principal objective in this paper is to focus on one key sector in one country and ask 
whether the criticisms that have been made of the CDM apply here, and whether any 
problems identified apply specifically to the CDM or to offset schemes in general.  If the 
former is the case, is it possible to salvage the positive features of the CDM in a better 
designed offset scheme? 
As regards the first of these questions, CDM projects in this sector receive a mixed 
report: 
 Most wind and NGCC projects in our sample are additional - the issuance of CERs for 
these projects does not add to global GHG emissions (though it may increase the 
global cost of emissions cuts). 
 The majority of small hydro projects are not additional.  Other things being equal, 
the issuance of CERs for these projects damages the environment by allowing a net 
global increase in GHG emissions. 
 All three types of projects produce significant benefits to human health by cutting 
harmful emissions of SO₂ and other pollutants.  In our view these projects achieve 




The problems identified are partly due to the inadequacy of the UNFCCC approach to 
assessing additionality.  An offset scheme designed for a specific sector such as power 
generation could focus on the impacts of projects in that sector, providing insights that 
the standardized CDM methodologies would miss.  This could enhance confidence that 
the sector-specific scheme achieves the impact that its designers intended and does not 
create perverse incentives. 
It is not our intention in this paper to make detailed policy proposals, second-guessing 
the outcome of international negotiations.  However the electricity sector is vital to the 
development goals of countries such as China and India and offers the possibility of an 
international agreement to limit GHG emissions.  By combining an offset scheme with 
direct funding of investment and technology transfer, it would be possible to underpin 
development of these countries by ensuring adequate supplies of electricity at the 
lowest possible cost while maximizing the use of zero or low carbon generation 
technologies.  To work effectively, such a scheme would have to transfer significant 
funds from the developed to the developing world.  To obtain buy-in from the countries 
that would provide the funds, it would have to be based on analytical methodologies 
that inspire confidence. 
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8: Electricity generation costs in India – India at a crossroads105 
8.1:  INTRODUCTION 
India faces formidable challenges in meeting its energy needs – to quote the opening 
statement of the country’s Integrated Energy Policy (IEP).106  The IEP is based on the 
premise that coal will remain India’s main energy resource for the foreseeable future.  
This view is widely held – the IEA forecasts that coal demand in India will more than 
double between 2010 and 2035.  However India’s rate of economic development and 
the resulting increase in electricity demand (the power sector accounts for more than 
60% of the expected increase in coal demand) has outstripped the production capability 
of Indian coal mines:107 much of the increase will be met by imports. (IEA, 2011) 
Growth of this scale would sharply increase India’s GHG emissions, putting in question 
the country’s commitment to reduce the carbon emissions intensity of its GDP by 20%-
25% from 2005 levels by 2020, while the increase in imports would impact both energy 
costs and energy security.  There could also be serious consequences for human health: 
a recent RFF Discussion Paper provides preliminary estimates of the impact of India’s 
coal fired power stations on health (Cropper et al., 2012).   
To avoid – or at least mitigate - these negative consequences, there is a need for policies 
aimed at maximizing the proportion of India’s generation capacity that is based on low 
or zero carbon technologies – nuclear or renewables.  India has no shortage of plans to 
increase investment in both.  An interim report by an expert group set up by India’s 
                                                     
105 By Ian Partridge: submitted for publication as (Partridge, 2012a). 
106See planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_intengy.pdf.  The Integrated Energy 
Policy was published by the Government of India in August 2006 (accessed 6/27/2012). 
107 According to an article in The Economic Times (Mumbai) dated June 6, 2012, the state owned 
Coal India Limited has warned its power sector customers that it can supply only 60% of their 




Planning Commission set targets based on an analysis of how India might meet its 
commitment cut the emissions intensity of its GDP (Planning Commission, 2011).108  The 
Strategic Plan109 published in February 2011 by the Ministry for New and Renewable 
energy (MNRE) contained similar targets together with more ambitious “aspirations” for 
grid-connected renewable generation.  For wind generation, the target – to be reached 
in 2022 - is 38.5 GW, with an aspiration of 45 GW - installed capacity at the end of 2010 
was 13.1 GW.  For small hydro the target is 6.6 GW, the aspiration is 8.0 GW and 
installed capacity in 2010 was 2.9 GW; for solar the target and the aspiration are both 
20 GW and 2010 capacity was only 18 MW.  These figures do not include large hydro 
(defined as above 25MW capacity), which is an important source of power for India with 
installed capacity of 37.4 GW in 2010 Off-grid generation is also excluded, though it 
could make a significant contribution to the country’s push to bring electricity to villages 
that currently have no supply.  India’s National Solar Mission – a government initiative 
set up to encourage investment in solar power – has a target of 2.0 GW for off-grid 
generation – the MNRE Strategic Plan suggests that this could be doubled.110   
Estimates of India’s ultimate renewable energy potential cover a wide range: for wind, 
the figure published by the Centre for Wind Energy Technology (CWET) - an R&D arm of 
the MNRE - is 103 GW at 80m hub height;111 however a recent study by the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory gave a range of figures from 2,006 GW at 80m hub height 
                                                     
108 Its proposals have been criticized as unambitious by the Centre for Science and Environment 
– a Delhi-based NGO: see http://www.cseindia.org/node/2604 (accessed 6/27/2012). 
109 See http://mnre.gov.in/information/policies-2/ (accessed 6/27/2012). 
110 Rapid growth in renewable energy capacity means that the Strategic Plan figures for installed 
capacities are already out of date: for solar, a MNRE press release dated May 11 2012 
(http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=83632) stated that 979 MW of grid-connected 
solar PV has been installed.  The most recent announced figure for wind capacity in India is 14.9 
GW at the end of August 2011 (source: MNRE).   




to 3,121 GW at 120m (Phadke et al., 2012).  The accepted figure for the country’s hydro 
potential (both small and large scale) is 149 GW112 while the potential for solar is usually 
simply described as huge.  One could raise questions about some of these estimates, but 
it seems reasonable to conclude that a very large increase in renewable generation 
capacity would enable India to at least partially escape the consequences of reliance on 
imported coal; and that the potential for such an increase clearly exists.  
The economic consequences of such an increase are not so clear.  In this paper I present 
a set of internally consistent estimates of generation costs for a number of renewable 
technologies and for coal fired plants in India, with projections of likely cost changes to 
2020.  The projections for coal fired plants use realistic coal price scenarios while those 
for renewables draw on a learning rate analysis for both wind and small hydro, based on 
cost data for registered CDM projects.113  The latter analysis was presented in an earlier 
paper (Partridge, 2012b).  Some cost estimates and comments on solar PV are included, 
but as only two Indian projects have achieved CDM registration (as of July 2012), these 
are based on figures published by McKinsey (Aanesen et al., 2012).  I have not found any 
similar set of projections for generation costs in India using both renewable and 
conventional technologies – the paper thus makes a unique contribution to debate 
about India’s energy policy.   
The conclusions presented below cast doubt on the primacy of coal in the Indian energy 
scene.  A reliable fallback position for India’s energy policy makers has always been that 
coal, despite its disadvantages, is both cheap and plentiful.  This position is no longer 
tenable: high cost imported coal is now the marginal energy source for India.  If 
                                                     
112 http://www.nhpc.gov.in/English/Scripts/Hydro_Scenario.aspx (accessed 08/08/2012). 
113 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a scheme created by the Kyoto Protocol that 
awards carbon offset credits to investors in projects located in developing countries that reduce 
net greenhouse gas emissions in the country concerned.  Financial and operating data on all 




international prices develop as forecast by the IEA, wind will be cheaper than coal, at 
the margin, by about 2019.  By that time, power from a new plant burning imported 
coal will be the most expensive option of those considered in this research, other than 
solar PV.  In Southern India, where wind conditions are favorable, wind power was 
already cheaper than power from imported coal in 2011.  This significant change in the 
realities underpinning Indian energy policy provides a strong argument for a maximum 
renewables (or nuclear) energy policy.     
In section 2 of this paper I describe the methodology I use for the analysis; section 3 lays 
out the results and section 4 provides a discussion of factors highlighted in the results 
analysis, with some overall conclusions. 
8.2:  METHODOLOGY: RENEWABLE GENERATION PROJECTS 
8.2.1: Analysis of costs 
The basis of my methodology is comparison between the costs of electricity based on 
renewable generation technologies (wind, hydro and solar PV) and a baseline coal fired 
plant.  My estimates of generation costs for wind and small hydro are taken from an 
earlier paper in which I estimate generation costs by project for samples of wind and 
small hydro projects (and two solar PV projects), and use learning rate analysis to 
project future costs for these technologies (Partridge, 2012b).  In this section I 
summarize the approach - for a more detailed explanation, please see the earlier paper.   
Generation cost is estimated using the identity:  
                                                                      
Data on operating and capital costs are obtained from the database of CDM projects 
maintained by the UNFCCC (http://cdm.unfccc.int/) which contains a PDD (project 
design document) for each registered project.  Capital cost in this case means initial 




(Merrett and Sykes, 1973).  A key input to the ACC calculation is the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) appropriate to the project - my assumptions concerning WACC 
are described in section 8.3.3.  Intermittency costs arise because the output of a wind 
turbine fluctuates due to the intermittency of the wind resource,114 imposing costs on 
the grid operator due mainly to the need for additional conventional generation as 
backup.  An analysis of intermittency costs would require a complex simulation exercise 
for the whole Indian grid, however a review of fifteen European and US studies 
(Holttinen et al., 2009) indicates that a conservative estimate of the added cost where 
wind contributes up to 5% of total supply to a grid would be $1.50 per MWh.115  Wind 
contributed only 2% of Indian electricity generation in 2009 (IEA, 2011). 
Small hydro plants often operate on a seasonal basis depending on rainfall, but during 
the period of operation output is reasonably predictable.  I spread costs and generation 
by seasonal plants over the year, but assume zero intermittency costs.   
8.2.2: Learning rate analysis 
The observation that manufacturing costs fall as experience of a technology 
accumulates was reported by (Wright, 1936).  It has become the basis for learning rate 
(or experience curve) analysis which, as used today, models the relationship between 
manufacturing cost and cumulative volume manufactured.  Learning curves based on 
such models are widely used for cost forecasting: according to Alberth and Hope (2007), 
“(learning curve analysis) in log format, is a very useful first order approximation (of 
future costs) with the distribution of the forecast error being both symmetrical and 
unbiased with a mean value that is statistically not different from zero”.  Alberth and 
                                                     
114 The same is true of solar.  In the limited analysis we have been able to do of solar PV projects 
in India we assume the same level of intermittency costs as for wind projects. 
115 Many of these studies include estimates of the cost impact at various levels of wind 
contribution to total generation.  Extrapolating back to 5%, the median added cost is about $1.3, 




Hope did point out that the translation of log into normal format forecasts introduces a 
bias towards overestimation of cost reductions, but that this is not significant for 
medium term forecasting.  (Alberth and Hope, 2007).  They suggested that medium term 
means about twelve years, in the context of an analysis of GHG abatement technologies.   
I apply learning rate analysis116 to renewable generation technologies (wind and small 
scale hydro) in India and use the results obtained to forecast future generation costs out 
to 2020.  For wind generation, a regression analysis with log(generation cost) as the 
dependent variable shows that project size has no significant effect on generation cost.  
The final model used for cost forecasting is outlined in table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Generation Cost Analysis – Wind 
Dependent variable:  log of generation cost (INR(2012) per MWh) 
Number of observations: 240 
R2:    .4375 
Adjusted R2:   .4328 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% conf. interval 
Log_cum -0.2065 0.0280 -7.38 0 -0.2616 -0.1514 
Is_south -0.1723 0.0146 -11.81 0 -0.2013 -0.1438 
Constant 10.1415 0.2611 38.84 0 9.6271 10.6559 
Notes: Log_cum is the log of cumulative installed capacity in MW; 
Is_south is a dummy variable (=1 if project is located in Southern grid region) 
The negative coefficient on the is_south variable in table 8.1 indicates that costs are 
lower in the South; the coefficient on cumulative capacity117 indicates a 13.3% learning 
rate – i.e. generation cost (in real terms) reduces by 13.3% for a doubling in cumulative 
                                                     
116 This section summarizes an earlier paper by the same author (Partridge, 2012b). 
117 Based on data on cumulative wind capacity installed in India obtained from the Ministry of 




capacity installed (95% confidence interval 10.0%-16.6%).  Separate model runs for the 
first half and second half of the period show no indication of flattening in the later years 
– in fact, the curve appears to get steeper, though the short time periods for these two 
runs mean that the confidence intervals are wide.  The lack of any scale effect is 
surprising - other studies of wind generation commonly find economies of scale (Wiser 
and Bolinger, 2011) – however it may be due to a peculiarity of the Indian wind industry: 
it is common in India for a wind turbine manufacturer to develop a wind farm on behalf 
of a number of investors, each of whom takes ownership of a small number of turbines.  
Because of the way that the data are presented in the project PDDs I treat each sub-
project as a separate CDM project: this would mean that small projects in the sample 
may have access to economies of scale typical of a larger wind farm. 
Additional regressions (not shown) to further explore regional differences show that 
capital costs do not vary significantly by region, but plant load factor (electricity 
generated as a percentage of the maximum theoretically possible for the turbine) is 
higher in the South and shows no trend over time.   
For small hydro, a scatter chart of generation costs against time (chart 8.1) shows a 
number of outliers – consistent with a high degree of forecasting uncertainty.   











The final model for hydro generation shows no significant learning effect (table 8.2).  
There is a small scale effect with lower generation cost in the North of India compared 
to other regions.  The relatively low R2 and the fact that the two independent variables 
are significant only at the 10% level indicate that my hydro forecasts are less reliable 
than my wind forecasts – as might be expected from the many outliers in chart 8.1.   
Table 8.2: Generation cost analysis – hydro 
Dependent variable:  log of generation cost (INR(2012) per MWh) 
Number of observations: 57 
R2:    .1099 
Adjusted R2:   .0769 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% conf. interval 
Log_cap -0.0529 0.0286 -1.85 0.07 -0.1103 0.0045 
Is_north -0.1303 0.0727 -1.79 0.079 -0.2761 0.0155 
Constant 7.6748 0.0877 87.5 0 7.4990 7.8507 
Notes: Log_cap is the log of project capacity in MW; 
Is_north is a dummy variable (=1 if project is located in Northern grid region) 
As of March 2012, two grid-connected solar PV projects (both of 5 MW capacity) had 
been registered as CDM projects in India.  Their generation costs, based on the same 
methodology used for wind and hydro, are INR 11.2 and INR 14.4 per kWh (currency of 
2012).  The cost of solar power is falling rapidly: a recent McKinsey and Co report 
(Aanesen et al., 2012) projects a LCOE for large solar PV installations of INR 5.0 per kWh 
in 2020 (2012 currency).  In section 8.4.3 I discuss the possibility that solar could make 
significant inroads into the share taken by coal in the future. 
8.2.3: The project sample - statistical considerations 
The sample of renewable generation projects used for this research comprises 100% of 
wind, hydro and solar projects that were registered as CDM projects as of 12/31/2011.  




elements of generation cost to be calculated.  However for some projects the data in 
the PDD are insufficient : this is the case for 17 of the 60 wind projects that requested 
registration in 2005-2007 but only two out of 199 projects from 2008-2011.  The 
situation with hydro projects is similar: 27 out of 41 2005-2007 projects could not be 
used but only three out of 46 of the 2008-2011 projects.  There is a possibility that the 
higher incidence of missing data for older projects could bias my estimates. 
Where investment cost data are given (18 of the 30 non-usable hydro projects and 10 of 
the 19 wind projects), statistical tests for potential bias show that it is not possible to 
reject the null hypothesis that the populations of usable projects and missing data 
projects have the same mean.  In all cases, the PDDs show project capacity in MW.  
Comparing usable projects and missing data projects on the basis of project size, I find 
that, for wind projects, there is again no indication that the samples have different 
means.  I conclude that, for wind generation, the preponderance of older projects 
among those with missing data does not bias my results.  However for hydro, missing 
data projects are on average smaller than usable ones.  As my generation cost model 
shows a scale effect, it is likely that my average estimated generation cost for earlier 
hydro projects is underestimated.   
I re-run my learning rate analysis for all hydro projects with the generation costs of the 
missing data projects determined by my regression model.  There is an element of 
circular reasoning, but the test provides at least a strong indication that the key 
conclusion of my learning rate analysis – that cumulative capacity installed has no 
significant effect on generation cost – remains unchanged.  For more details of the tests 




8.3:  METHODOLOGY: COAL FIRED PROJECTS 
8.3.1:  Costs and efficiency 
I compare the costs of renewable generation technologies with those of the baseline 
plant, defined as the marginal plant (the next to be built) based on conventional 
technology.  In India the marginal conventional plant is coal fired (in section 8.4.3 I 
consider the possibility that this might change at some time in the future).   
Ten years ago most generation plants being built in India were 500MW subcritical units 
designed by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), based on indigenous technology 
and optimized to burn domestic coal.  Today, the country is switching to supercritical 
boiler technology and imports of coal are growing rapidly.  The government’s “Ultra 
Mega Power Project” (UMPP) program has effectively delegated design decisions to 
Independent power producers.  Four UMPPs – all supercritical - are under construction, 
with two at the bidding stage and several others planned.  At least one supercritical 
plant outside the UMPP program is already operating.  I compare the costs of renewable 
generation both to the former subcritical standard and to a modern supercritical unit. 118 
The impact of increasing imports of coal on Indian generation costs is complex: many 
power stations are using a blend of imported and domestic fuel – this is the case even 
for plants at inland locations which must add rail transport costs to the already high cost 
of imported fuel.  To simplify this situation, I assume that all plants use either 100% 
domestic or 100% imported coal.  I calculate generation costs for all locations based on 
a typical grade of domestic coal: for coastal locations only, I also consider a typical grade 
of imported coal. 
                                                     
118 A supercritical boiler generates steam at a higher temperature and pressure than the 
previously standard subcritical units: this enables it to operate at a higher level of efficiency, but 
the high operating temperature requires the use of sophisticated materials in its construction, 




Estimates of baseline generation costs depend crucially on assumptions on the thermal 
efficiency of coal fired plants, and on their capital and operating costs.  Assumptions on 
plant efficiency, capital and non-fuel operating costs are taken primarily from project 
PDDs.  Many of these use the BHEL 500MW unit as the baseline: some also provide data 
on supercritical plants as several such plants in India have been put forward for CDM 
registration on the grounds that their higher thermal efficiency enables them to cut CO₂ 
emissions per unit of electricity generated compared to a subcritical plant.  Data are 
obtained also from sources such as reports of regulatory hearings and some reports 
(MIT, 2007; Mott McDonald, 2006).  My understanding of the various sources was much 
helped by contacts with engineers at the Indian Central Electricity Authority (CEA). 
Construction cost estimates for subcritical and supercritical plants are shown in table 
8.3: for comparison the table shows estimates from reports by MIT (The Future of Coal 
(MIT, 2007)), and by Mott McDonald (consulting engineers) (Mott McDonald, 2006). 
Table 8.3: Estimates of Construction Costs 
US$ per kW Subcritical Supercritical Difference (%) 
Assumed in this report 652 920 41% 
From (MIT, 2007) 1280 1330 4% 
From (Mott McDonald, 2006) 1224 1293 6% 
The three sets of estimates in table 8.3 apply to different countries in different years,119 
over a period when plant costs fluctuated as a boom in global construction was followed 
by financial crisis.  However in my view the sources are probably internally consistent: 
the cost premium for a supercritical plant over the less sophisticated subcritical plant 
                                                     
119 The Mott McDonald report was published in 2006: its construction cost estimates assume all 
imported components erected on site using Indian labor; cost estimates in the MIT report 
(published in 2007) are for US projects; our construction cost data are taken mainly from 




should be the same in each case.  In fact, it is higher in India - in my view because the 
subcritical plant uses Indian technology and Indian firms have lengthy experience of 
building plants to this design; the supercritical design is new to India and uses foreign 
technology.  If this is the correct explanation, the effect is likely to be temporary. 
A direct parallel is found in a study of the cost of reducing CO₂ emissions by substitution 
of natural gas combined cycle (NGCC)120 generation for coal in India and the US (Sathaye 
and Phadke, 2006), which found a higher marginal abatement cost in India.  
Construction costs of NGCCs were found to be higher in India: the authors speculated 
that, as the technology matures, the cost differential between India and the US would 
narrow.  Their findings parallel the results of this study: the reason for the results 
obtained are that plant costs in India depend on the extent to which the technology 
concerned is owned (in both the literal and figurative senses) by Indian firms.  Both 
studies demonstrate how technology transfer issues interact with energy policy. 
8.3.2: Cost of coal  
Fuel cost estimates for all locations are based on the specifications of coal sampled at 
Dadri power station by a team from Ohio State University.121  The specifications are 
typical of grades supplied to thermal power stations in India, with high ash content 
(38.22%), low sulfur (0.5%) and energy content (Gross Calorific Value, or GCV) of 3692 
kcal/kg.  The Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests requires that coal with ash 
content no greater than 34% is used in environmentally sensitive areas or where the rail 
delivery distance is over 1000 km.  I assume that this is achieved by washing raw coal to 
reduce its ash content.  Cost of washing is estimated based on data from CEA engineers. 
                                                     
120 An NGCC plant is complex but achieves much higher levels of thermal efficiency than a coal-
fired plant. 




Pithead prices of domestic coal are published by Coal India Limited (CIL).  I add indirect 
taxes that have the characteristics of a cost: this includes mineral royalties, as they are 
payments for the use of a resource that belongs to the government (Otto et al., 2006) 
and some charges for use of forest land.  I do not include other indirect taxes such as 
value added tax (VAT), which has no impact on the cost of electricity to India.   
The cost of rail freight means that distance between mine and power plant accounts for 
large regional differences in generation cost.  I estimate freight costs based on likely 
supply patterns for new plants determined by analysis of CIL output forecasts to identify 
mines that can significantly increase production.  Delivery costs are estimated based on 
distances from these mines to plant locations and on published freight rates.  The main 
coal mining regions are located in Eastern and Central India.  The hypothetical marginal 
plant in this area is located at the pithead.  Delhi and industrial areas in Northern India 
are on average about 900km by rail from mines able to increase output.  Most other 
industrial centers are located roughly 1,300km from incremental supplies of domestic 
coal, including coastal locations in the West (in Maharashtra and Gujarat) and in the 
South East.  Incremental coal supplies to Bangalore and the South West of India must 
travel more than 1,700km by rail.  An outline map of the supply regions is provided 
(Map 1).  Assam and the North east are excluded from the analysis.   
Most of India’s coal imports come from Indonesia.  Until recently, firms developing 
investment proposals for large power stations in India fuelled by imported coal would 
base their cost estimates on quoted prices for very low grade Indonesian coal, taking 
advantage of the low price per unit of energy content for these grades.  However, in 
September 2011 the Indonesian government acted to require parity of export prices per 
unit of energy for all grades.  Sourcing of future imports to India is now highly uncertain 
(see articles in The Economic Times (Mumbai) of October 3 2011, and Reuters of April 4, 
2012).  In the absence of clear information, I base my calculations on the specifications 




Map 8.1: Supply zones and principal coalfields 
 
Source of coalfield Locational data: (Trippi and Tewalt, 2011) 
Generation cost estimates presented here are levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) – i.e. 




back to the base year.  Due to the volatility of international coal prices, the assumption 
used in many LCOE calculations of constant real terms prices is inappropriate.  I define 
scenarios that I believe provide upper and lower bounds for prices.  In the low price 
scenario coal behaves as a quintessential commodity: it is traded in a competitive 
market; global reserves are large and OPEC type price controls are not feasible due to 
the diversity of current and potential producer countries.  In the long term prices should 
fluctuate around the long run marginal cost of new supplies, or LRMC (which may vary 
over time (Pindyck, 1999).  Mott McDonald (UK consulting engineers) forecast prices for 
a report on Indian power projects by assuming an LRMC for Pacific basin exporting 
countries of US$40 per ton122 (Mott McDonald, 2006).  During the period 1980 to 2004 
international prices approached this level on several occasions then fell back (chart 8.2).  
This commodity type price behavior lends credibility to the Mott McDonald approach.   
Chart 8.2: Australian Coal Price Index 
Price index for Australian steam coal;123 6667 kcal/kg; fob Port Kembla; US$/t. 
 
Source:  IMF 
                                                     
122 Metric tons are used throughout this paper. 
123 The chart shows the Australian price index as it has been calculated on a consistent basis 
















Since early 2004, prices have risen far above $40, driven by booming demand from Asia.  
In 2008 production costs in exporting nations rose by about $10 per ton, driven by 
higher prices for diesel fuel, labor, steel and other inputs.  By 2010, costs had risen to an 
average for the main producing countries of about $56 per ton (IEA, 2011).  These are 
short run marginal costs, but it is likely that the proposed or recently opened mines in 
such areas as Mongolia and more remote parts of Australia have pushed LRMC up to 
about $50 per ton (IEA, 2010, quoting data from Marston and IHS Global Insight).  For 
my lower bound forecast I assume that the Indonesian benchmark falls to $50 per ton 
(2010 Dollars) fob loading port in 2020, and then remains constant in real terms. 
For the upper bound coal price scenario I use the IEA’s forecasts from its annual World 
Energy Outlook – specifically its New Policies Scenario, which is based on “cautious” 
implementation of already announced measures to combat climate change (IEA, 2011).  
My “IEA scenario” is the New Policies Scenario adjusted to reflect Indonesian prices.  My 
coal price forecasts for a location on the West coast of India are shown in table 8.4.   





Pithead price 793 2,861 5,393 
Freight & Handling 1,384 1,102 1,102 
Royalty etc 225 25 25 
Delivered Cost 2,402 3,989 6,520 
   
 
GCV (kcal/kg) 3692 6322 6322 
Delivered Cost (US$/GJ) 2.63 2.77 4.52 
8.3.3: Return on capital 
A significant element of the cost of electricity is the return required by investors in 




(RoE).  The required after tax RoE, appropriately adjusted for risk, can in principle be 
estimated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  The standard formulation is: 
                                                                      (1) 
where ri is the expected return on an investment i, rf is the expected return on a risk 
free investment (the risk-free rate) and rm is the expected return on the whole market.  
βi is the Beta value for the investment - a measure of risk relative to the market. 
The CAPM estimate of the expected post-tax return on equity (RoE) for thermal 
generation in India is 15.7%, based on a risk-free rate equal to the rate on Indian 
government ten year bonds (8.654% as of April 27 2012); a market risk premium of 8.5% 
(the average reported by 28 Indian academics and practitioners to a survey made by a 
team from the University of Navarre (Fernandez et al., 2011)); and a Beta for the Indian 
power sector of 0.83, obtained from an online dataset maintained by Professor 
Damodaran of the Stern Business School at New York University.124 
In principle, the RoE required by investors in renewable energy can also be estimated 
using the CAPM.  a study by Donovan and Nuñez of the cost of capital for renewable 
energy projects in developing countries has an estimated Beta of 1.45 for Indian 
renewable energy projects (Donovan and Nunez, 2012).  Using this figure, the CAPM 
gives a post-tax RoE for the Indian renewable energy sector of 21%.   
The portfolio used by Donovan and Nuñez to compute Beta includes large companies 
engaged primarily in thermal generation, manufacturers of renewable generation 
equipment and a few companies – typically only recently quoted – that make most of 
their income from renewable generation.  The Indian Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (CERC) does not use the CAPM for setting tariffs for renewable generation - 
                                                     
124 See http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html.  Version used was 




it believes that the small number of renewable generation companies quoted on the 
Indian market means that the data are unreliable.125  The makeup of the portfolio used 
by Donovan and Nuñez tends to confirm this opinion.  I use the CERC target RoE for 
renewable generation projects, which is 15.6% post-tax, taking account of a ten year tax 
holiday available to all renewable generation projects - in practice they pay a minimum 
alternative tax (MAT) rather than the full corporate rate (which is clearly sufficient to 
attract investment – according to an analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, India 
invested $10.3bn in clean energy projects in 2011.126)  
8.3.4:  Generation costs – domestic and imported coal 
Table 8.5 shows estimated generation costs for 2009-2012 for each of my defined 
supply zones.  The cost estimate for imported coal applies to any coastal location.  The 
table shows that, for all regions and all years, a new plant fuelled by domestic coal 
produces electricity more cheaply than a new plant of the same type using imported 
coal - even in Southwest India, where the cost of domestic coal includes rail freight over 
1,700km.  The comparison of subcritical with supercritical technology is not so clear-cut: 
in general, the higher efficiency of the supercritical plant gives it a cost advantage where 
coal prices are high but with low coal costs – as in the pithead supply region – subcritical 
is cheaper.  The difference is nowhere more than a few percent.  In most of the world 
the more efficient supercritical plant would have a clear cost advantage (MIT, 2007).  In 
section 8.3.1 I suggest that this apparently anomalous situation may reflect the fact that 
the subcritical plant uses indigenous technology: Indian firms have built large numbers 
of these plants, enabling them to cut costs due to a learning curve effect.  In time, they 
will build up a similar level of experience with supercritical technology.   
                                                     
125 http://cercind.gov.in/2009/February09/SOR-regulations-on-T&C-of-tariff-05022009.pdf 
(accessed April 27, 2012). 




Table 8.5: Generation costs - coal (INR/kWh) 
Plant Type  Subcritical Supercritical 
Domestic Coal (Pithead Supply) 2009 0.93 1.02 
2010 1.04 1.15 
 2011 1.14 1.26 
 2012 1.13 1.26 
    
Domestic Coal @ 900km (Delhi) 2009 1.54 1.56 
2010 1.66 1.70 
 2011 1.79 1.83 
 2012 1.86 1.91 
    
Domestic Coal @ 1,300km 
(Southeast, West and Punjab) 
2009 1.76 1.76 
2010 1.88 1.89 
 2011 2.02 2.03 
 2012 2.13 2.14 
    
Domestic Coal @ 1,700km 
(Bangalore and Southwest) 
2009 1.96 1.94 
2010 2.09 2.07 
 2011 2.23 2.22 
 2012 2.40 2.39 
    
Imported Coal (Coastal Location) 2009 2.08 2.07 
2010 2.43 2.41 
 2011 3.02 2.96 
 2012 3.26 3.19 
8.4: POLICY ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.4.1: Generation costs – summary and forecasts 
I now have models for generation costs for both renewable and coal-fired plants and 




Chart 8.3: Generation cost comparisons - INR(2012))/kWh 
 
Some methodological points are: 
 Costs for wind and hydro are predictions from the learning curve models discussed 
above, based on figures for capacity in 2020 from the report Low Carbon Strategies 
for Inclusive Growth (Planning Commission, 2011)).  For hydro, where the regression 
analysis shows a small scale effect and no learning, the projections are based on a 
25MW unit with a constant generation cost in real terms, differentiated by region.   
 For coal, projections through 2011 are for a subcritical plant: from 2012 the assumed 
marginal plant is a supercritical unit, with capital cost falling due to learning from 
2015.127 Cost for domestic coal is for coastal regions in the South and West. 
 Prices for domestic coal are assumed to be constant in real terms after 2012. 
Pithead coal prices in India are much lower than fob prices in the major exporting 
countries.  Table 8.6 shows delivered prices in terms of cost per unit of energy, to 
                                                     
127 Based on a 15% learning rate.  Cumulative capacity installed in 2015 based on company press 
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remove distortion due to quality differentials (2012 price is January-August average).  
Currently, imported coal is significantly more expensive, though in the LRMC 
scenario prices of domestic and imported coal converge.   
Table 8.6: Coal cost delivered to power station ($/GJ)a 
 2010 2011 2012 
Pithead 1.10 1.19 0.93 
Delhi 2.36 2.46 2.18 
Southeast, West & Punjab 2.80 2.91 2.63 
Southwest 3.21 3.33 3.09 
Importedb 4.10 5.12 4.78 
Notes: (a) In current Dollars including royalty, freight, handling charges etc. 
 (b) Indonesian benchmark grade delivered to a power station located near the 
unloading port: freight cost assumed the same to all Indian ports. 
In terms of potential impact on policy, the most important result presented here is the 
prediction that in the IEA scenario the costs of wind generation and of the marginal coal 
fired plant will converge and in 2019 will cross.  Thereafter, coal in a new plant will be 
the most expensive of the technologies considered in this research other than solar – as 
it already is in the South.  This result follows directly from a switch to imported coal as 
India’s marginal fuel due to the failure of Coal India Limited to significantly increase 
output of domestic coal.  The significance of this result for India’s energy planners can 
hardly be overestimated. 
8.4.2: Sensitivity analysis – macroeconomic events and generation cost projections 
It is worth considering what changes in assumptions might invalidate my conclusion of a 
wind/coal generation cost crossover in about 2019 in the IEA coal price scenario – in 
other words, in what circumstances would the world slip into the LRMC scenario?  The 




it would clearly become more likely if slower growth in the Asian “tiger” economies 
triggered a significant reduction in international coal demand.  In a world where growth 
in these economies remained slow in the long term, the predicted wind/coal cost 
crossover might be postponed indefinitely. 
There is some uncertainty also about cost projections, which are based on data from 
project PDDs.  The data are forecasts rather than actual figures – a PDD is typically 
prepared before project construction starts.  It is possible that PDD cost projections are 
inaccurate and may be systematically biased.128  In the case of wind power, estimates of 
generation cost depend on three parameters – capital cost, variable operating cost and 
plant load factor (PLF) – defined as the total quantity of electricity produced expressed 
as a percentage of what could theoretically be produced if the unit worked at its design 
output for 100% of the time.  Of these three, construction cost estimates for wind farms 
are probably accurate - Indian engineers are experienced with the technology and 
designs are standardized; the influence of variable costs is limited - wind generation is 
characterized by very low levels of variable costs (Wiser and Bolinger, 2012); PLF, 
however, is difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy.  It depends to a significant 
extent on the expected average wind strength over the course of a typical year: in a 
developing country, this is unlikely to be known with any degree of certainty.   
I consider how my projection of wind/coal cost crossover in 2019 would change if actual 
PLFs were 10% and 15% below PDD forecasts.  Assuming that India continues to build 
wind farms at the rate seen in recent years, and that the relationship between 
cumulative capacity and generation costs does not change, the crossover year would be 
2029 for a 10% shortfall and 2037 for a 15% shortfall.  On the other hand, if the PLFs 
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implied in the project PDDs are 10% too low, crossover would occur in 2013.  Clearly, 
any systematic bias in PLF projections would have a significant impact. 
PLF depends to some extent on the design of the unit – for example, mounting a wind 
turbine on a higher tower increases its PLF compared to the same turbine on a lower 
tower as wind tends to be stronger at greater heights (Wiser and Bolinger, 2012).  
However, by far the most important influence on the PLF of a wind plant is location.  
Some places simply get more wind than others – see tables 8.7a and 8.7b. 
Table 8.7a: Capacity weighted average PLFs - US by region (2004-2010)   
Region Average PLF 
East 24.9% 
Northwest 28.0% 
New England 29.4% 





Total US 33.6% 
Source: (Wiser and Bolinger, 2012) 
Table 8.7b: Average PLFs - India (2006-2011) 
Region Average PLF 
Southern India 26.6% 
Rest of India 22.5% 
It appears that PLFs in Southern India – the region with the best wind resource – are low 
by US standards, while PLFs in the rest of India are very low – below average levels in 




region: PLFs in South India ranged between 16.4% and 37.1% (n = 120).  Despite the fact 
that the performance of the average project is poor, the best are comparable to those in 
the US.  There is a need for further research on the reasons for this wide spread of PLFs, 
and on the relationship between these forecast PLFs and those actually achieved. 
My analysis assumes a constant learning rate - however wind generation costs in the US 
departed from a learning curve trajectory in about 2004 as the plant and equipment 
market overheated.  There is no sign of this happening in India, but estimated crossover 
dates of 2029 and 2037 presented as sensitivities should not be seen as point estimates, 
while even the base case estimate of crossover in 2019 is risky. 
For coal fired plants, generation cost projections depend crucially on the future course 
of coal prices – in particular international prices, as imported coal is India’s marginal 
energy resource in the future.  I deal with uncertainty by basing cost projections on two 
price scenarios for imports.  There is also uncertainty over capital costs of supercritical 
plants in Indian conditions.  In section 8.3.1 I show that the value used in my estimates is 
significantly higher than would be expected based on a comparison of differentials 
between subcritical and supercritical costs in other countries.  Project PDDs suggest a 
41% differential between the total investment cost per MW of subcritical and 
supercritical plants, however independent sources in the UK and the US show 
differentials of the order of 5%.   
I suggest in section 8.3.1 that the discrepancy is due to Indian engineers’ lack of 
familiarity with supercritical technology, however another possibility is that my cost 
estimate for supercritical is too high – it is based on a small sample of PDDs and the 
converse (subcritical cost estimate too low) is less likely as large numbers of subcritical 
units have been built in India and construction cost data are public knowledge.  A 
sensitivity analysis shows that, if my construction cost estimate for supercritical units is 




predict wind/coal cost crossover in 2022 rather than the base case prediction of 
crossover in 2019. 
8.4.3: Alternative baseline scenarios 
An implicit assumption of the analysis described is that the marginal source of electricity 
for India for the next several decades at least will be coal.  Is this a foregone conclusion?  
Certainly, all recent assessments by the Indian government of long term energy policy 
have accepted it as a fact. 
Of technologies that are fairly well developed, only two might possibly usurp the role of 
coal in Indian power generation during the next twenty years.  One is unconventional 
gas – particularly shale gas, which has dramatically changed the energy picture in the 
USA.  The other possibility is that distributed generation based on solar and biomass 
could absorb much of the expected growth in electricity demand, allowing the grid-
connected generation system to consolidate and focus on efficiency. 
Estimates of Indian reserves of unconventional gas look more like guesses than scientific 
assessments.  Figures given by Schlumberger – the multinational oilfield services firm – 
are probably better than most: Schlumberger has the distinction of having drilled and 
discovered gas in a shale deposit in India.  It has estimated that shale gas reserves in 
India (gas in place) fall within the range of 300 tcf-2,100 tcf.129  Assuming 15% is 
recoverable, economic reserves might lie between 45 tcf and 315 tcf.   
According to the BP Review of World Energy, India’s proven reserves of conventional gas 
at the end of 2011 amounted to 43.8 tcf, with annual production of 1.6 tcf and 
consumption of 2.2 tcf – the balance being accounted for by imports.  At the low end of 
Schlumberger’s range of estimates economically recoverable reserves would double - 
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useful, but not a game-changer.  At the high end, reserves would increase by a factor of 
eight, providing over two hundred years of production at historic rates.  It would be 
possible to envisage a situation in which most new generation capacity would be gas 
fired – the situation in the US for the past several years. 
However, even if the reserves are there, they have to be developed.  Two Schlumberger 
consultants, writing in DEW Journal (Drilling and Exploration World) argued that India 
may find it extremely difficult to replicate the success of shale gas development in the 
US  (Verma and Shanthamurthy, 2010).  They see problems in three key areas: 
 In the US, mineral rights belong to the landowner.  Exploration companies can 
assemble exploration rights and surface access over large areas.  It helps that many 
areas that are prospective for shale gas are sparsely populated and landholdings are 
large; however even in more populated regions such as New York State, the 
alignment of interests between landowner and exploration company smoothes over 
problems.  In India, mineral rights belong to the government, the country is 
relatively heavily populated, landholdings are often small and landowners’ rights are 
jealously guarded. 
 The US benefits from a large and competitive oil and gas services industry: in 2008, 
1,400 – 1,500 rigs drilled about 35,000 natural gas wells; in India, fewer than 100 
land rigs drilled less than 650 wells.  The US has a large pool of experienced field 
personnel and geoscientists, and competition among service companies spurs 
innovation and drives down costs.  Furthermore, a long history of exploration has 
built archives of geological data that simplify the task of exploration (Verma and 
Shanthamurthy, 2010).  India has none of these advantages.  
 Finally, the shale gas revolution in the US has been helped by a pre-existing pipeline 
infrastructure and the availability of highly liquid markets for the gas produced – an 




financed by futures sales.  India’s energy markets are mostly tightly controlled and 
its infrastructure is undeveloped.  
On balance, it seems unlikely that shale gas will revolutionize India’s energy scene.  Even 
if the reserves exist, I would anticipate a long slow build-up of production, driven by 
state-owned industries and a few large multinationals.  Possibly the best that can be 
hoped for would be more construction of gas fired plants aimed at easing the country’s 
lack of peaking capacity rather than baseload. 
Distributed generation is widely regarded as the wave of the future: a cynic might add 
that it always will be.  On the positive side, India’s near 300 million people with no 
access to the electricity grid create a strong incentive to make distributed generation 
work and the government puts a high priority on rural electrification.  The main 
technologies involved are fairly simple and there is more scope for individual initiative 
and competition than in the gas business, with its underlying natural monopoly. 
There are also negatives: there are some very large vested interests behind extension of 
the grid, which would maintain the key roles of the state owned companies and the 
huge private sector concerns that have invested in power generation.  The government 
has wisely prioritized distributed generation for rural areas, but will have a hard time 
maintaining focus when the problems in the grid connected sector are so pressing and 
the lobbying power of its protagonists so overwhelming. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that distributed generation as a way to meet the energy 
needs of rural areas will grow rapidly.  It will not supplant coal as the main baseload 
power source: what it might do would be to enable India to grow its economy while 
expanding energy supply to all sectors of the population.  If this freed up the grid 
connected sector to put less emphasis on a frenetic growth rate and focus more on 
infrastructure, meeting peak load requirements and integration of renewables, the 




use of coal would still be a key driver of India’s energy policy, leaving the analysis 
presented in this paper still valid. 
8.4.4: Conclusions 
Imported coal is now the marginal energy source for India: given the volatility of 
internationally traded coal prices, this significantly increases the level of economic risks 
to which the country is exposed (and complicates the task of economic forecasting).  My 
analysis draws on two forecasts of international coal prices: in the high price case, 
power from a new coal fired plant burning imported coal becomes the most expensive 
option of those considered, other than solar PV, by about 2019.  This is the most 
significant change from the current situation identified in this paper.  On the other hand, 
in a low coal price scenario, imported and domestic coal could reach effective price 
parity (defined as equal generation costs for modern power stations burning imported 
and domestic coal) at a relatively low price level by about 2020.  In real life, the price 
situation may fluctuate between the two scenarios.   
Looking at renewable generation as an alternative to coal, it is clear that hydro is and 
will remain India’s cheapest source of power.  Wind power is cheaper than power from 
imported coal in southern India: if international prices develop as forecast by the IEA, it 
will be cheaper in much of the country by 2020.  The IEA forecast is for relatively 
constant prices at levels slightly lower than the average of the last few months – it 
probably does not represent an upper bound to the possible price range.  The 
implication is that a significant increase in the proportion of India’s electricity supply 
contributed by renewable generation would not constitute a major economic 
disadvantage to the country.  
India’s energy planners have been able, in the past, to fall back on the comfortable 
assumption that domestic coal will be cheap and plentiful.  Future energy policy must be 




increased levels of economic risk.  The low cost of hydro power and the falling price of 
wind generation are strong arguments for further increasing the role of renewable 
generation as a means of reducing risk. 
The cost of power from solar PV is falling rapidly but even in the high coal price scenario, 
it will still be more than 60% more expensive than coal power from the marginal plant in 
2020.  Solar PV – even if it can be combined with storage - will not be a contender to 
replace coal as a baseload technology for the foreseeable future, but distributed 
generation – including solar – could be a means to take the pressure off the 





9: What can an analysis of CDM projects tell us about the financing of 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions in India?130 
9.1:  INTRODUCTION 
Based on data from the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2011, coal fired power stations in 
developing countries will account for 20% of global energy related emissions of CO₂ in 
2020, even in a scenario that assumes that these countries make efforts to cut 
emissions.  India and China alone will account for 17% of the global total (IEA, 2011).  
Even relatively limited progress in substituting renewables based power generation for 
coal in these countries would result in a significant reduction in global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. 
International climate change negotiations since the Bali conference in 2007 have 
accepted that developed countries should partly fund the cost of cutting developing 
world GHG emissions, possibly by means of one or more new market mechanisms 
(NMMs).  Market-based approaches have potential advantages - see (Coase, 1960; 
Montgomery W D, 1972) – but these have to be balanced against the fact that the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) – an old market mechanism - has been the target of 
severe criticism.  A particularly serious – and in our view valid – criticism is that many 
CDM projects are not additional: they would be implemented anyway, even without the 
CDM subsidy.  David Victor has stated that, in his view, one third to two thirds of CDM 
projects are not additional (Victor, 2011).  One researcher’s opinion is not proof, but of 
about 250 experts who participated in a worldwide Delphi survey made by Germany’s 
Oeko-Institut, 86% believed that carbon revenues are not a decisive factor in the 
investment decision for CDM projects and 71% believed that many projects would be 
                                                     
130 By Ian Partridge and Dr Shama Gamkhar – work in progress.  Dr Gamkhar is co-Chair of Ian 




implemented in the absence of the CDM (Cames et al., 2007).131  Non-additionality 
implies that, if offset credits are issued in the absence of real emissions reductions 
created by the CDM, the purchaser of these credits – maybe a participant in the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme - is able to increase carbon emissions.  Total global 
emissions increase and real damage is done (Fischer, 2005).   
An idea that has gained many followers is that future market based schemes should be 
sector-specific (de Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011; Lewis, 2010; Wooders, 2011).  An attraction 
of a sectoral crediting mechanism (SCM) is that its rules could be written for a specific 
type of project – a possible cause of many of the problems experienced with the CDM is 
that its rules have to accommodate every conceivable type of project that might reduce 
GHGs.  The future of carbon finance may lie in combining a number of sector-specific 
market based schemes with finance provided through direct grants or soft loans.   
In this research we analyze the economics of Indian projects that reduce GHG emissions 
by substituting renewable generation technologies for coal.  Our objectives are (1) to 
assess how grid-connected renewable generation might fit into a sectoral crediting 
scheme that might be combined with a direct financing approach; and (2) to propose 
and test a methodology to assess additionality in the specific case of grid-connected low 
carbon electricity generation projects.  Our analysis is based on estimates of generation 
costs for renewable technologies and for the coal fired baseline plant: we combine 
these generation cost estimates with the calculated level of CO₂ emissions from the coal 
fired baseline plant to obtain estimates of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of CO₂ by 
substitution of renewable generation for coal.  The same generation cost estimates 
provide a basis for determination of project additionality using an approach described in 
the next section. 
                                                     




9.1.1: Determination of additionality 
A project is additional for the purposes of the CDM if “anthropogenic GHG emissions by 
sources are reduced below those that would have occurred in the absence of the 
registered CDM project activity”.132  The level of emissions that would have occurred in 
the absence of the project activity is known as the baseline.  CDM rules permit two 
principal approaches to the determination of additionality:133 
 Barrier analysis: a project is additional if barriers exist that would prevent its 
development in the absence of registration as a CDM project activity, and these 
barriers do not affect at least one alternative to the project. 
 Investment analysis: a project is additional if it fails to meet a standard profitability 
benchmark or if it is financially less attractive than at least one alternative project.  
The investment analysis approach appears to be both objective and verifiable but, in the 
specific case of low carbon generation, it suffers from the problem that additionality is 
effectively determined by the electricity tariff.  In most developing countries this is set 
by some arm of government, which is unlikely to take a disinterested stance.  We 
propose an alternative approach to determination of additionality that focuses on cost, 
not revenue, reducing the scope for manipulation of the assessment. 
In many countries, one generation technology or fuel has clear economic advantages 
over alternatives: in India, this baseline is coal.  We propose that, in countries where a 
baseline technology can be defined, a project is not additional if it generates electricity 
more cheaply than the marginal baseline plant as it would be economically rational to 
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build it anyway.  Projects with higher generation costs than the baseline are additional 
and should be eligible to receive credits from a sector-specific offset scheme.  
Generation costs and emission reductions per unit generated should be assessed by 
technology, not project by project.  They should be reviewed periodically as advances in 
technology are likely to change the relative cost picture.  A scheme of this type that 
applied to only two countries – China and India – would cover 17% of all global energy 
related emissions in 2020 based on the IEA’s New Policies scenario (IEA, 2011).  
Inclusion of other coal-dependent countries would increase this proportion. 
The proposed method would disallow some projects that might have lower generation 
costs than the baseline but face barriers that would prevent their implementation – a 
typical barrier might be distance from a connection point to the regional transmission 
grid.  However there is no obvious reason why a subsidy proportional to units of 
electricity generated by one project would solve this problem – a better (and probably 
more cost-effective) solution might be a subsidy from developed countries to fund 
extension of the grid.   
9.1.2: Summary of analysis and conclusions 
Our key findings are: 
 Small hydro plants have negative MACs as they have the lowest generation cost of 
the technologies assessed in this paper.  Our suggested methodology would indicate 
that these projects are non-additional, raising questions about whether they should 
be eligible for the CDM program.  
 As output of domestic coal has apparently reached a plateau, the marginal source of 
energy for India is imported coal.  We use a scenario approach to forecasting the 
costs of generation based on imported coal, as international coal prices are highly 
volatile.  In a scenario based on IEA forecasts, the cost of wind generation in much of 




our proposed criterion, wind generation should then lose its eligibility for offset 
credits.  However, as future MACs are highly dependent on the course of 
international coal prices, we suggest that relative costs should be reviewed 
periodically and the eligibility of different technologies for offset credits adjusted.  
 The MAC of solar PV is positive throughout the period covered by this study - these 
plants are clearly additional and should be eligible to receive offsets.  We suspect 
that the same is true of solar thermal, but we have no Indian data on which to base 
an analysis. 
Our methodology is described in section 9.2 and our empirical findings are presented 
and discussed in detail in section 9.3 and 9.4: section 9.5 provides conclusions. 
9.2:  DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY  
We estimate current and projected generation costs for wind, small hydro and coal fired 
generation – the methodology employed and the most important data sources are 
summarized below.134  For the baseline plant - defined as the marginal coal fired plant 
(the next to be built) - we estimate the level of CO₂ emissions per unit of electricity 
generated.  We calculate both current and projected marginal abatement cost (MAC) for 
cutting emissions by substitution of one technology for another using the identity  
                                 
where Δ Generation cost signifies the difference in generation cost per kWh between 
technology (1) and technology (2) and Δ Emissions is the reduction in emissions per kWh 
achieved by the substitution.  Our estimates of Δ Emissions are simplified in that the 
reduction in emissions due to the displacement of coal fired generation is taken as the 
average level of emissions per kWh for coal (the validity of this assumption is discussed 
                                                     
134 The estimates and projections are taken from earlier papers by one of the authors (Partridge, 




in section 9.2.4), and emissions from wind and small hydro plants in operation are taken 
to be zero.135  
9.2.1:  Calculation of generation cost - wind and hydro 
We estimate the generation cost for each project in the sample using the identity: 
                                                                      
Operating cost is assumed to remain constant in real terms over the life of the project.  
Capital cost means initial investment cost annualized using the annual capital charge 
(ACC) methodology - see (Merrett and Sykes, 1973).  Intermittency costs arise because 
the output of a wind turbine fluctuates due to the intermittency of the wind resource,136 
imposing costs on the grid operator due mainly to the need for additional conventional 
generation as backup.  An analysis of intermittency costs would require a complex 
simulation exercise for the whole Indian grid, however a review of fifteen European and 
US studies (Holttinen et al., 2009) indicates that a conservative estimate of the added 
cost where wind contributes up to 5% of total supply to a grid would be $1.50 per 
MWh.137  Wind contributed only 2% of Indian electricity generation in 2009 (IEA, 2011). 
Small hydro plants often operate on a seasonal basis depending on rainfall, but during 
the period of operation output is reasonably predictable.  Added costs due to 
intermittency are assumed to be zero. 
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Cost data for renewables are obtained from the UNFCCC database of registered CDM 
projects – see (http://cdm.unfccc.int/) - the approach used by (Partridge and Gamkhar, 
2010).   The project design documents (PDDs) on the website are a valuable data source 
– they currently provide operating and financial details of more than 4,000 registered 
projects.  Our sample comprises 100% of grid-connected wind and small hydro 
generation projects in India that had been registered as CDM projects as of 12/31/2011.   
The PDDs for some projects – in particular those registered prior to 2008 – do not 
provide sufficient data to allow calculation of a generation cost.  Data are missing for 19 
out of 249 wind projects (of which 17 are dated 2007 or earlier) and 30 out of 87 hydro 
projects.  For all projects at least some data are available, enabling comparisons to be 
made between usable and non-usable projects on the basis of investment cost per MW 
(for most missing data projects) and project size (for all projects).  We find no indication 
that the bias towards early projects distorts our results – for details of the statistical 
tests used, please refer to the relevant paper (Partridge, 2012b).   
9.2.2:  Calculation of generation cost - coal fired plants 
It is first necessary to define the marginal coal fired plant: until a few years ago this 
would have been the 500MW subcritical unit designed by Bharat Heavy Electricals 
Limited (BHEL), optimized to burn domestic coal.  Future coal fired plants are likely to 
use supercritical138 technology - at least one such plant is already operating – and 
imported coal is now the marginal source of energy for India (Partridge, 2012a).  We use 
both the former subcritical standard and a modern supercritical unit as baselines: we 
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assume the use of domestic coal for all locations and make an additional baseline 
assessment based on imported coal for coastal locations only.   
Assumptions on plant efficiency, capital and operating costs for coal fired plants are 
taken primarily from project PDDs, many of which use the BHEL 500MW unit as the 
baseline.  We also obtain data on supercritical plants from PDDs as several such plants 
have been put forward for CDM registration on the grounds that they cut CO₂ emissions 
per unit of electricity generated due to their high thermal efficiency.  Data from PDDs 
are checked against sources such as reports of regulatory hearings and studies such as 
(MIT, 2007).  Our understanding of the various sources mentioned above was much 
helped by contacts with engineers at the Indian Central Electricity Authority (CEA). 
The largest operating cost element for a coal fired plant is coal.  Pithead prices for 
domestic coal are published by Coal India Limited (CIL).  We add royalties and other 
levies related to resource use but we do not add taxes on profits or value added as we 
take the view that these are not part of the cost to the country of power from a new 
plant.  Coal quality parameters are based on the specifications of coal sampled at Dadri 
power station by a team from Ohio State University,139 which are typical of grades 
supplied to thermal power stations in India, with high ash content (38.22%) and low 
sulfur (0.5%).  Energy content (Gross Calorific Value, or GCV) is 3692 kcal/kg.  The Indian 
Ministry of Environment and Forests requires that coal with ash content no greater than 
34% should be used in any power station located in an environmentally sensitive area, 
or where the distance from mine to power station is more than 1000 km.  We estimate 
the cost of washing and the effect on coal quality using data provided by the CEA. 
The cost of coal delivered to a plant includes rail freight.  We analyze likely supply 
patterns for new plants and use tables published by Indian railways to estimate 
delivered cost of coal by region.  As most of India’s coal mines are located in the Eastern 
                                                     




and Central part of the country, our hypothetical marginal power plant in this area 
would be located at the pithead.  For non-pithead plants we define supply regions based 
on average distance to a mine that is capable of increasing production (as determined 
by analysis of production forecasts made for India’s five year planning process).  Delhi 
and industrial regions in Northern India are on average about 900km by rail from mines 
capable of increasing output significantly; a band from 900km to 1,300km covers most 
other important industrialized centers, while incremental coal supplies to South 
Western India must travel more than 1,700km by rail.  Assam and the Northeast are 
separate from the rest of India in coal supply terms and are excluded from our analysis. 
Imported coal is becoming an increasingly important component of India’s energy 
supplies.  The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2011 forecasts that India’s coal demand will 
more than double between 2010 and 2035 (IEA, 2011), however output of domestically 
mined coal is failing to keep pace.  According to a recent press report, the state owned 
Coal India Limited (CIL) has warned its power sector customers that it can supply only 
60% of their requirements: it hopes to be able to increase this to 80% within a few 
years.140  Many existing power stations are blending up to 15% of imported coal with 
their supply from CIL, and many new power stations are designed to burn 100% 
imported fuel: in the interests of simplicity, we assume that our baseline power stations 
burn either 100% domestic coal or 100% imported.   
Currently, most of India’s imports of thermal coal come from Indonesia: we base our 
calculations on the specifications of benchmark grade Indonesian coal with energy 
content (GCV) of 6322 kcal/kg.  For simplicity, we assume that the freight costs from any 
Indonesian loading port to any Indian discharge port are the same – we believe that the 
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error introduced is minimal.  Our assumptions concerning the price of imported coal are 
summarized in the next section. 
9.2.3: Price scenarios for coal imports 
Our generation cost projections are essentially levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) – i.e. 
the average cost over the life of the plant discounted back to the base year.  For most 
cost elements it is sufficient to assume that costs remain constant in real terms, 
however this is not a reasonable assumption for prices of internationally traded coal, 
which are highly volatile: we base our estimates on two scenarios that we believe 
provide upper and lower bounds for import prices. 
 The lower price scenario is based on the fact that coal is a quintessential commodity 
- in the long term prices should fluctuate around the long run marginal cost (LRMC) 
of new supplies, which may change over time (Pindyck, 1999).  A report on power 
generation in India (Mott McDonald, 2006) assumed an LRMC for Pacific basin 
exporting countries of US$40 per ton141 fob loading port.  A realistic estimate today 
would be about $50 per ton fob (IEA, 2010, quoting data from Marston and IHS 
Global Insight).  For our lower bound forecast we use a figure of $50 per ton (2010 
Dollars) fob Indonesian loading port, which we assume to apply from 2015. 
 For our upper bound scenario we adapt forecasts made by the IEA for its annual 
World Energy Outlook (2011 edition) - specifically, the New Policies Scenario, which 
is based on energy-related policies announced (but in some cases not yet 
implemented) by both OECD and non-OECD countries.  Our “IEA” scenario is the 
IEA’s New Policies forecast adjusted for coal quality.   
Our price forecasts for 2020 for both domestic and imported coal, adjusted to a 
common currency basis, are shown in table 9.1 for a location on the West coast of India. 
                                                     









Pithead price 793 2,861 5,480 
Freight & Handling 1,384 1,102 1,102 
Royalty etc 225 25 25 
Delivered Cost 2,402 3,989 6,607 
   
 
GCV (kcal/kg) 3692 6322 6322 
Delivered Cost (US$/GJ) 2.63 2.77 4.59 
9.2.4: Reduction in emissions due to use of renewable generation 
We estimate CO₂ emissions for a plant burning Indian coal using an emission factor of 
.0967 tons CO₂ per GJ (NCV basis) reported by (Roy et al., 2009): for imported coal we 
use the IPCC default emission factor of .0946 t/GJ.  Other greenhouse gases are ignored 
- a modern coal-fired power station emits negligible quantities of nitrous oxide;142 the 
effect of particulates on warming is significant but hard to estimate, and their residence 
time in the atmosphere is short.  
To simplify the calculation, we assume that the reduction in emissions due to use of 
renewable generation is equal to the average emissions rate of a coal fired plant 
(Callaway and Fowlie, 2009; Kaffine D et al., 2011).  This assumption is not generally true 
- studies show that adding renewables to an existing generation system typically 
displaces some mix of coal and gas (Kaffine D et al., 2011) rather than just coal; however 
in this research we examine the effect of additional renewable generation capacity on 
plant construction, not on dispatching decisions (short term decisions by grid operators 
on which units should vary their output as demand fluctuates).  If Indian energy 
planners maximize construction of gas fired and large hydro plant regardless of the 
                                                     




renewable contribution to total generation, we can assume 1:1 substitution of 
renewables for coal in terms of new plant construction. 
Even given 1:1 substitution, the net emissions reduction achieved is less than the 
average emissions rate of a coal fired plant.  Grid operators anticipate fluctuations in 
wind generation by operating some conventional plants at reduced output levels so they 
can be quickly run up to full power when required.  A partially loaded plant is less 
efficient than a plant at full load and thus has higher CO₂ emissions per unit of power 
generated (Kaffine D et al., 2011).   
A study of regional grids in Texas, California and the Midwest of the US shows the extent 
to which the share of coal in total generation affects the net reduction in CO₂ emissions 
per MWh of wind generation (table 9.2).  In the Midwest, where generation is 
predominantly coal fired, each MWh of wind generation corresponds to a reduction in 
CO₂ emissions of 0.93 tons143- close to the average emissions level of a coal fired plant in 
the US, which is 1.0 ton/MWh (Kaffine D et al., 2011).  It seems likely that the error 
introduced by our use of average emissions as a proxy for net reductions is small. 
Table 9.2: Reduction in CO₂ emissions due to wind generation 




Reduction in CO₂ 
Emissions per MWh Wind 
Midwest 80% 2.0% 0.93 tons 
California 0.0% 3.2% 0.27 tons 
Texas 37% 4.7% 0.44 tons 
Source: (Kaffine D et al., 2011) 
                                                     




9.3:  RESULTS – GENERATION COSTS 
Estimated generation costs for domestic and imported coal for 2011 are shown in table 
9.3.  It can be seen that, in 2011, a new plant fuelled by domestic coal produced 
electricity more cheaply than a new plant of the same type using imported coal - even in 
Southwest India, where the cost of domestic coal includes rail freight over 1,700km.  
Where coal prices are high, the higher efficiency of the supercritical plant gives it a cost 
advantage over subcritical technology, however with low coal costs – as with domestic 
coal in the pithead supply region – subcritical generation is (slightly) cheaper.   
Table 9.3: Baseline Generation Costs for 2011 (INR(2012)/kWh) 
Coal type and plant location Subcritical Supercritical 
Domestic Coal (Pithead Supply) 1.23 1.34 
Domestic Coal @ 900km 1.92 1.96 
Domestic Coal @ 1,300km  2.16 2.17 
Domestic Coal @ 1,700km 2.39 2.38 
Imported Coal (Coastal Location) 3.23 3.17 
For wind generation, we estimate a regression model for 2005-2011 with the log of 
generation cost as dependent variable – see table 9.4.  The negative coefficient on log of 
cumulative installed capacity indicates that costs fall with experience of the technology, 
while the negative is_south variable indicates that costs are lower in the South - as of 
August 2011 this region has 42% of India’s total wind capacity (Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy – www.mnre.gov.in).  Note that project size is not in the final model. 
A similar analysis for hydro generation (57 observations) shows no significant learning 
effect – this is not surprising as the technology has changed little over several decades.  
There is some scale effect and generation costs are lower in the North.     
As of March 2012, two grid-connected solar PV projects had been registered as CDM 




figures for wind and hydro presented above, are INR 11.2 and INR 14.4 per kWh (2012 
currency).  The cost of solar power is falling rapidly: a recent McKinsey and Co report 
(Aanesen et al., 2012) forecasts that LCOE for large solar PV installations will be about 
INR 5 per kWh (2012 currency) by 2020. 
Table 9.4: Generation Cost Analysis – Wind 
Dependent variable:  log of generation cost (INR(2012) per MWh)   
N:   240 
R2:   0 .4375 
Adjusted R2:  0.4328 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% conf. interval 
Log_cum -0.206 0.028 -7.38 0 -0.262 -0.151 
Is_south -0.173 0.015 -11.81 0 -0.201 -0.144 
Constant 10.142 0.261 38.84 0 9.627 10.656 
Notes: Log_cum is the log of cumulative installed capacity in MW; 
Is_south is a dummy variable (=1 if project is located in Southern grid region) 
Table 9.5 shows our cost estimates for grid-connected wind and small hydro in 2011 (i.e. 
for projects commissioning in 2011), as predicted by the regression models described 
above.  Small hydro exhibits a scale effect: our estimates are for a 25MW unit.  
Projected costs to 2020 for all technologies are shown in Chart 8.3.   
Table 9.5: Cost of wind and small hydro Generation 2011 (INR(2012)/kWh) 
 
 
Wind: South 2.97 
 Rest of India 3.53 
Small Hydro: North 1.59 




9.4: RESULTS - MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS 
The marginal abatement cost (MAC) to cut CO₂ emissions by substitution of a renewable 
generation technology for a baseline coal fired plant is defined here as the increase in 
generation cost per kWh divided by the decrease in emissions per kWh.  For new plants 
commissioning in 2012, the baseline plant might use subcritical or supercritical 
technology and might burn domestic or imported coal, depending on location: by about 
2015, in our view, the marginal plant will use supercritical technology as the majority of 
large coal fired plants currently at the planning stage are supercritical units.  In most of 
India the marginal plant will burn imported coal as there appears to be little possibility 
of significantly increasing output of domestic coal.  
Tables 9.6a and 9.6b show MACs for wind and small hydro, stated in 2012 currency, 
compared to alternative baselines.  It is apparent that: 
 MAC for small hydro projects is always negative, regardless of location or baseline, 
as small hydro is the cheapest generation technology for India (see chart 8.3). 
 For wind projects and for comparisons where the baseline plant burns imported 
coal, tables 9.6a and 9.6b show a more complex picture: 
 In 2011, prices for internationally traded coal peaked and wind generation was 
the cheaper technology, at least in the South of India, implying that its MAC 
against imported coal was negative.   
 If coal prices remain high, as forecast by the IEA, this situation will last 
throughout the period covered by our forecasts.  However in the LRMC (lower 
bound) price scenario, MAC for wind power in Southern India will be positive in 
2012 and for the foreseeable future. 
 In the rest of India, wind generation will be more expensive than coal in both price 




Table 9.6a: Marginal Abatement Cost ($/tCO₂); plant startup 2012 
LRMC Scenario 
Subcritical Supercritical 
Domestic Imported Domestic Imported 
Wind: West Coast 24.3 20.4 27.0 22.3 
 Southwest 9.2 9.6 10.6 10.4 
 Southeast (Tamil Nadu) 14.2 9.6 15.7 10.4 
  
 
   
Hydro: Delhi/North (4.9) N/A (6.6) N/A 
 South & West Coasts (5.7) (11.7) (6.8) (13.3) 
 Southwest (10.8) (11.7) (11.9) (13.3) 
IEA Scenario 
 
Wind: West Coast 24.3 5.2 27.0 7.1 
 Southwest 9.2 (5.5) 10.6 (4.8) 
 Southeast (Tamil Nadu) 14.2 (5.5) 15.7 (4.8) 
 
 
   
Hydro: Delhi/North (4.9) N/A ( 6.6) N/A 
 South & West Coasts (5.7) (31.3) (6.8) (33.3) 
 Southwest (10.8) (31.3) (11.9) (33.3) 
Table 9.6b: Marginal Abatement Cost; plant startup 2015/ 2020 
($ (2012)/tCO₂) 
Plant startup year & price scenario 
2015 2020 
LRMC IEA LRMC IEA 
Wind: West Coast 22.4 3.4 18.8 (1.4) 
 Southwest 11.2 (7.8) 8.2 (12.0) 
 Southeast (Tamil Nadu) 11.2 (7.8) 8.2 (12.0) 
 
 
   
Hydro: Delhi/North (6.6) (6.6) (6.6) (6.6) 
 South & West Coasts (8.6) (27.6) (7.8) (28.1) 
 Southwest (8.6) (27.6) (7.8) (28.1) 
Note: Estimates for 2015/2020 are for a supercritical unit.  It is assumed to burn 




Estimates of MAC provide an indication of the incentive needed to stimulate investment 
in the technology concerned - in principle, the MAC is the carbon price at which the 
project would be economically viable without further subsidy.  Tables 9.6a and 9.6b 
show that small hydro always has a negative MAC while the wind power MAC against 
imported coal is negative in the high price (IEA) scenario, at least in coastal regions in 
the South.  In these cases no production-linked incentive is required.  In the low price 
(LRMC) scenario, a carbon price in the region of $25/ton in 2012, falling to below 
$20/ton by 2020, would eliminate the price disadvantage of wind power relative to 
marginal coal fired plants in much of India.  In Southern India, where wind costs are 
lower, a carbon price of around $10 would be sufficient.  Based on McKinsey’s estimate 
of the generation cost for solar PV in 2020 (see section 9.3), MAC for solar in 2020 will 
be $42/tCO₂e in the IEA scenario and $62 in the LRMC scenario. 
These “target” carbon prices can be compared with the IEA’s projections for the New 
Policies scenario.  This assumes that Korea will implement an ETS by 2020; the US and 
Japan will introduce shadow pricing of carbon by 2015; and China will introduce some 
form of CO₂ pricing by 2020, all against a background of steady global growth.  In this 
situation, the IEA projects a carbon price of $30/tCO₂e in 2020 in the EU, New Zealand 
and Australia, with lower prices in China and Korea.  Shadow prices in the US and Japan 
start at $15/tCO₂e in 2015 and rise to $35 in 2035 (all carbon prices stated in 2010$). 
Another source of carbon price projections is the report of the UNFCCC’s High Level 
Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing.144  This puts forward three carbon price 
projections for 2020: $10-$15; $20-$25 and $50.  The first two of these are consistent 
with the implementation (with different degrees of enthusiasm) of pledges made after 
the Copenhagen conference.  The report does not mention macroeconomic 
assumptions, but it is apparently not based on economic modelling. 





It appears that neither forecast would be consistent with a sharp slowdown in the 
rapidly developing Asian economies.  Although our LRMC scenario is based on the 
economics of coal production, we believe it would most likely be triggered by a sharp 
fall in international coal demand (or, less likely, a sharp increase in supply).  It therefore 
provides an indication of the impact on energy markets of a slowdown in the “tiger” 
economies, which would significantly reduce regional coal demand.  In a world where 
growth in these economies remained slow in the long term, the carbon price might 
settle at too low a level to stimulate significant investment in renewable generation. 
9.4.1: Should supercritical plants receive offset credits? 
In recent years, a few supercritical coal fired plants in India have applied for registration 
as CDM projects.  The rationale is that the supercritical plant, due to its higher 
efficiency, burns less coal than the baseline subcritical plant to produce the same 
electricity output and thus emits less CO₂.  This argument is seen as controversial in 
some quarters: many environmentalists take the view that the CDM should not be 
rewarding investment in coal fired plant of any type.  However, ignoring this 
philosophical controversy and looking at the economics, we can use our generation cost 
estimates to calculate a MAC.  Table 9.6c shows estimated MACs for the case where a 
subcritical plant is substituted by a supercritical plant burning the same coal. 
Table 9.6c: Marginal Abatement Cost ($/tCO₂e); supercritical vs subcritical 











Southeast, West & Punjab 3.0 3.0 (11.7) 
Bangalore & Southwest (2.1) 3.0 (11.7) 




The economics of this substitution depend largely on the assumed price of coal – with a 
high coal price, the higher capital cost of the supercritical unit is more than offset by 
lower fuel costs due to its greater efficiency.  Where the proposed fuel is imported coal, 
MAC is negative in the IEA (upper bound) price scenario and (just) positive in the LRMC 
(lower bound) scenario.  With domestic coal, MAC is negative only in the far Southwest 
of India where the delivered cost of domestic coal is high due to high rail freight costs.  
We conclude that: 
 A supercritical plant burning imported coal is (marginally) additional today if one 
assumes that international coal prices will remain low in the long run; otherwise not. 
 In most of India a supercritical plant burning domestic coal is additional; however 
this is partly due to the low domestic coal price.  It could be argued that the 
international community subsidizes supercritical power plants through the CDM in 
order to offset a subsidy to subcritical plants provided by the Indian government. 
 It is, in any case, increasingly unrealistic to take a subcritical plant as the baseline in 
calculating MAC.  If a supercritical plant is the baseline, its MAC is zero by definition. 
9.5: CONCLUSIONS - ADDITIONALITY AND THE DESIGN OF SECTORAL OFFSET SCHEMES 
One objective of this paper is to review the effectiveness of generation cost 
comparisons in assessing additionality.  David Victor believes that an improved CDM 
without the loopholes that allow registration of non-additional projects would be very 
small (Victor, 2009): to achieve meaningful scale would need a change in emphasis from 
project-by-project additionality to a broad focus on whether a scheme channels funds 
towards lower carbon technologies on a large scale (Grubb et al., 2011) - this would 
require a reasonably accurate measure of additionality for categories of project, rather 
than individual projects.  In our view, our proposed method can provide such a measure.  




 MAC for small hydro is negative - this suggests that small hydro projects, at least in 
India, are not additional and should not receive offset credits. 
 The cost of wind generation in India is falling: future cost differentials (and therefore 
MACs) depend on coal prices.  If these develop in line with IEA forecasts and if wind 
generation costs continue to fall, wind power in Southern India will be cheaper than 
power from the marginal coal fired plant and its MAC will be negative throughout 
the period.  In the rest of India, MAC will be positive until 2020, based on the IEA 
forecasts, while in the low price (LRMC) scenario, MAC will be positive throughout.  
Additionality, in this situation, becomes a dynamic rather than a static concept: the 
relative costs of wind and coal generated power should be reviewed periodically.     
 After a short transition, supercritical coal fired plants will be India’s marginal 
generation technology: as such they will be the baseline for calculation of MAC and 
ineligible to receive offsets.   
 MAC for solar PV is positive and the technology meets our test of additionality.  This 
technology should qualify for subsidies through any future NMM or other direct 
funding mechanism applicable to the energy sector.  We expect that the same is true 
of solar thermal, but we have no Indian data on which to base an analysis.   
Our methodology and analysis create a basis for the design of a sector-specific 
agreement such as those envisaged by the EU that would ensure additionality on a 
sectoral basis, avoiding the delays and additional costs caused by project by project 
assessment.  It would retain the CDM’s advantage of providing incentives directly to 
project developers and, in our view, would be simpler to administer than the CDM and a 




APPENDIX: CALCULATION METHODOLOGIES AND DATA SOURCES 
AI: INDIA - COAL-FIRED PLANT 
A1.1: Plant efficiency and costs 
The Indian government has designated successive generations of coal fired boilers as 
the national standard: (Chikkatur A., 2008) states that “the current standard for coal-
power technologies in India is the BHEL 500 MW subcritical PC (pulverized coal) unit”.  
The UMPP program ended this tightly controlled approach as the choice of boiler was 
left to the bidders, who seem to have ignored a government press release stating that 
the new standard would be a 3X660 MW supercritical plant.  We base our calculations 
on alternative baselines: a 2X500 MW subcritical plant and a 3X660 MW supercritical.   
For both baselines the parameters used are averages of values obtained from a number 
of sources.  Our supercritical baseline is an amalgam of data from PDDs of units that 
applied for CDM registration (Sasan, Tirora, Mundra/Tata and Mundra/Adani) and a 
report by Mott McDonald.  This covers several types of unit – we use the data for a 
“base supercritical” unit.  The wide spread of PDD values may indicate that some of 
them relate to Mott McDonald’s “high supercritical”. (Mott McDonald, 2006) 
For the subcritical baseline, sources include data from the PDDs mentioned in the 
previous paragraph plus a report of a regulatory hearing posted on the CERC website 
that relates to a modern 500MW plant.145  We also use data from The Future of Coal 
(MIT, 2007) - these relate to a plant with flue gas desulfurization (FGD) but we adjust for 
a plant without FGD assuming that the FGD unit consumes 2% of the plant’s output (the 
report states that own use consumption by the FGD unit is between 1% and 3%).  The 
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MIT data are for a plant burning Illinois No 6 coal: this has lower ash content than Indian 
coals, however adjustment factors for lower quality coals are provided.  The CEA 
website provides actual heat rates for some plants, however the only 500MW subcritical 
plant included is Trombay, which for various reasons cannot be taken as representative. 
In all cases, the sources mentioned provide a range of values for any given parameter – 
we calculated average values over the range.  In deciding whether to include outlying 
values in the averages we relied partly on guidance from CEA engineers.146  All the 
figures used are adjusted to a gross output/GCV basis.   
Table A1: Efficiency on Gross/GCV basis 
 Subcritical Supercritical 
 Domestic Imported Domestic Imported 
CEA figures (AK Gupta) - OHR 35.4%  38.3%  
MIT adjusted 35.3% 37.5% 39.6% 41.9% 
Booras & Holt (from MIT) 36.6% 38.9%   
PDD Averages  35.6% 35.3% 39.7% 40.9% 
Trombay design rate 35.6%    
Mott McDonald base   40.6% 41.8% 
Mott McDonald high   42.3% 42.8% 
Value Used 35.5% 37.2% 40.0% 41.2% 
We estimate per-unit capex and O&M (Operation and Maintenance) costs using the 
sources mentioned above, omitting the Mott McDonald figures which reflect costs in 
advanced countries (for supercritical they are close to the Indian data – presumably 
reflecting Indian engineers’ reliance on foreign input in the construction of these 
plants).  We adjust these figures for inflation using the composite index (60% WPI and 
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40% CPI) used by Indian regulators.  We ignore the use of secondary oil fuel, and 
disregard the PDD figures for plant life, which reflect regulatory norms rather than 
reality (we use 40 years).  The own-use figures in the PDDs (other than for Sasan) also 
seem to reflect regulatory norms: on the advice of A.K. Gupta, we use the average own 
use figure for 500 MW plants for 2007-2008, taken from the CEA Performance Review to 
apply to both subcritical and supercritical plants. 
The CAPM estimate of the expected post-tax return on equity (RoE) for thermal 
generation in India is 15.7%, based on a risk-free rate equal to the rate on Indian 
government ten year bonds (8.654% as of April 27 2012) and the average market risk 
premium of 8.5% reported by 28 Indian respondents (academics and practitioners) to a 
survey made by a team from the University of Navarre (Fernandez et al., 2011).  Beta for 
the Indian power sector is 0.83, according to an online dataset maintained by Professor 
Damodaran of the Stern Business School at New York University.147  As the CAPM figure 
is very close to the CERC allowable return of 15.5% post-tax, we use the CERC figure. 
We convert investment cost per MW to an annual capital charge (ACC) using a 
spreadsheet created by Hoff Stauffer of Wingaersheek Research Group – see (Stauffer, 
2006).  Plant life is taken as 40 years; debt ratio is the CERC norm of 70%; debt interest 
rate is 12.25% (prime lending rate of State Bank of India as of August 2010); tax rate is 
the current Indian rate including surcharge (i.e. 34%); inflation the average for 2005-
2011.  Depreciation for the purpose of calculating WACC is the current standard of 15% 
on the declining balance (note that this is depreciation allowable for tax purposes, not 
depreciation allowable in calculation of tariff). 
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A1.2: Coal supply pattern 
The price of coal delivered to the generating plant depends on plant location and supply 
source.  We define supply regions by identifying mines capable of increasing production 
and estimating freight costs from these mines to key cities.   
The combined output for 2010/11 for Coal India Limited (CIL) and the Singareni 
Collieries Company Limited (SCCL) - the two state owned coal mining companies - in the 
XI Plan (2007-2012) is 522.38 Mt, rising to 561.30 Mt in 2011/12.  Preliminary figures 
(published November 2006) show coal production for the last year of the XII Plan 
(2016/17) of 709.00 Mt for CIL and SCCL, with a huge increase in “Other” – output from 
private mines (the official XII Plan figure was released too late for this research).  Table 
A2 below shows the key figures taken from Planning Commission documents. 
Table A2: Coal Output (Million tons) 
Company 





1H Actual Plan Estimate 
ECL 46.00 33.00 48.00 2.00 11.50 
BCCL 30.00 30.00 35.00 5.00 12.54 
CCL 78.00 51.00 115.00 37.00 16.93 
NCL 70.00 68.50 80.50 10.50 24.95 
WCL 45.00 45.50 45.00 0.00 19.53 
SECL 111.00 112.00 140.00 29.00 49.46 
MCL 137.00 106.00 197.00 60.00 41.50 
NEC 3.50 1.00 3.50 0.00 0.21 
CIL (Total) 520.50 447.00 664.00 143.50 176.62 
SCCL 40.80 51.00 45.00 4.20  
Other 118.70 56.00 346.00 227.30  




Actual production levels are below plan targets, however we assume that the originally 
planned output increases by company for 2016/17 over 2011/12 (table A2) give a 
reasonable indication of which companies can increase output during the next decade.  
Thus we assume that the principal marginal sources of new supplies of domestic coal 
will be CCL, NCL, SECL and MCL.  Key mines belonging to these companies are North 
Karanpura (CCL), Singrauli (NCL), Korba (SECL), Ib Valley (MCL) and Talcher (MCL).  Our 
analysis is based on supply to new power stations by rail transport from these mines. 
The Indian Railways online route finder http://rbs.indianrail.gov.in/ShortPath/index.jsp 
provides estimated rail transport distances from these mines to India’s ten largest cities, 
together with five other cities chosen for their geographic diversity (the analysis 
excludes Assam and the Northeast of India).  The distance used for each city is the 
minimum of the distances from each of the mines – see Table A3.    On the basis of this 
analysis we define the following supply patterns for new power stations: 
 All new power stations in a large area in Eastern and Central India will be built at the 
pithead.  SCCL’s principal coalfields are included in the pithead supply area: they are 
not among those identified as able to increase output significantly, but it is assumed 
that any new supplies available will be consumed at pithead plants. 
 The supply distance for Delhi and industrial regions in nearby states is 900 km (based 
on Delhi, Jaipur and Kanpur: incorporates much of Haryana and Eastern Rajasthan). 
 The supply distance for principal coastal locations in the South and West is 1,300 km 
(Mumbai and Chennai: excludes coasts of Kerala and Karnataka).  We use the same 
supply distance to most inland regions of Maharashtra and Gujarat as well as 
industrial regions North of Delhi.  The far Northern states are assumed to be 
supplied primarily by hydro power. 
 The supply distance for the far South West is in excess of 1,600 km – for calculation 




Table A3: Supply distances to key cities 
City State Populationa Mine Distance (km) 
Mumbai Maharashtra 12,478,447 Korba 1,340 
Delhi Capital Territory 11,007,835 Singrauli 914 
Bangalore Karnataka 8,425,970 Talcher 1,604 
Hyderabad Andhra Pradesh 6,809,970 Korba 999 
Ahmedabad Gujarat 5,570,585 Singrauli 1,269 
Chennai Tamil Nadu 4,681,087 Talcher 1,332 
Kolkata West Bengal 4,486,679 N. Karanpurab 358 
Surat Gujarat 4,462,002 Korba 1,235 
Pune Maharashtra 3,115,431 Korba 1,397 
Jaipur Rajasthan 3,073,350 Singrauli 974 
Kanpur Uttar Pradesh 2,767,031 Singrauli 481 
Bhopal Madhya Pradesh 1,795,648 Singrauli 659 
Ludhiana Punjab 1,613,878 Singrauli 1,201 
Nashik Maharashtra 1,486,973 Korba 1,158 
Aurangabad Maharashtra 1,171,300 Korba 1,173 
Notes:  (a) http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data_files/India2/Table_2_PR_Cities_1Lakh_and_Above.pdf 
              (b)  Nearest loading point seems to be Chainpur  
For an approximate indication of the boundaries of the supply regions, see Map 8.1.  For 
each supply region, we calculate average rail transport costs using freight rate tables 
(http://www.indianrailways.gov.in/railwayboard/view_section.jsp?lang=0&id=0,6,338) 
that are posted from time to time by Indian Railways.  We take no account of the use of 
coastal seafreight for long distance transport and make no attempt to estimate 





A1.3: Prices of Domestic coal 
We calculate the cost of pithead supplies based on CIL and SCCL prices posted on the 
two companies’ websites148  (pithead supplies in the South come partly from SCCL, 
which posts slightly higher prices for the same grade).   We use weighted averages of 
prices for E, F and G grades, weighting by output.  For CIL, We compute a weighted 
average price for each subsidiary and weight subsidiaries according to the expected 
increase in output during the XI Plan period. 
Add-on costs (handling charges, royalties and similar payments) included in the 
delivered cost of coal are complex.  A detailed breakdown is on the SCCL website, 
though it is not clear which cost components typically apply to supplies to thermal 
power stations.  CIL does not provide a similar breakdown.  In principle, we include all 
add-on costs that are likely to be paid by the average power station customer and that 
represent a charge for a service or use of a resource, meaning that we include royalties 
and forest-related charges but not excise, stowing excise or VAT.  For the purposes of 
the analysis we do not include crushing or screening charges, or any surface transport 
charge, but we do include loading charges shown in the CIL and SCCL price notices.  
Table A4 shows typical figures taken from the SCCL document (for an E grade r.o.m. coal 
– price sheet applies from August 1 2011). 
A1.4: Analysis of domestic coal 
In the absence of valid data on coal quality by plant, estimates for all locations are based 
on the specifications of coal sampled at Dadri power station by a team from Ohio State 
University149 and analyzed by NETL.  More details of the analysis are provided in a USAid 
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feasibility study on the potential for IGCCs in India.150  The Dadri sample is typical of 
grades supplied to thermal power stations in India, with high ash content (38.22%) and 
low sulfur (0.5%).  Energy content (Gross Calorific Value, or GCV) is 3692 kcal/kg.   
Table A4: Breakdown of SCCL price (INR/t) 
Charge Included Not Included 
Base Price 1,130  
Premium  339 
Fixed Royalty 70  
Variable Royalty 56.5  




Fuel Surcharge 48  
Clean Energy Cess 50  
Other  186.49a 
Total 1,381.5 542.44 
Note: (a) Stowing Excise Duty, Excise Duty and VAT.  The SCCL price breakdown shows 
surface transport charge and lifting charge as zero.  It shows a pre-weigh bin 
charge that we assume applies to road transport only. 
The Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests requires that coal with ash content no 
greater than 34% should be used in environmentally sensitive areas or where the 
distance from mine to power station is more than 1000 km.  Information provided by 
the CEA (Amarjeet Singh and A.K. Gupta) indicates that this regulation is observed but it 
is not entirely clear how – CIL has very limited washery capacity.  However we assume 
washed coal is supplied to all locations outside the pithead supply region (Delhi is just 
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under the I,000 km limit but is assumed to require washed coal because it is a major 
population center).  We assume that washed coal is blended with r.o.m. coal to give 
exactly 34% ash.  The cost of washing and the effects on coal analysis are estimated 
based on information provided by the CEA (A.K. Gupta).  It is standard international 
practice to burn washery rejects in a fluidized bed combustion (fbc) unit to generate 
electricity – it is unlikely that this is done in India.  Ideally, our calculations should take 
account of both emissions from the fbc (if it exists) and the value of the power 
generated, however we have no data on which to base a calculation. 
A1.5: Imported Coal 
For coastal plants only we look at the economics of using imported coal.  As of late 
2011, India imports coal mainly from Indonesia.  Much of our information on imports 
comes from Mr Arun Kumar of PTC Energy Ltd.151  There is currently (late 2011) 
significant uncertainty about grades imported due to a major change in Indonesia’s 
policy on export pricing: many project developers have negotiated electricity tariffs 
based on firm contracts for very low grade imported coal, which has historically been 
available at advantageous prices.  However, those low price contracts have been 
unilaterally repudiated by Indonesia and developers are exploring alternatives.  In the 
absence of better information, we use benchmark grade Indonesian steam coal as a 
reference for imported coal (GCV of 6322 kcal/kg). 
We make no attempt to forecast the delivered cost of imported coal.  Instead we rely on 
two scenarios that together cover the likely range of prices.  For a low price scenario we 
adopt the approach taken by the Mott McDonald report, which bases its forecasts on an 
estimated long run marginal cost (LRMC) for Australian coal of $40/ton fob (Mott 
McDonald, 2006).  The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2010 indicates that LRMC has 
increased by $10 due to factors such as congestion of rail routes to Australian ports that 
                                                     




are likely to be long term (IEA, 2010).  The opening up of mines in more remote areas 
such as Mongolia has probably also increased LRMC.   Our base case forecasts for 
imported coal assume a fob price for benchmark Indonesian coal of $50 per ton in 2009, 
constant in real terms.   
An alternative analysis – also for Australian coal – is provided in An Analysis of Steaming 
Coal Price Trends - see http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/159.pdf, which suggests 
that the cap on prices is set by the price that attracts US exports into the Pacific market 
(which is about $40 per ton).  If this is the case, any disruption of the Pacific basin 
market due to lower economic growth in key countries could seriously destabilize this 
market as growth in US shale gas production is increasingly pushing coal producers in 
the western US into export markets. 
Our high price scenario is the New Policies scenario from (IEA, 2011).  The coal price 
forecasts in this document are for average OECD import prices: historic prices in the IEA 
documents have averaged about 93% of the Indonesian benchmark price and adjust the 
forecasts accordingly. 
In both scenarios we apply a cost of freight, using an estimate of LRMC made by Mott 
McDonald for Panamax ships – past imports have been mainly in handysize vessels.  
Additional costs (port charges and local transport) are as advised by Arun Kumar.  As 
with domestic coal, we add royalties and other charges that relate to services or use of 
resources only – for example, we add clean energy cess but not import duty.  For both 
domestic and imported coal we ignore handling loss.   
A1.6: CO₂ emissions 
For domestic coal we use an emissions coefficient estimated by (Roy et al., 2009).  For 
imported coal we use the IPCC default figure.  We take no account of leakage effects 
such as emissions from mining.  We assume that each MWh generated by renewables 




generated by a coal fired plant.  Research by (Kaffine D et al., 2011) indicates that the 
error introduced by this simplifying assumption is likely to be small (see section 9.2.4). 
A2: CHINA – COAL FIRED PLANT 
A2.1: Plant costs and efficiency 
A draft report to the World Bank on renewable energy in China (Meier, 2003) contains a 
complete calculation of generation cost for certain regions of China for the year 2000.  
Our calculations are essentially an updated version of Meier’s, broadened to cover all 
important regions and adjusted to remove taxation effects. 
A 2006 IEA report notes that “the (Chinese) government encourages the construction of 
plants with a capacity of 600 MW or more” and “by the end of 2003, 83 plants with a 
capacity of 1,000 MW or more were in operation” (IEA, 2006).  Supercritical technology 
is the standard for new construction of coal-fired power stations with capacity greater 
than 600MW (http://www.worldcoal.org/pages/content/index.asp?PageID=421).  The 
IEA report Cleaner Coal in China notes that about 60% of all newbuilds in China are large 
supercritical units (IEA, 2009).  We use a 2X600 MW supercritical unit as a baseline.  
O&M costs and capital investment for this plant are given in a document issued by 
“Power Planning Design Institution” that is referenced in the PDDs for many Chinese 
projects.  Responsibility for this organization, which was formerly responsible for 
supervision of power plant construction, has been transferred to another Ministry.  We 
use data from an unpublished version of the same document (dated 2009) provided by 
John Romankiewicz of Bloomberg New Energy Finance. 
Capital cost is converted to an annualized capital charge rate using Stauffer’s 
spreadsheet - see (Stauffer, 2006).  Assumptions are taken from project PDDs: the debt 
interest rate is 10%; annual inflation is 2%; the tax rate is 33%; and the weighted 




Our figures for thermal efficiency of power plants are taken from The Future of Coal 
(MIT, 2007), which gives data for standardized conditions and for a plant burning Illinois 
No 6 coal.  The MIT document provides adjustment factors for different conditions and 
coal grades – in our calculations we use the MIT figures adjusted for generic Chinese 
coal and to a Gross output/GCV basis (the MIT figures are for net output).  We take 
account of the fact that all new Chinese coal fired power stations must be fitted with 
flue gas desulfurization – we assume that the FGD is actually operating, which is not 
always a certainty in China.  Capital and operating cost of FGD are taken from (You and 
Xu, 2010); parasitic power requirement from (MIT, 2007). We assume that the FGD 
sulfur removal efficiency is 85% - this is a rough average of removal rates in operational 
FGD projects in China, though new wet FGD units apparently achieve 95%. 
Sulfur removal affects operating cost not only through the direct cost of running the 
FGD but also because Chinese power stations pay a pollution charge for SO₂ emissions.  
We include this pollution charge in operating costs, based on figures for the charge per 
kg SO₂ emitted taken from (Xu, 2009).  No credit is given for the desulfurized electricity 
price premium also mentioned by Xu.   
Coal washing is increasingly used in China - the cost is invariably included in PDD 
baseline cost analyses.  You and Xu (2010) gives figures for the capital and operating 
costs of coal washing – we add these to coal costs, calculating the annualized capital 
charge for the washery using the same capital charge rate as a power plant.  Heat 
content of coal is adjusted for the loss in volume due to ash reduction.  As we base our 
calculations on the ash content of washed coal, we effectively give credit for the 
reduction in railfreight achieved by washing.  We take no account of either emissions or 
net revenues due to burning washery rejects. 





A2.2: Coal cost and quality 
Our analysis is based on all Chinese plants using Shanxi mixed coal with a GCV of 5000 
kcal/kg, which is a standard blend supplied to thermal power stations.  The China Energy 
Databook (http://china.lbl.gov/databook) indicates that coal from the state of Shanxi 
accounts for by far the largest proportion of coal transported across state boundaries.   
There have been a series of changes in recent years in the pricing of coal supplied to 
thermal power stations by Chinese mines.  Until 2007, coal mines used a dual pricing 
system: planned volumes were sold at low prices set by the national planning process 
while any production in excess of the plan quantity was sold at a freely negotiated price 
(usually referred to as in-plan and out of plan volumes).  Sagawa & Koizumi  (2007) show 
a breakdown of coal prices into in-plan and out of plan for years up to 2006 (Sagawa and 
Koizumi, 2007).  The China Energy Databook gives the weighted average as an average 
price for all major state-owned mines.   
After 2007 coal prices were liberalized – in practice the price became a weighted 
average of spot-based pithead prices and negotiated long term contract prices.  Data for 
these years are unobtainable – our estimates are based on the following assumptions: 
 We estimate weightings based on news sources including China Coal Monthly, 
Sinocast, Interfax, Coal World, China Coal Newsletter and China Coal Report.   
 Contract prices for 2008 and 2009 are given in the same publications: for 2007 we 
take the in-plan / out of plan differential from Sagawa & Koizumi and apply it as if 
the contract price in that year is the in-plan price. 
 Spot-based prices are based on FOR (free on rail) spot prices at Qinhuangdao (the 
key coal port) taken from the sources mentioned above and netted back to the mine 
using rail freight rates from Meier (2003) adjusted for inflation.   
Meier’s figures for delivered cost of coal to locations in Hunan (Central China) and 




adjust these figures using information on rate changes from the news sources 
mentioned above and generate freight costs for locations not included in Meier’s 
calculations by assuming that they are proportional to distance.  Judging by numerous 
news items, sea freight seems to have remained roughly constant over the period with a 
peak in 2007 followed by a decline (supplies to South China and much of East China are 
assumed to go by sea from Qinhuangdou).  The sea freight rate doubled at the end of 
2009, but this is outside the period of the analysis. 
A3: RENEWABLE GENERATION 
Cost and efficiency data for renewable generation projects in both India and China are 
taken from project PDDs.  The only important assumptions that have to be made are 
those necessary to convert capital cost into an annual capital charge, and the estimation 
of costs of intermittency. 
The annual capital charge is estimated using Stauffer’s model.  Key assumptions are: 
 For China we used a 40 year plant life for all technologies: for India, the assumed 
plant lives are 25 years for wind and 50 years for hydro. 
 Financial assumptions for India are based on levels permitted by CERC unless there is 
a reason to prefer a different figure –some regulatory parameters seem generous.  
The debt ratio (debt to debt plus equity) for renewable energy projects is taken as 
70%; debt interest rate is 13% (rate permitted under CERC tariff regulations); tax 
rate is 34%; WACC is 15.6% - this is the rate permitted by CERC, taking account of a 
tax holiday offered by the Indian government as an incentive for investment in 
renewable energy.   
 For China, debt ratio is taken as 50%; tax rate is 33%; interest on debt is 10%; 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is estimated by taking the assumption for 
coal fired plants (8% WACC and 70% debt ratio) and re-estimating WACC for the 50% 




exception of the lower debt ratio for renewables, all parameters are as allowed by 
the Chinese government (according to several PDDs). 
The cost to grid operators of wind (and solar) intermittency can only be established by 
means of a complex simulation exercise for the whole transmission grid.  So far as we 
are aware, no such exercise has been undertaken in any developing country.  A review 
of fifteen European and US studies (Holttinen et al., 2009) shows that integration costs 
per MWh increase with the proportion of supply to the grid contributed by wind, though 
no simple relationship is apparent.  Many of the fifteen studies focus on the impact on 
costs of high levels of wind contribution to total generation – in several cases they show 
the impact for a range of contribution levels above 10%.  For India as a whole, the 
contribution level in 2009 was 2% (IEA, 2011): by extrapolating curves of cost vs wind 
contribution given in Holttinen et al back to 5% we obtain a median cost impact of about 





Abbreviations and Acronyms 
The large infrastructure of organizations, treaties, emissions trading schemes and offset 
schemes that has developed since the creation of the IPCC in 1988 has given rise to a 
long list of abbreviations and acronyms - it is sometimes hard to believe that these 
strings of letters are not deliberately designed to confuse outsiders.  I provide below a 
partial list of abbreviations and acronyms used in the document.   
AAU Assigned Amount Unit: Kyoto emissions caps are set in AAUs.  Can be traded. 
(section 2.2) 
BOCM Bilateral Offset Crediting Mechanism: a NMM scheme proposed by Japan. 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism. (section 2.3.1) 
CER Certified Emission Reduction: certifies that a CDM project has cut emissions by 1 
ton.  Can be traded. (section 2.2) 
COP Conference of the Parties (signatories of the UNFCCC).  COP/MOP (or CMP) means 
a COP that is also a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  COPs are held 
annually in December and are numbered: for example, the Copenhagen 
conference in 2009 was COP15. 
CPA CDM Program Activity (section 3.2.8) 
DNA Designated National Authority – authorizes CDM projects (section 2.3.1) 
DOE Designated Operational Entity – specialized consultant that verifies CDM projects 
(section 3.1.2) 
EB The Executive Board – decision making body of the CDM (section 3.1.2) 
ERU Emission Reduction Unit: certifies that a JI project has cut emissions by 1 ton.  Can 
be traded. (section 2.2) 
EU ETS The European Emission Trading Scheme (section 2.2.2) 
EUA Emissions permit in the EU ETS (section 2.2.2) 
GCF Green Climate Fund (section 2.6) 
GCV Gross Calorific Value: a measure of the energy content of a fuel 
GEF Global Environment Facility (section 2.7) 
GHG Greenhouse gases 
GIS Green Investment Scheme (section 2.4) 
ICE Intercontinental Exchange: a group of (mainly) commodities markets.  Owns ICE 





IEA The International Energy Agency 
IPCC The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – (section 2.1) 
JI Joint Implementation – a carbon offsets scheme (section 2.3.2) 
JVETS Japanese Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (section 2.2.3) 
KC Kyoto Credit – generic term for offsets created by the Kyoto Protocol – primarily 
CERs and ERUs 
LCOE Levelized Cost of Electricity (section 4.2.3) 
LRMC Long run marginal cost: the cost of increasing output by one unit after 
manufacturers and associated markets (e.g. labor, materials) have adjusted to 
changes in the product market  
LULUCF Land use, land use change and forestry (section 2.3) 
MAC Marginal abatement cost: the cost of reducing emissions (of any pollutant) by one 
unit 
MRV Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
MW MegaWatt (106 Watts): a unit of generation capacity.  GW (GigaWatt) = 109 Watts 
and TW (TeraWatt) = 1012 Watts 
MWh MegaWatt hours: a unit of power generated. 
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (section 2.5) 
NGCC Natural gas combined cycle: a highly efficient type of natural gas fuelled 
generation unit 
NMM New Market Mechanism (section 3.3) 
NZU New Zealand Unit – emissions permit in the New Zealand cap & trade scheme. 
OTC Over the counter: off-exchange market for customized securities 
PCF Prototype Carbon Fund (section 2.3.1) 
PDD Project Design Document (section 3.1.2) 
PoA Program of Activities (section 3.2.8) 
PV Photovoltaic: Solar PV is a type of solar generation technology 
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation – a UN-sponsored 
program to generate offsets.  REDD+ is similar but places more emphasis on 
conservation 
RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Emissions Trading Scheme set up by States in 
the North East of the US.  (section 2.2.3) 




by a carbon sink (typically a forest).  Not eligible for the EU ETS and therefore 
rarely seen. 
SA Sectoral Agreement 
SCM Sectoral Crediting Mechanism: NMM based on emissions targets for whole 
sectors, not individual projects – a type of SA. 
UNEP United Nations Environment Program 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (section 2.1) 
VCS Verified Carbon Standard – body that assesses voluntary mitigation projects 
(section 2.2.3) 
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